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ABSTRACT
Learning theory  i s  employed as a  model fo r  th ree  research  
areas of management; (a) job redesign , (h) the Hawthorns s tu d ie s , 
and (c) a t t i tu d e  form ation and change toward labo r unions. 
Analogies are drawn between learn ing  th e o re tic a l  v a riab les  
and v ariab les  in  each of the  th ree  research  areas. Based on 
these  analogies, a  la rg e  number of p red ic tio n s  are  deduced. 
Learning theory i s  a lso  shown to  be capable of explaining a 
la rg e  portion  of the  resp ec tiv e  l i te z a tu re s  in  these  d is t in c t  
research  areas. The broader th e o re tic a l functions o f research  
in te g ra tio n  and research  guidance are  demonstrated by the  use of 
an a e s th e tic  th e o re tic a l  to o l employed in  a  highly fu n c tio n a l 
th e o re tic a l  technique.
EXTENSIONS OF NEO-HULLIAN LEARNING THEORY 
TO SELECTED AREAS OF MANAGEMENT
CHAPTER I  
INTRODUCTION
The purpose o f t h i s  paper i s  to  demonstrate th a t Neo-Hulliaji 
learn ing  theory ( e .g . , Capaldi, in  p re ss ; H ull, l9^3i M ille r,
I 97I ;  Spence, 1956; Rescorla & Wagner, 1972) can he a  f r u i t f u l  
to o l fo r  theory and research  in  management. Learning theory 
has been boldly extended to  sev era l in te re s tin g  areas beyond 
those fo r  which i t  was o r ig in a lly  intended ( e .g . , a t t i tu d e  
formation and change : see L ott & L o tt, I 968, 1972; McGuire,
1957; Razran, I 938; S ta a ts , 1975; Weiss, I 962, I 968; altru ism s 
see Weiss, Boyer, Lombardo, & S tich , 1973; Weiss, Buchanan, 
A l t s ta t t ,  & Lombardo, I 98O; com petition: see S te ig led er, Weiss, 
B alling , Wenninger, & Lombardo, I 98O; S te ig led e r, Weiss, Cramer,
& Feinberg, 1978; conformity: see Seybert & Weiss, 1972;
defection  from so c ia l movements: see Weiss, I 963; so c ia l
f a c i l i t a t io n :  see C o ttre l l ,  I 968 ; Weiss & M ille r, I 97I ;  Zajonc, 
I 965) . These and o ther successfu l ap p lica tions o f learn ing  theory 
to  so c ia lly  re lev an t to p ics  have amply demonstrated the breadth
and f le x ib i l i ty  of a  powerful th e o re tic a l instrum ent which can 
e leg an tly  p red ic t and explain ind iv id u a l and so c ia l behavior 
in  a  wide v arie ty  of s e tt in g s . These p a s t accomplishments of 
learn in g  theory encourage i t s  use in  management, where an 
a r t ic u la te d  theory capable of p red ic tin g  and explaining the 
behavior of ind iv iduals in  the worIq)lace i s  so re ly  needed (Pugh, 
I 966; S c o tt, I 96I ) .
To date , severa l theo ries  have been developed and used in  
research  in  management. For example, expectancy theory of work 
and m otivation (Vroom, 196^) has been applied  to  leadersh ip  
(House, 1971)1 turnover and absenteeism (P o rte r & S tee rs , 1973)i 
so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  (P e rr is , Beehr, & Gilmore, 1978), and job 
design (Aldag & B rie f , 1979} Lawler, I 969) , While expectancy 
theory has been ex tensively  employed, c r i t i c s  claim th a t  not only 
are  the conceptual p ro p e rtie s  of the  theory fa u lty , bu t a lso  the 
ap p lica tio n s  of the  theory in  research  have been defective  (see, 
e .g . ,  Heneman & Schwab, 1972? M itchell, l9 7 ^ )« In  add ition , 
the  theory’s range of a p p lic a b ili ty  has been c ite d  as being 
r e s t r ic t iv e  (Mayes, 1978). Many have concluded th a t th e  theory 
i t s e l f  i s  inadequate and in  need of replacement ( e .g . ,  Hom, 1979? 
House, Shapiro, & Wahba, 197^? Kennedy, I 98O).
I t  i s  not the purpose of the  p resen t paper to  argue the 
m erits of learn ing  theory over o ther th eo rie s  th a t  have been 
employed in  management. In s tead , by demonstrating the f l e x ib i l i ty ,  
p rec is io n , breadth, and elegance of learn ing  theory, readers can
witness fo r  themselves i t s  unique advantages fo r  research  in  
management.
Learning theory has been p a r t ia l ly  employed in  management; 
however, f u l l  r e a liz a tio n  of learn ing  th eo ry 's  breadth  has not 
occurred to  d a te . Learning theory encompasses numerous d iverse  
paradigms. For example, avoidance conditioning, c la s s ic a l  
defense conditioning, c la s s ic a l  reward conditioning, instrum ental 
escape conditioning, instrum ental reward conditioning, punishment, 
and se le c tiv e  learn in g  a l l  d i f f e r  and have th e i r  resp ec tiv e , 
th e o re tic a lly  derived laws. The p a st emphasis in  management on 
the  ap p lica tio n  of operant p rin c ip le s  would appear to  be unnec­
e s s a r i ly  lim itin g  (c f ,  Davis & Luthans, I 98O), The present paper 
w ill  demonstrate th a t  a  broader u t i l iz a t io n  of learn in g  th e o re tic a l 
p r in c ip le s  and paradigms could prove extremely f r u i t f u l  fo r  the  
advancement of research  in  management.
Method
Technique of Theory Construction
In  extending learn ing  th e o re tic a l p rin c ip le s  and paradigms 
to  se lec ted  research  areas in  management, use w il l  be made of 
substan tive  modeling as a  technique of theory construction  
(see , e .g . ,  Brodbeck, 1959» Campbell, I 92O; Evans, 1973» Lachman, 
I 96O; Oppenheimer, I 956; Weiss, I 98O). In  substan tive  modeling, 
a  body of knowledge containing fa c tu a lly  estab lish ed  laws which 
a re  in teg ra ted  by a common th e o re tic a l network i s  extended v ia  
analogy to  an a rea  which i s  r e la t iv e ly  d e fic ie n t in  the organized
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and em pirical character of i t s  knowledge. The extension "by 
analogy of v a riab les  in  th e  s c ie n t ia l  model to  a  research  a rea  
can perm it the  discovery of sev era l in tr ig u in g  new v a riab les , 
the  p red ic tio n  of numerous unique re la tio n sh ip s , and the  explana­
t io n  of e x is tin g  laws.
A "d ic tio n ary  of analogies" o r  " ru le s  of correspondence" i s  
employed in  substan tive  modeling. The researcher u t i l iz e s  th is  
to o l in  form ulating and presen ting  th e  analogies drawn between 
the model and the  research  a rea . The v ariab les  of the  model 
a re  re la te d  in d iv id u a lly  to  sp ec ified  v ariab les  in  the  research  
a rea . These analogies then  function  to  perm it th e  researcher 
to  generate p red ic tiv e  o r explanatory laws fo r  the  research  a rea .
Once th e  v a riab les  of the model have been re la te d  v ia  analogy 
to  v a riab les  in  the  research  area, a l l  th e  re la tio n sh ip s  and laws 
known to  e x is t  fo r  the variab les  o f the  model a re  p red ic ted  fo r  
th e  analogous variab les  in  the  research  a rea  w ithout any fu r th e r  
assumptions being requ ired . These p red ic tio n s  can then be 
em pirica lly  sc ru tin iz ed  to  see i f  they  hold as laws fo r  the  
resea rch  a rea .
I t  can be seen th a t  in  se le c tin g  a  model, one which has 
experim entally v e r if ie d , th e o re tic a lly  organized laws would be 
p re fe rab le  to  a  model w ithout such an advanced s ta te  of knowledge. 
This i s  the  prim ary advantage of u t i l iz in g  learn ing  th e o re tic a l 
p r in c ip le s  as a  model; the  laws in  learn in g  are em pirically  
estab lish ed  and organized by theoiry. Another advantage i s  th a t
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fo r  th is  hody of knowledge many of the complex in te rre la tio n sh ip s  
a re  estab lish ed —a t  le a s t  fo r  v a riab les  taken two or th ree  a t  a 
tim e.
The p resen t paper w ill  employ learn in g  theory  as a  model 
fo r  th ree  areas of managements (a) job redesign , p a r t ic u la r ly  
job enrichment; (b) the  Hawthorne s tu d ie s ; and (c) a t t i tu d e  
formation and change toward la b o r unions. In  th ese  extensions, 
the  le a rn in g  th e o re tic a l laws and p rin c ip le s  e s tab lish ed  fo r  
ind iv id u a l and so c ia l  behavior w il l  be employed. This e n ta i ls  
the  inc lu sio n  of numerous, q u a n tita tiv e ly  rigo rous laws (both 
main and in te ra c tio n  e ffe c ts  sp ec ified ) in  a  wide v a rie ty  of 
paradigm atic s i tu a tio n s . In  the  p resen t ap p lica tio n s  of learn ing  
theory to  se lec ted  areas of management, use w il l  be made of th is  
w ealth of learn in g  th e o re tic a l  p r in c ip le s  and paradigms. This 
w ill  be p a r t ic u la r ly  evident fo r  both job redesign  and a tt i tu d e  
form ation and change toward lab o r unions. The landmark stud ies 
undertaken a t  the  Hawthorne p la n t of the  Western E le c tr ic  Company, 
lAiile h is to r ic a l ,  a re  o f continuing in te r e s t  in  sev era l f ie ld s .  
Therefore, the  ap p lica tio n  of learn in g  theory  to  the  Hawthorne 
s tu d ie s  w ill  e n ta i l  a  d e ta iled  explanation o f some of the re s u lts  
found in  th is  c la s s ic  p iece of resea rch . In  a t t i tu d e  formation 
and change toward lab o r unions and in  job redesign , learn ing  
theory  w ill  be app lied  to  no t only explain e x is tin g  d a ta , but 
a lso  to  a ffo rd  some in tr ig u in g , here to fo re  unexamined, p red ic tio n s .
Analogy versus Reductionism. The use of suhstajitive modeling 
as a  th e o re tic a l  techniq.ue does not e n ta i l  a  commitment to  any 
ph ilosoph ical viewpoint such as reductionism . There i s  nothing 
in h eren t in  the p resen t use of substan tive  modeling which im plies 
th a t  management must in ev itab ly  be "reduced" to  learn in g , nor 
i s  such a p o s itio n  im p lic itly  adhered to .  Rather, the sp ec ific  
model applied  to  a  given research  area and substan tive  modeling 
as a  general th e o re tic a l  technique are  so le ly  employed fo r  
fu n c tio n a l purposes ; th a t  i s ,  the model can be u se fu l in  in te g ra tin g , 
organizing, and guiding a  research  area in  need of in te g ra tio n , 
o rganization , and guidance. I f  a  theory in  management was a t  a  
s u f f ic ie n tly  advanced stage so th a t  i t  contained a la rg e  amount 
o f organized, coherent knowledge, i t  could be used a model to  
a s s i s t  another a rea  about which there  was an in s u ff ic ie n t under­
stand ing . U nfortunately, however, t h i s  s ta te  of a f f a i r s  has 
no t y e t been re a liz e d  in  many f ie ld s  of management o r psychology.
In  co n tra s t, lea rn in g  theory does enjoy, to  some degree, th is  
considerable w ealth of in teg ra ted , organized knowledge, maMng 
i t  an a t t r a c t iv e  model fo r  the p resent functional.pu rposes,
• The Law of E f fe c t. An em pirical law of e f fe c t  po sitio n  
i s  u t i l iz e d  throughout th is  paper. Vroom, in  h is  well-known 
book Work and m otivation (196^ ) , observed;
Without a  doubt the law of e ffe c t o r p rin c ip le  of 
reinforcem ent must be included among the most 
su b s ta n tia l find ings of experimental psychology 
and i s  a t  the  same time among the most u sefu l 
findings fo r  an applied psychology concerned 
with the con tro l of human behavior, (p . I 3 )
While the emphasis of the  p resen t paper i s  in  p red ic tin g  and 
explaining ra th e r  than co n tro llin g  behavior, the law of e f fe c t ,  
which has been exceedingly u sefu l in  p a s t research  and theory, 
could continue to  be of serv ice  in  extensions of learn ing  theory 
to  management.
I t  has been p red ic ted  and firm ly  estab lish ed  " th a t the 
prompt reduction  in  the  s tren g th  of a  strong drive stim ulus 
a c ts  as a  reinforcem ent" (DoUard & M ille r, 1950, p . 4o). This 
perm its a  researcher to  spec ify  a  p r io r i  those s tim u li which 
w ill  function  as re in fo rc e rs  w ithout implying th a t  a l l  re in fo rce rs  
must operate in  th is  manner (DoUard & M ille r, 1950} M ille r, 1959) « 
T heoretical p red ic tions of in te r e s t  in  management can be made 
by using an em pirical law of e f fe c t  in  add ition  to  the  preceding 
conceptualization  which sp e c if ie s  in  advance those events which 
w ill  function  as re in fo rc e rs .
CHAPTER I I
A LEARNIMG THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OF JOB REDESIGN 
In troduction
O rganizational development techniques involving m odifications 
of jo ts ,  making them "enriched" o r "enlarged", are  becoming 
inc reasin g ly  u t i l iz e d  and researched  in  the workplace (F riedlander 
& Brown, l97^)* Enriched jobs a re  those which have been redesigned 
so th a t  the  employee's new ta sk  includes more re sp o n s ib il ity , 
autonomy, and complexity—expansion of the jo b 's  " v e r t ic a l  dimension" 
(Hackman, 1977» Herzberg, I 968) ,  Job enlargement genera lly  i s  
characterized  by a  wider v a rie ty  o f tasks performed—expansion of 
the  jo b 's  "ho rizon ta l dimension" (Herzberg, I 968) ,  Herzberg 
noted th a t  job enlargement i s  an o lder term connoting a  change 
only in  the  s tru c tu ra l  breadth of a  job (c f . Lawler, I 969) .
However, the two terms have a t  times been used interchangeably 
in  the l i te r a tu r e  (see , e .g . .  Bishop & H il l ,  I 97I ) .
U nfortunately, many job redesign  programs are disbanded 
because they do not produce the intended e ffe c ts  on performance 
(Hackman, 1975&; l975t>> Passmore, 1979) » That i s ,  performance 
does no t in ev itab ly  r i s e  and top management becomes d is illu s io n ed  
with the program and discontinues i t .  Hackman (1975^)» fo r  example.
observed th a t " job enrichment i s  f a i l in g  a t  le a s t  as often  as 
i t  i s  succeeding" (p . 98) ,
The ap p lica tio n  of learn in g  theory to  job redesign permits 
a  g u ite  d e ta iled  explanation of some of the  reasons fo r  these 
programs not producing the an tic ip a te d  increments in  performance. 
An enriched ta sk  the employee i s  asked to  engage in  i s  defined 
as being more complex and challenging than previous tasks 
encountered. In  ad d itio n , th e re  a re  sev era l p o te n tia l sources 
of d riv e  in  the work environment. These sources of drive may be 
a lready  e x is te n t p r io r  to  implementing the  new program or the 
program i t s e l f  may in troduce new sources of drive in to  the 
workplace. In  learn in g  theory, the th e o re tic a l constructs drive 
and h a b it s tren g th  combine m u tlip lic a tiv e ly  to  determine response 
s tre n g th  (e x c ita to ry  p o te n t ia l ) . An employee switched to  a  
novel, complex, "enriched" ta sk  could th e o re tic a lly  have a  h ab it 
h ierarchy  with dominant responses th a t  are  in c o rre c t. Since 
any increases in  drive w il l  energize these  dominant in co rrec t 
responses, q u an tity  and q u a lity  of performance w ill  probably both 
su f fe r  when one or more sources of d rive  a re  p resen t. Proponents 
of job enrichment have cautioned th a t these  r e s u l ts ,  p red ic ted  
by learn in g  theory , may, in  f a c t ,  occur. For example, Herzberg 
( I 968) warned implementers of job enrichment to  "be prepared 
fo r  a  drop in  performance in  the  experimental group [those with 
enriched jobs] the f i r s t  few weeks" (p. 62) .  In  ad d itio n , the 
observations th a t  o rgan izational change involving job redesign
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ty p ic a lly  r e s u lts  in  "short-term  lowered performance" (F ried lander 
& Brown, l97^) o r a  "temporary drop in  p roductiv ity" (Rush, l9 7 l) 
in d ic a te  th a t  the  reductions in  q u an tity , a t  l e a s t ,  have been 
observed. Rush fu r th e r  sp ec if ie d  th a t  "most s tu d ie s  on job 
design and management experience in  using i t  fo r  m otivation 
in d ic a te  th a t  a  drop in  p ro d u c tiv ity  soon re s u l ts  sh o rtly  a f te r  
job changes are  introduced" (p . 21). Such ca re fu l observations 
concerning performance a re  p red ic ted  by a  learn in g  th e o re tic a l 
account of job redesign . I f  some source of d riv e  i s  e x is te n t 
when a job change program i s  implemented, then reductions in  
performance w ill  l ik e ly  be observed w ith the novel, complex ta sk . 
Q uality  a lso  has been shown to  be d e trim en ta lly  a ffec ted  
when jobs are  redesigned or changed. Learning theory  p red ic ts  
many of the  re s u l ts  found in  a  unique experiment concerning job 
redesign . Bishop and H i l l  ( I 9 7 I )  compared the  e f fe c ts  of job 
enlargement—defined as a  change to  a  wider v a r ie ty  of tasks 
and increases in  re sp o n s ib il i ty , job change—in  which the  ta s k 's  
content changed w ithout any increases in  re sp o n s ib il ity  o r number 
of ta sk s  performed, and a  con tro l condition—in  which the ta sk  
was no t manipulated. The re s u l ts  o f th is  study demonstrated 
th a t  job enlargement and job change conditions re su lte d  in  
s ig n if ic a n tly  lower q u a lity  (more e rro rs )  than the  con tro l 
condition . A dditionally , the  job enlargement su b jec ts  made 
s ig n if ic a n tly  more e rro rs  than su b jec ts  vriio only experienced 
a  change in  jobs. Bishop and H il l  attem pted to  explain  th e i r
1 n
re s u l ts  v ia  a  "double Hawthorne e ffec t"  in  which job enlargement 
and job change subjects f e l t  "special" while con tro l sub jec ts 
had "cause fo r  disappointm ent". However, they a lso  ind ica ted  
th a t :
The data  on q u a lity  seem confounded with ta sk  
complexity and make in te rp re ta tio n  questionable.
This i s  i l lu s t r a te d  by the dramatic decrement in  
q u a lity  th a t occurred under the job enlargement 
condition and the f a c t  th a t  the  two le v e ls  of 
ta sk  complexity (job  enlargement and job change) 
were found to  show a re la tio n sh ip  to  e rro r 
frequency, (pp. 179- 180)
The presen t learn ing  th e o re tic a l  in te rp re ta tio n  of job redesign
parsim oniously explains Bishop and H i l l 's  r e s u l ts .  I f ,  as i t
seems from th e i r  d esc rip tio n , the job enlargement sub jects
encountered a  more complex ta sk  in  comparison to  job change and
con tro l su b jec ts , then e rro rs  were energized with a re su ltin g
decrease in  q u a lity . The g re a te r  ta sk  complexity fo r  both job
enlargement and job change workers in  comparison to  the con tro l
condition would a lso  be p red ic ted  to  r e s u l t  in  d e fic ien c ies
in  q u a lity  as was found in  th is  study.^
In  addition  to  having a general energizing e f fe c t  on h a b it,
two o ther p ro p ertie s  a re  a lso  a ttr ib u te d  to  drive by learn in g
theory: (a) the  sudden onset of d rive punishes a  contingent
response; and (b) the prompt reduction of drive re in fo rces  a
contingent response ( e .g . , Brown, 1953î Logan, l959i Lombardo,
Libkuman, & Weiss, 1972; Spence, l9 5 ^ )« These add itiona l
p ro p ertie s  o f d rive  w ill a lso  be employed and extended in  the
presen t learn ing  th e o re tic a l analy sis  of job redesign . Some of
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the sources of drive which might be e x is te n t in  the work environment 
w ill  be sp ec ified  in  th is  an a ly s is . P a r tic u la r  a tte n tio n  w ill  be 
given to  those s itu a tio n s  in  which the  sources of d rive  may be 
unique to  a  job redesign program. I t  should, be noted, however, 
th a t  many sources of d rive  can be p resen t in  the  workplace 
independent of the in troduction  of a  job redesign program (see, 
e .g . ,  Meglino, I 976) . Thus, undesirable responses (o r desirab le  
ones) may already  occur which lead  to  the o ff se t  of the  source 
of d riv e . A lte rn a tiv e ly , desirab le  responses (o r undesirable 
ones) may be punished by i t s  onset; o r, in  general, h ab its  w ill  
be energized by the presence of a  source of d rive  in  the work 
environment. However, novel problems can emerge w ith the 
in troduction  of a job redesign program even i f  a  source of d rive  
i s  n o t unique to  the program since the  dominant responses of the 
employee may be those the organization would no t wish to  have 
energized. For example, e rro rs  may be rampant, old h ab its  can 
compete w ith learn ing  and performing a  new procedure, a  low 
ra te  or speed of p ro d u c tiv ity  may p re v a il, perhaps even d is s a t is ­
fac tio n  or f ru s tra t io n  may occur (although d is sa tis fa c t io n  and 
f ru s tra tio n  might be caused by the previous responses, c f . 
Cherrington, R eitz , & S co tt, l9? l)*
The following observation by Rush ( I 97I )  concerning the 
c r i t i c a l  fa c to rs  fo r  job red esig n 's  success w ill  be shown in  
the  succeeding pages as being compatible w ith, and more under­
standable from a  learn ing  th e o re tic a l perspective :
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Whether job design has any m otivational impact on 
th e  worker may depend upon a number of fa c to rs  th a t  
re la te  to  the  character of the work performed and 
the  clim ate of the o rgan ization , as w ell as the 
nature  of the p e rso n a lit ie s  and the m otivations 
o f the work force* (p . 9)
The p resen t th e o re tic a l a n a lj^ is  w il l  examine some of these
fa c to rs  in  f a r  g re a te r  d e ta i l  than most previous in v estig a to rs
have attem pted, perm itting  the  explanation and p red ic tio n  of
numerous re la tio n sh ip s  in  the f i e ld  of job redesign .
S ocia l F a c il i ta t io n  
One area  of so c ia l psychology th a t has enjoyed th e o re tic a l 
in te g ra tio n  v ia  the extension of learn in g  theory i s  th a t  area 
designated as " so c ia l f a c i l i t a t io n ” ( e .g . ,  Zajonc, I 965» C o ttre ll ,  
1968; C o ttre ll ,  R i t t le ,  & Wacfc, I 967; C o ttr e l l ,  Wack, Sekerak,
& R i t t l e ,  1968; Weiss & M ille r, 197^)» In  th e i r  review of the 
l i te r a tu r e  concerning so c ia l f a c i l i t a t io n ,  Geen and Gange (1977) 
ind ica ted  th a t "d rive  theory  remains the  most parsimonious 
[theory] fo r  explaining both increments and decrements in  
performance in  terms of a  s in g le  s e t  of constructs" (p . 1268) .  
S oc ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  has been considered by many in v estig a to rs  to  
be th e  fundamental a rea  o f so c ia l  psychology (Zajonc, I 9651 
Weiss & M ille r, I 97I ) « As such, so c ia l f a c i l i t a t io n  could a lso  
be e s s e n tia l  to  the  study of o rgan izational behavior, as could 
the  complete extension of the d rive  theory of so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  
(Weiss & M iller, I 97I ) .  Weiss and M ille r extended Zajonc®s 
o rig in a l conceptualization o f audience e f fe c ts  on learn in g  and
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performance to  take advantage of the numerous learn ing  paradigms 
and laws.
The drive  theory of so c ia l f a c i l i t a t io n  could be s ig n if ic a n t
f o r  numerous areas of o rgan izational behavior. Most of the work
accomplished in  organizations i s  performed in  the  presence of
o th e rs . In  some s itu a tio n s , these "o thers" a re  peers ("co ac to rs"),
while o ther conditions have employees engaging in  ta sk s  îd.th
superio rs p resen t, CottzreU 's ( I 968) m odification of Zajonc's
(1965) theory sp ec ified  th a t the  d rive  induced by observation
was s o c ia lly  leeimed and th a t  i t  was prompted by an evaluative
stance taken by the  observer, C o t t r e l l 's  th e o re tic a l  m odification
could a s s i s t  researchers  in  d iscrim ina ting  the  e ffe c ts  of
evaluative and non-evaluative audiences on work behavior. In
ad d ition , Zajonc's own d is tin c tio n  between learn ing  and performance
could have im portant p ra c tic a l  im plications fo r  o rgan izational
behavior. Meglino ( I 976) ,  fo r  example, noted the e f fe c ts  of
evaluative  o rgan izational clim ates fo r  s itu a tio n s  involving
poorly learned  ta sk s :
S itu a tio n s  where employees: a re  disadvantaged,
lack  appropriate  experience, perform complex or 
h ighly  v a riab le  jobs, have re c en tly  completed a  
tra in in g  program, a re  newly h ired  or promoted, 
e t c . ,  a re  o ften  characterized  by jobs or tasks 
which are  poorly learned , (p, 60)
Meglino fu r th e r  sp ec ified  some elements o f the workplace which
may c rea te  a  h ighly evaluative o rgan izational clim ate:
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Facto rs such as closeness o f supervision, rewards 
o r punishments based upon performance, the 
presence of d ead lines, the  presence of competition 
among employees, the absence of consideration and 
support, e tc . ,  a l l  may con tribu te  to  an employee's 
perception  th a t  h is  or her perfom ance i s  being 
h igh ly  evaluated, (p . 6o)
By ch arac te riz in g  o rgan izational clim ates on an evaluative 
dimension and by d if fe re n tia tin g  task s  on degree of complexity, 
Meglino was able to  reso lve  p a st d iscrepancies in  the o rgan isational 
clim ate l i te r a tu r e  and generate some usefu l p ra c tic a l  and th e o re ti­
c a l in s ig h ts . An in ten s iv e  extension of the d rive theory of 
so c ia l f a c i l i t a t io n  could be th e o re tic a lly  valuable fo r  research 
in  o rgan izational behavior, p a r t ic u la r ly  fo r  job redesign .
One th e s is  of the  p resen t an a ly sis  i s  th a t  so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  
can occur, in  c e r ta in  circum stances, v ia  the in s ta l la t io n  of a  
job redesign  program. Researchers of o rgan izational development 
techniques ( e .g . ,  Campbell & Dunnette, I 968; F ried lander & Brown, 
1974; Huse, 1975) s t r e s s  the use of c a re fu l, system atic evaluations 
o f  perfozmance throughout an o rgan izational development p ro je c t 's  
l i f e .  Such evaluation i s  a lso  s p e c if ic a lly  prescribed  when 
implementing job enrichment ( e .g . , Aldag & B rie f, 1979; Hackman, 
1975a, 1975b; Herzberg, I 968; Rush, I 97I ) .  These conditions can 
comply with the  necessary conditions fo r  producing so c ia l 
f a c i l i t a t io n .  (A ctually  d e b il i ta t io n  of responding would be 
p red ic ted  to  occur in  th is  case. The term so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  
i s  used in  the  l i t e r a tu r e  to  describe both increments and decrements 
in  responding re su ltin g  from evaluative  observation .) Observation
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i s  often  associated  p rim arily  with the i n i t i a l  s tages o f an 
o rgan izational development program. I f  the harsh evaluation i s  
discontinued, then the d rive  induced by the presence of others 
would no longer be a  re lev an t fa c to r . Thus, any previously 
exhibited  decrements in  performance of increments in  e rro rs  should 
no longer occur.
Learning Paradigms 
When an organ izational development program such as job 
enrichment i s  implemented, i t  i s  d esirab le  to  examine the e ffe c ts  
o f the  new p ro jec t on employee behavior. I f  th e  e ffe c ts  of the 
program are  no t c le a r ly  separa te  from the e ffe c ts  of so c ia l 
f a c i l i t a t io n ,  then increments o r decrements in  performance are 
no t as re l ia b le  as would be desired . In  ad d itio n , so c ia l 
f a c i l i t a t io n  in  f ie ld  se tt in g s  such as the workplace i s  a  worthy 
a rea  of inqu iry  in  i t s  own r ig h t ,  A f u l l  extension o f a  wide 
v a rie ty  of learn ing  th e o re tic a l  p r in c ip le s  can con tribu te  su b s ta n tia l 
richness to  such an inqu iry  and guide fu tu re  in v e s tig a tio n s . 
C lass ica l Conditioning
The presence of o thers has been shown to  possess the  
fun c tio n a l c h ra c te r is t ic s  of aversive d rives (Geen & Gange, 1977» 
Weiss & M ille r, l97l)> In such a form ulation, the d rive  p roperties  
induced by a  severe evaluation can be assoc ia ted  with cues 
functioning as conditioned s tim u li. The sim plest case of a 
conditioned stim ulus i s  when i t  i s  considered as an o r ig in a lly  
n eu tra l cue.
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A v a rie ty  of p o te n tia lly  in te re s tin g  conditioned stim ulus 
analogs can be hypothesized fo r  the  workplace. In  job redesign , 
the  ind iv id u a l re fe rre d  to  as the  "change agent" or consultan t 
(the ind iv idua l responsib le  fo r  in troducing and implementing the 
o rgan izational development program) may function  as a  conditioned 
stim ulus analog, L o tt and L o tt ( I 968) conceptualized persons as 
"discrim inable stim u li"  and found th a t responses may be conditioned 
to  them. Their th e o re tic a l an a ly sis  and subsequent experim entation 
support the p resen t supposition of a  change agent functioning  as 
a  conditioned stim ulus analog.
The organization i t s e l f  might a lso  function  as a  conditioned 
stim ulus analog. However, a f te r  experience in  an o rg ^ iz a tio n , 
many employees do no t regard  the  organization as n e u tra l. Rather, 
the  organization i s  associated  with many fa c to rs  which could weight 
i t  as e i th e r  p o s itiv e  o r negative or even co n flic tin g  (see, e .g . .  
M ille r, I 9# ,  1959) • While i t  might be in te re s tin g  to  examine 
a t t i tu d e  changes th a t  occur toward the organization re su ltin g , from 
job redesign , such changes would involve counterconditioning 
which fo r  p resen t purposes make the  organization an inappropria te  
analog fo r  a  conditioned stim ulus. S im ilarly , the ta sk  i t s e l f  
might function  as a  conditioned stim ulus analog; however, again, 
p r io r  to  the  in troduction  of job redesign , the  ta sk  has been 
associated  with a  v a r ie ty  of s tim u li ( e .g . ,  boredom, fa tig u e , 
f ru s tra t io n , p rid e , monetary s tim u li—p a r tic u la r ly  in  a p iece- 
ra te  incen tive  system ). As previously  s ta te d , the sim plest case
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of a  conditioned stim ulus deals with a  n e u tra l cue. The change 
agent would appear to  he best su ite d  fo r  functioning as a  conditioned 
stim ulus and w ill  th e re fo re  be used as an i l lu s t r a t iv e  conditioned 
stim ulus analog. (Learning theory can, of course, deal w ith more 
complex s itu a tio n s —e . g . , m ultip le  cues, some of which are  no longer 
n e u tra l as a  r e s u l t  of having previously  been associated  with p leasan t 
o r noxious s tim u li. Such processes, known sev e ra lly  as blocking, 
c o n f lic t ,  cross-m odality  blocking, e t c . ,  a re  very adsq_uately 
tre a te d  in  theory and experiment [ e .g . ,  Dickinson & Bearing, 1979» 
Fowler, 1978; Fowler, Goodman, & DeVito, 1977» Fowler, Goodman, & 
Zanich, 1977; Kamin, I 968, I969 ; M ille r, I 9# ,  1959» R escorla & Wagner, 
1972] .  However, the  emphasis in  th is  sec tio n  w ill  be focused 
on a  fundamental learn in g  paradigm: the  c la s s ic a l  conditioning 
of learned  d r iv e s .)
A cquisition . A drive may be c la s s ic a l ly  conditioned to  a  
n e u tra l stim ulus by repeated ly  a sso c ia tin g  the n e u tra l stim ulus 
with the  aversive d rive  ( e .g . ,  K alish, l95^; M ille r, 1951» Paivio ,
196^ ; Spence & Spence, I 966) .  The d rive which i s  linked  with the 
conditioned stim ulus may be e i th e r  primary or acquired (e .g . .
M ille r, 1951; Weiss, I 980) .  I f  the  change ag en t's  observation of a 
worker i s  followed by aversive events ( e .g . ,  a  harsh ap p ra isa l of 
th e  employee), then an analog of reinforcem ent would be hypothesized.
A s e r ie s  of such asso c ia tio n s  of the  change agent and aversive 
events would be p red ic ted  to  lead  to  th e  c la s s ic a l  conditioning of 
a learned  drive to  th e  change agent, and would be analogous to  a
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s e r ie s  o f acq u is itio n  t r i a l s .
S ig n ifican t a cq u is itio n  may develop when the  source of 
co n tro llin g  function  remains ex te rn a l to  the in d iv id u a l ( e .g . ,  
a  superv isor, a  change agent, o r q u a lity  con tro l in spec to r) a f te r  
a  job has been redesigned. Such ex te rn a l co n tro l can be seen 
by the employee as evaluative  and th e re fo re  aversive . As such, 
the  asso c ia tio n  of the ex te rn a l source of con tro l and aversive 
evaluation would be p o sited , analogous to  a c q u is itio n . Evidence 
c ite d  by Rush ( I 97I )  supports th i s :  Lim iting the  co n tro l which 
an employee has over h is /h e r  own work was repo rted  to  be a  "b arrie r"  
to  successfu l job redesign . S im ilarly , in  an ap p lica tio n  of job 
enrichment, Huse and Beer ( I 97I)  in d ica ted  th a t  " a l l  rou tin e  f in a l  
inspection  was even tually  turned  over to  th e  assembly workers 
themselves" [emphasis added] (p . lO ?). We can in fe r  from th is  
quote th a t  some o th er source a t  f i r s t  evaluated the  employees' 
work ( e .g . , a  q u a lity  con tro l in sp e c to r) . This combined with 
a  more complex ta sk  (assembling an e n tire  hot p la te ,  previously  
produced v ia  assembly l in e )  may explain  the i n i t i a l  decrement in  
performance subsequent to  the  job enrichment program th a t  i s  
d isp layed  by the  graph presented  in  Huse and B eer's  re p o rt (p. I 06) .
P rec ise  p red ic tio n s  can be made about d if f e re n t s tren g th s  of 
the  learned  drive conditioned to  the change agent based on the 
number of acq u is itio n  t r i a l s . In  lea rn in g , the  s tren g th  of the 
learned drive i s  an increasing  function  of the  number o f re in fo rced  
t r i a l s  ( e .g . ,  G oldstein, I 960, 1977; K alish, M ille r, I95I ) .
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I t  therefo re  follows ( i f  the previous analogies hold) th a t  the 
a b i l i ty  of the change agent to  function  as a  source o f learned 
d rive  should he an increasing  function of the number of times 
th e  change agent has been connected with a  s i tu a tio n  in  vrtiich 
an employee i s  harshly  evaluated. For example, a  consultant 
who has excessively  evaluated an employee in  a  derogatory 
fash ion  should be more l ik e ly  to  a f fe c t  an employee on h is /h e r 
ta sk  than a consultant who has only ra re ly  evaluated an employee.
The number of acq u is itio n  t r i a l s  can a lso  a ffe c t  the  change ag en t's  
power to  function  in  an instrum ental escape conditioning, avoidance, 
o r punishment paradigm.
E x tinction . In  co n trast to  the acq u is itio n  procedure described 
above, the  learned  drive may be reduced v ia  ex tin c tio n —by 
p resenting  the conditioned stim ulus repeated ly  without the  learned 
d rive  ( e .g . ,  K alish, l 9 5 ^ s  M ille r, l95 l)*  Analogously, in  job 
redesign , so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  may be reduced by having the  change 
agent cease making a  severe appra isa l of the  employee or s im ila rly  
become d isso c ia ted  from unpleasant events. In  essence, the 
change agent would be presented to  the  employee w ithout the 
previous associations with undesirable outcomes. Thus, i f  the  
feedback by the change agent was no longer ev alu a tiv e , ex tin c tio n  
would be p red ic ted . A lte rn a tiv e ly , i f  the  feedback received by 
th e  ind iv idual was d ire c tly  from the ta sk , from a machine, or 
v ia  some s im ila r mechanism, an ind iv idual such as the  superv isor, 
change agent, or q u a lity  con tro l in specto r would be precluded from
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being associated  w ith the feedback. Therefore, th e  ex tin c tio n  of 
prev iously  formed assoc ia tions or a  prevention of the  formation 
of th e  aversive assoc ia tions would be p red ic ted . The so c ia l 
f a c i l i t a t io n  l i t e r a tu r e  has generated d a ta , in teg ra ted  by learn ing  
theory , which co n trasts  help received from a socially-m ediated  
source and a  mechanical source. Shea, Routh, C o ttre l l ,  and Brecht 
( i 973) found th a t  a socially-m ediated  source of help on a ta sk  (an 
experimenter) suppressed a  contingent response over time to  a 
s ig n if ic a n tly  g re a te r  degree than when the  source of help was 
m echanically-mediated. The con tro l function  in  management could 
a lso  be viewed as "help" fo r  th e  worker. I f  th i s  "help" i s  
socially-m ediated , however, as when a  superv isor, change agent, 
o r in spec to r gives i t ,  then i t  w ill  not be sought and w ill  be 
pun itive  since  i t  i s  concomitantly associated  w ith aversive 
evaluation . I f  i t  i s  assoc iated  in s tead  w ith a  mechanical process, 
as when i t  i s  p a r t of the  ta sk  which the  worker generates fo r  
him/her s e l f  and i s  separa te  from the  so c ia l process fundamental 
to  the  aversive aspect of evaluative observation, then i t  w ill no 
longer function  as an aversive stim ulus.
These p red ic tio n s , derived from learn ing  theory , are supported 
by p re sc rip tio n s  and find ings in  the  job redesign l i t e r a tu r e .  For 
example, Herzberg (197^) in d ica ted  th a t  one im portant "ingredient" 
in  a  job enrichment program i s  th a t  feedback to  the  employee be 
"d irec t"  and "nonevaluative", Likewise, Rush (1971) emphasized 
the  importance o f d ire c t  and immediate feedback in  job redesign
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e f fo r t s .  Sush c ite d  a  successfu l exan^le of job enrichment a t  
Texas Instrum ents. In  th is  case, Rush noted th a t workers "now 
in spec t th e i r  own work and ra te  th e i r  own performance" (p. 1W-), 
Similarly, Walton (1975) reported  cases of successfu l work 
re s tru c tu r in g  where groups engaged in  "self-management" w ith a  
re su ltin g  elim ination of supervisory  p o sitio n s  a lto g e th er.
In  learn ing , the capacity  of a  conditioned stim ulus to  
function  as a  source of drive i s  a  decreasing function  of the 
number o f ex tinc tion  t r i a l s  ( e .g . ,  Armus, I 96O5 K alish, 195^).
Hence, in  job enrichment, a  change ag en t's  a b i l i ty  to  e l i c i t  so c ia l 
f a c i l i t a t io n  should be a  decreasing function  of the number of times 
he/she has not harsh ly  evaluated the employee. Again, we can 
p re d ic t d ifferences in  employee responses toward consu ltan ts 
based on d ifferences among consu ltan ts in  the  number of ex tin c tio n  
t r i a l s .
.G ounterconditioning. I f  the  assoc ia tions fo r  the  change agent, 
subsequent to  the acq u is itio n  procedure previously  described, were 
transform ed to  being with p leasan t events, then the analog in  
learn ing  would not be ex tin c tio n  but would be counterconditioning 
re su ltin g  in  in h ib itio n  of the learned  aversive d riv e . In  learn in g , 
in h ib itio n  develops when a response incompatible with the  response 
e l ic i te d  by the learned  drive i s  conditioned to  the conditioned 
stim ulus ( e .g . ,  Davison, I 968; Melvin & Brown, 196^; M ille r, I 95I ;  
Pearce & Dickinson, 1975)• For example, i f  the change agent were 
to  commend the employee fo r  sev era l days, p ride might be e l ic i te d
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and could in h ib i t  so c ia l f a c i l i t a t io n .  In  the job redesign s itu a tio n , 
i t  might be d esirab le  to  attem pt to  change the asso c ia tio n s  the 
employee has developed toward the consu ltan t through countercondition­
ing ra th e r  than re ly in g  on ex tin c tio n  since  learned  drives can be 
h igh ly  r e s is ta n t  to  ex tin c tio n  (see, e .g . .  M ille r, l95 i)»
Summation. Summation, in  ^diich the  p resen ta tio n  of more than 
one conditioned stim ulus increases the  s tren g th  of the  learned 
d rive  ( e .g . ,  Martens & Landers, 19?2; M cA llister & M cA llister,
1967, M cA llister, M cA llister, Welden, & Cohen, 1974; M ille r, 1951)1 
might be conceived of as analogous to  a  hypo the tical s i tu a tio n  
during the  an a ly s is  of a  job redesign program in  which there  are 
a  group of consu ltan ts who independently have observed the employee 
and de liv e red  a  harsh , o r otherwise p u n itiv e , evaluation . The 
combined presence of these  people observing the  employee execute 
h is /h e r  ta sk  should r e s u l t  in  an increase  in  the  s tren g th  o f the 
d rive  (Weiss & M ille r, I 9 7 I ) ,  i f  the  re le v an t analogies hold.
In  ad d itio n , the s tren g th  of the  d rive  has been shown to  
in te ra c t  with th e  number of acq u is itio n  t r i a l s  ( e .g . ,  G oldstein, 
i 960, I 977) .  Thus, the. number of times which the  consu ltan t(s) 
was (were) p a ired  with evaluation should in te ra c t  w ith  the number 
of consu ltan ts observing the  employee in  determining the e ffe c t 
on the  employee ( e .g . ,  in  instrum ental escape conditioning, 
punishment, or performance a t  the enriched ta s k ) .
G enera liza tion . Another s i tu a t ic n  th a t  can be examined in  
the c la s s ic a l  conditioning of a  learned  drive  i s  g en era liza tio n .
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The g en era liza tio n  of a  learned, d riv e  i s  a  function of stim ulus 
s im ila r i ty . The more s im ila r  a  p a r t ic u la r  stim ulus i s  to  the 
o r ig in a l conditioned stim ulus, th e  more the  learned  drive w ill 
g enera lize  to  the  new stim ulus ( e .g . ,  D esiderate , 196^ ; M iller,
I 95I ;  S ieg e l, H earst, George, & O'Neal, I 968; Weiss, I 963) . Thus, 
in d iv id u a ls  s im ila r  to  the  in d iv id u a l who o rig in a lly  in s tig a te d  
and evaluated the  joh redesign  program w ill  he more in c lin ed  to  
e l i c i t  s o c ia l f a c i l i t a t io n  than d is s im ila r  in d iv id u a ls . This 
s im ila r i ty  need no t he lim ited  to  physica l c h a ra c te r is tic s  hut 
could include psychological s im i la r i t ie s  to  the  o r ig in a l evaluater. 
For example, i f  the  change agent was from a  p a r t ic u la r  department 
o r a t  a  p a r t ic u la r  o rg an iza tional le v e l , than a l l  people from 
th a t  department ( e .g . ,  a l l  people from personnel) or le v e l ( e .g . ,  
a l l  a s s is ta n t  v ice  p res id en ts  o r a l l  management personnel in  general) 
might he sources o f d rive  when they  observe the  employee performing 
h is /h e r  ta sk . A lte rn a tiv e ly , i f  an aversive change agent was 
ex te rn a l to  the o rgan ization , then any "ou tsider" observing the 
employee could induce the  learned  d riv e .
The e ffe c ts  of the  learn in g  process of acq u is itio n  and the 
ex ten t of the g en era liza tio n  of th i s  acq_uisition to  d if fe re n t 
types o f consu ltan ts  ( e .g . , in te rn a l  o r ex tern a l) i s  an area 
of in te r e s t  in  o rgan iza tional development. Hess (l9 ?8 ), fo r  
example, found th a t  in te rn a l o rg an iza tio n al development consultan ts 
were more e ffe c tiv e  in  c e r ta in  re sp ec ts  (lower absenteeism was 
suhstained) than ex te rn a l consu ltan ts  in  using a  survey feedback
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technique. This was thought to  he p a r t ia l ly  a ttr ib u te d  to  the 
ex tern al consultan ts being more in tim id atin g , challenging, and 
detached; in  co n tra s t, the  in te rn a l consu ltan ts were perceived 
as being more accepting. S im ilarly , Huse (1975) ind ica ted  th a t 
generally  th e  in e ffe c tiv e  o rgan izational development change agent 
i s  characterized  as " in sen sitiv e"  and " re je c tin g " , A lack  of 
system atic research  and theory concerning the  c h a ra c te r is tic s  
o f e ffe c tiv e  change agents has been noted ( e .g . ,  Beer, i9?6; 
F ried lander & Brown, 19?4; Huse, 1975)• F ried lander and Brown 
(197^)» fo r  example, observed th a t "the  co n su ltan t's  impact as 
a  rep resen ta tiv e  of a  group—a group ex tern al to  and possib ly  a 
th re a t  to  h is  c l ie n t—i s  not often  considered" (p . 331). The 
p resen t theory  does consider th is  and i t  provides a  guide fo r  
determining the processes involved and the reasons why ce r ta in  
c h a ra c te r is tic s  are in e ffe c tiv e  w ith a  job redesign  program: A 
th rea ten in g , pun itive , o r s im ila r posture o f evaluation  can 
condition a  p a r tic u la r  agent to  become a  learned  source of 
noxious d riv e . Furthermore, th is  e f fe c t  can generalize  to  
.consu ltan ts of a  s im ila r  c la ss—e .g . ,  a l l  ex te rn a l consu ltan ts.
A g rad ien t of g en era liza tio n , whereby s tim u li are  arranged 
by v irtu e  o f th e ir  degree o f s im ila r i ty  to  the  o rig in a l conditioned 
stim ulus can be envisioned fo r  the job redesign s itu a tio n . For 
example, i f  the o rig in a l change agent was the  v ice  p residen t of 
personnel, then the a s s is ta n t vice p res id en t o f personnel would be 
expected to  e l i c i t  more generalized drive than the  a s s is ta n t 's
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sec re ta ry . This p red ic tion  i s  deduced i f  a g rea te r s im ila r ity
i s  perceived between the vice p residen t and the a s s is ta n t than
between the vice p residen t and the  sec re ta ry  (and i f  the
p e rtin e n t analogies h o l d ) I n  con trast to  g en era liza tion ,
discrim ination  would be p red ic ted  when the  stim ulus person
observing the employee i s  q u ite  d iffe re n t from the o rig in a l
evaluative change agent. For example, the employee's co-workers
would f a i l  to  e l i c i t  any appreciable so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  when
they observe the employee i f  they lack  any psychological s im ila r i ty
to  the  change agent (the  learned  source of d riv e ).
Weiss and M iller ( I97I)  in d ica ted  th a t  stim ulus s im ila r i ty
in  so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  might be based on "punitive  power". Within
the work organization , such a psychological q u a lity  might be
p a r tic u la r ly  re le v an t. Weiss and M iller noted one way to  vary
th e  s treng th  of the learned d rive  th a t i s  highly  su ited  to  the
present analysis;
the  observation of su b jec ts  by observers who ty p ic a lly  
exercise d if f e r e n t ia l  h ie ra rch ica l o r peer-lev e l 
punitive  power over them—as the observation of 
white c o lla r  workers by (a) managers, or (b) o ther 
white c o lla r  workers, or (c) blue c o lla r  workers (p. 4 ? ).
An in d iv id u a l's  pay and promotional opportun ities , c r i t i c a l  a t tr ib u te s
of th e  work s itu a tio n  according to  Mikes & Hulin ( I968) ,  among
o ther things could be assoc iated  with an e v a lu a te r 's  pun itive  power.
Power and p o l i t ic a l  considerations are becoming increasing ly
in v estig a ted  in  o rgan izational behavior in  general and o rgan izational
development in  p a r tic u la r  (see , e .g . ,  F ried lander & Brown, 1974-;
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G reiner, l967i Kuse, 1975)* The an a ly s is  of such a  variab le  in  
learn ing  th e o re tic a l  terms might prove p a r tic u la r ly  tim ely.
Escape Conditioning
There are few things as firmly established as the empirical 
finding that a response which removes an aversive drive will be 
reinforced. In job redesign, a response which reduced the aversive 
evaluation the employee received would be reinforced and thereby 
strengthened. Alternatively, analysis could be focused on responses 
directed toward the classically conditioned source of drive. The 
previous section dealt with conditioning the learned drive to 
the change agent, therefore, the present section will deal with 
ways in which responses can be instrumental in allowing the employee 
to escape the change agent conditioned to function as a learned
3source of drive.
To analyze the current situation via an instrumental escape 
conditioning paradigm, a discrete trial analog will be employed.
Thus, the termination of the observation by the change agent will 
hypothetically be temporary, for some period of time, analogous 
to a discrete trial in learning.
Several escape conditioning variables affect the strength 
of the instrumental response in learning, for example, the type 
of trial, the magnitude of reinforcement, the delay of reinforcement, 
etc. The elaboration of analogs for these and other pertinent 
learning variables should extend the present learning theoretical 
analysis beyond a rudimentary level. The analogies for instrumental
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escape conditioning v ariab les  w ill  now be presented and enumerated
f o r  l a t e r  ease of exposition .
Rules of Correspondence; Dependent V ariab les. An i l lu s t r a t iv e
instrum ental escape response analog in  the  work s i tu a tio n  might be
an employee f i l in g  a  grievance to  the  union concerning the evaluative
change agent. This response could be re in fo rced  by the in te rru p tio n
of on-going observation by the  consu ltan t (o r term inating h is /h e r
mere presence, given th a t  the consu ltan t has become a  learned  source
of d riv e ) . The response might be more l ik e ly  to  be re in fo rced  i f  the
grievance was s u f f ic ie n tly  fo rce fu l o r q^uickly f i l e d  (possib ly
analogous to  a  co rre la ted  reinforcem ent procedure, see , e .g . ,  Logan,
I 960, 1961 ; Weiss, Boyer, Golwick, & Moran, I 97I ) .
Grievance f i l in g  has been observed to  occur in  response to
o rgan izational development e f fo r ts .  French, Ross, Kirby, Nelson,
& Smyth (1958)1 fo r  example, found th a t a  major change in  technology
su b s ta n tia lly  increased the to ta l  number of grievances f i l e d ,
Schuster (1979) s ta te d  th a t in  re fe rence  to  programs involving
p ro d u c tiv ity  improvement:
In  terms of the day-to-day re la tio n sh ip , an e ffe c tiv e  
program should re s u l t  in  a  reduction  in  the  number of 
grievances f i l e d  and the settlem en t of grievances a t  
e a r l ie r  stages in  the grievance procedure, (p . 24?)
Rush ( I 97I)  a lso  observed th a t  "union re s is ta n c e  o r d is in te re s t"
can be a  "b a rrie r"  to  successfu l app lica tio n s  of job redesign .
I f  the  organization i s  not unionized, i t  i s  even possib le  th a t
employees could form a  union or th rea ten  to  do so to  attempt to
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escape the  aversive source ,of d riv e . A lte rn a tiv e ly , aggression 
d irec ted  toward the change agent could occur o r the employee 
could r e s t r i c t  h is /h e r  output in  the change ag en t's  presence.
The re s is ta n c e  to  change l i t e r a tu r e  has documented these and other 
behaviors occunring when change occurs in  the  work environment 
( e .g . ,  Coch & French, 1948; French e t  a l . , 1958; Huse, 1975)*
For i l lu s t r a t iv e  purposes, f i l in g  a  grievance w ill be employed 
as an instrum ental escape response analog and the s treng th  of 
the tendency to  f i l e  a  grievance w ill  be considered to  be analogous 
to  the  learn in g  dependent v a riab le , response s tren g th  (1) .^
French e t  a l .  (1958) noted th a t  grievances may be d irec ted  
a t  is su es  o ther than those causing the  employee to  f i l e  a  grievance. 
This i s  in  accord w ith H use's (1975) observation th a t th re a ts  
produced by o rgan izational change need not be consciously perceived 
o r id e n tif ie d  by the employee. Therefore, the  grievance f i l e d  by 
the employee need no t be lim ited  to  a  grievance concerning the 
change agent o r the  observation.
Rules of Correspondence; Independent V ariab les. A re in forced  
t r i a l  in  learn ing  i s  one in  which the  instrum ental response 
term inates the aversive d riv e . Analogously, a  re in fo rced  t r i a l  in  
job redesign could be hypothesized as f i l in g  a  grievance re su ltin g  
in  the  term ination of observation by the change agent fo r  th a t 
p a r t ic u la r  " t r i a l " —some period  of time (2 ). A lte rn a tiv e ly , a  
n on -re in f orced t r i a l  analog could be the  s i tu a tio n  in  job redesign 
in  which f i l in g  a grievance does not in te rru p t the aversive observation
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by the  change agent (3 ). A s e r ie s  of t r i a l s  in  which the employee 
f i l e s  a grievance without any e f fe c t  on the change ag en t's  observation 
would be analogous to  ex tin c tio n  (4 ). A mixture of t r i a l s  in  which 
f i l in g  a  grievance a t  times a ffe c ts  the change a g en t's  observation 
and a t  times does not would be analogous to  p a r t ia l  reinforcem ent (5 ) .
Delay of reinforcem ent in  learn ing  focuses on the time in te rv a l 
between the response and the reinforcem ent, in  th is  case the time 
lag  between f i l in g  a grievance and the  cessation  of the  change 
a g en t's  observation (6) ,  A ll of the  previously  developed c la s s ic a l  
conditioning operations which a f fe c t  the  s tren g th  of the  aversive 
d rive  may be used here to  vary the in te n s ity  of the  d riv e . An 
example of p a r tic u la r  in te r e s t  i s  when a group of change agents 
evaluate the  employee (7 ). In  add ition , the  harshness of the  change 
a g en t's  evaluation o r the ex ten t of the pun itive  consequences 
associated  with the change a g en t's  evaluation could be conceived 
of as an analog of drive in te n s ity . I l lu s t r a t iv e ly ,  a  change 
agent making a negative evaluation in  f ro n t of an employee's peers 
would be considerably more noxious than such an evaluation made in  
p riv a te  (8) .  Hamner (1977) de lineated  s ix  ru le s  fo r  managers when 
u t i l iz in g  reinforcem ent p r in c ip le s . One of the p ro sc rip tio n s  which 
Hamner presented concerned reprimanding the  employee in  fro n t of 
o ther people. The ra tio n a le  fo r  th is  p ro sc rip tio n  was th a t i t  
could increase "undesirable responses". The p resen t analysis  
expands on Hamner's ex p lica tion  of the e ffe c ts  of such a  reprimand 
(o r evaluation); in  co n trast to  a p riv a te  reprimand (o r evaluation).
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a public censure would be highly aversive.
Some researchers of organizational behavior have noted that 
certain types of individuals may not respond positively to enriched 
tasks (e.g., Hackman & Lawler, 1971» Hackman & Oldham, 1975» Hulin 
& Blood, 1968) .  An individual difference variable has been 
postulated for those persons not desiring to grow in their work 
or be challenged, identified as "low grovrth need strength" (Hackman 
& Oldham, 1975)• The origin of discrepancies among individuals in 
growth need strength may be explained by the present theory by 
relying on a differentiation in past socialization experiences.
If an employee has associated evaluative observation in an organization 
or outside of it with highly aversive consequences, then a program 
incorporating frequent observations should not be desired by such 
an individual. Individuals defined as low in growth need strength 
might find the observation particularly obnoxious based on their 
past learning history. In other words, low growth need strength 
may be an analog of high drive intensity (9 ) ,  Individual difference 
variables have been successfully employed in learning research as 
sources of variation in drive intensity (e.g., manifest anxiety;
Spence, I 956; Spence & Spence, I 966; competency; S te ig led er,
Weiss, Cramer, & Feinberg, 1978), While these p a st successes 
do no t in  any way guarantee the success of the p resen t ind iv idual 
d ifference  analog of d rive in te n s ity , th e re  i s  ample precedent fo r  
so conceiving in d iv idua l d iffe ren ces .
The use of a drive-reduction hypothesis of reinforcement
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in te rtw ines d riv e  in te n s i ty  and magnitude of reinforcem ent. In  
the p resen t case, magnitude of reinforcem ent could be varied  by 
having the instrum ental response analog, f i l in g  a  grievance, 
e lim inate  a  group of consu ltan ts observing the  employee, analogous 
to  a  la rg e  magnitude of reward, or only one consu ltan t, analogous 
to  a  small magnitude of reward ( lo ) . A lte rn a tiv e ly , f i l in g  a 
grievance might r e s u l t  in  cancelling  a  change a g e n t's  public 
evaluation , analogous to  a  la rg e  magnitude of reward, or one made 
p r iv a te ly , analogous to  a  sm all magnitude of reward (11).
In  escape conditioning , the noxious d rive  may be p resen t on 
some t r i a l s  and absent on o th ers . Such a  procedure i s  known as 
in te rm itte n t shock (Franchina, I 966) .  An analog of the in te rm itte n t 
shock procedure i s  av a ilab le  fo r  job redesign . An employee coming 
to  work may be faced w ith th e  change a g en t's  observation on a 
p a r t ic u la r  day o r he/she may not (12). Indeed, in  job redesign 
and o ther o rg an iza tional development programs, evaluation  and 
observation of th e  employee i s  ra re ly  a d a ily  or even reg u la r 
phenomenon (Huse, 1975)*
P re d ic tio n s . In  escape conditioning, response s tren g th  i s  an 
increasing  function  of the  number of re in fo rced  t r i a l s  ( e .g . .  
D esiderate , 196^ ; S te ig led er e t  a l . ,  1978; Weiss, Lombardo,
Warren, & K elley, 1971). By combining ru le s  of correspondence 
1 and 2, i t  can be p red ic ted  th a t the  s tren g th  of the tendency to  
f i l e  a  grievance w ill  be an increasing  function  of the  number of 
times such a response has previously  le d  to  cancelling  the  change
ag en t's  observation. This p red ic tio n  req u ires  no fu r th e r  assumptions 
beyond the  analogies a lready  assumed. I f  the  analogies are  co rrec t, 
the re la tio n sh ip s  holding between the  v a riab les  in  learn ing  should 
a lso  hold fo r  the analogous v a riab les  in  job redesign .
The above p red ic tio n , based on the known e f fe c t  of reinforcem ent 
in  learn ing  has not been d ire c tly  te s te d  so f a r  by researchers  of 
job r e d e s i^ .  However, Huse and Beer ( I 97I )  d id  observe th a t 
" i n i t i a l  attem pts a t  job enrichment may be extrem ely d i f f i c u l t  in  
unicsaized p la n ts  th a t  d is t ru s t  management" (p . 105)• A th e o re tic a l  
explanation fo r  Huse and B eer's  statem ent can be advanced which 
draws on an assumed p r io r  learn ing  h is to ry  of unionized workers.
I f  f i l in g  grievances o r making o ther re lev an t responses previously 
led  to  term ination of aversive s tim u li in  the  work environment, 
then reinforcem ent would be p red ic ted . Therefore, a  strengthen­
ing of the  response ^daich le d  to  i t s  term ination would be p red ic ted  
to  occur. Thus, with a  cu rren tly  aveis ive  s i tu a tio n  such responses 
should be aresoried to  s ince  they have been successfu l (reinforced) 
in  the  p a s t.
S trength  of aresponding in  learn in g  i s  a  decreasing function  of 
the  number of non-rein f orced t r i a l s  ( e .g . .  Bower, I 96O; Weiss, 
Lombardo, Warren, & K elly , I 97I ) . Thus, anales of coazcespondence 
1 and 3 may be combined to  derive the follow ing pred ictions 
The stren g th  of the  tendency to  f i l e  a  grievance w ill  be a  decreasing 
function of the  number o f times i t  has no t teamiinated the change 
ag en t's  observation.
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In  escape conditioning, response s treng th  i s  g re a te r  under 
continuous reinforcem ent than under p a r t ia l  reinforcem ent (e .g .,  
Bower, I 96O; S te ig led er e t  a l . ,  1978; Weiss, Buchanan, A l ts ta t t ,
& Lombardo, I 97I ;  Weiss, Lombardo, Warren, & Kelley, I 97I ;  Woods, 
Markman, Lynch, à  Stokeley, 1972). For job redesign, a  decreased 
s tren g th  of tendency to  f i l e  a  grievance i s  p red icted  fo r  employees 
vdio have not been completely successfu l in  elim inating the change 
a g en t's  observation in  the p ast (the  p a r t ia l  reinforcem ent group) 
than fo r  employees who have always been successfu l in  elim inating 
the change ag en t's  obseirvation when they have f i l e d  a  grievance 
(continuous reinforcem ent group). This p red ic tion  i s  deduced 
through the combination of ru le s  of correspondence 1, 4 , and 5«
In  learn ing , immediate reinforcem ent produces a  stronger 
response than delayed reinforcem ent. S p ec ifica lly , response 
s tren g th  in  escape conditioning i s  a  monotonically decreasing 
function  of delay of reinforcem ent, and probably negatively  
accelerated  (e .g . ,  Fowler & Trapold, I 962; Seybert & Weiss, 1974; 
S te ig led er e t  a l . , 1978; Weiss, Boyer, Golwick, & Moran, I 97I ;
Weiss, C ecil, & Frank, 1973). Thus, ru le s  of correspondence 1 and 6 
may be combined to  y ie ld  analogous p red ic tions in  job redesign.
For example, an employee who i s  observed a t  the  s t a r t  of h is /h e r  
d ay 's  work f i l e s  a  grievance. I f  the grievance response immediately 
stops the observation, a  strong response w ill  be conditioned. I f  a 
delay supervenes, there  w ill be a  concomitant decrease in  the 
s tren g th  of the  tendency to  f i l e  a  grievance, with longer delays
34
fu r th e r  d e b ili ta tin g  th is  response. Because the function  i s  
sp ec ified  as not only decreasing but a lso  as negatively  accelerated , 
i t  can be p red ic ted  th a t some d ifferences between delays w ill more 
su b s ta n tia lly  a f fe c t  the  s tren g th  of the  tendency to  f i l e  a  grievance 
than w ill  o thers. I l lu s t r a t iv e ly ,  a  d ifference  between 5 minutes 
delay  and 10 minutes delay should have a g re a te r  e f fe c t  on the 
grievance response than i f  the  comparison i s  between 7 hours and 
7 hours and 5 m inutes. While th is  po in t may seem in tu i t iv e ly  
obvious, the p resen t an a ly sis  allows the  p red ic tion  of such 
q u a n tita tiv e  d ifferences v ia  theory  ra th e r  than in tu i t io n , perm itting  
em pirical sc ru tin y  of a  derived p red ic tio n .
Delay of reinforcem ent in  escape conditioning a lso  has been 
shown to  in te ra c t w ith the number of re in fo rced  t r i a l s  in  determining 
response s tren g th  ( e .g . ,  Fowler & Trapold, I 962; Seybert & Weiss, 
197^ ; Weiss, Lombardo, Warren, & K elley, I 97I ) .  By combining 
ru le s  of correspondence 1 , 2 , and 6 , i t  can be p red ic ted  th a t the  
delay of term ination of the  change a g e n t's  observation w ill 
combine m u ltip lic a tiv e ly  w ith the number of times th e  change 
a g en t's  observation has form erly been cancelled  in  determining 
th e  s tren g th  of th e  tendency to  f i l e  a  grievance.
In  conditioning, increases in  d rive re s u l t  in  increases in  
response s treng th  ( e .g . ,  Spence & Spence, I 966; S te ig led e r, Weiss, 
B alling , Wenninger, & Lombardo, 1980; Weiss, Rawson, & Pasamanick, 
1963) .  An analogous p red ic tio n  derived by combining ru le s  of 
correspondence 1 and 9 i s  as follow s: Employees low in  growth
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need stren g th  w ill  have a stronger tendency to  f i l e  a  grievance 
than  w ill  high growth need s tren g th  employees.
G reater magnitudes o f reinforcem ent r e s u l t  in  g re a te r  response 
s tren g th s  in  escape conditioning ( e .g . ,  Lombardo, T a to r, & Weiss, 
I 972; Nation, Wrather, & M ellgren, 197^5 S te ig led e r e t  a l , ,  1978; 
Trapold & Fowler, I 960) ,  Thus, in  job redesign , the  s tren g th  o f 
the  tendency to  f i l e  a  grievance w ill  be g rea te r when th is  response 
e lim inates a  group of change agents than when i t  removes a  s in g le  
change agent (derived v ia  ru le s  o f correspondence 1 and lO ), This 
i s  sp ec ified  as a  complete reduction  in  the  drive so th a t  a l l  o f 
the  consultants a re  removed. Thus, i f  iO consultan ts are  p re sen t,
10 are  e lim inated; i f  f iv e  are  p resen t, the  instrum ental response 
in te rru p ts  the  observation o f a l l  f iv e  consu ltan ts. Small reductions 
from re la t iv e ly  high le v e ls  of drive a re  sub jec t to  somewhat 
d if f e re n t p rin c ip le s  (see, e .g . ,  Campbell & K raeling, 1953; Weiss, 
Lombardo, Warren, & K elley, 1971)* Rules of correspondence 1 and
11 can a lso  be combined to  p re d ic t th a t  the  cessation  of a  p u b lic  
evaluation  by the cliange agent should r e s u l t  in  a  stronger tendency 
to  f i l e  a  girievance by the  employee than the  cessation  o f a p riv a te  
evaluation .
In  escape conditioning, magnitude of reinforcem ent and d rive  
combine m u ltip lic a tiv e ly  to  determine response s tren g th  (e .g . .
B e ll, Noah, & Davis, I 965) .  I t  th e re fo re  follow s, i f  jmles of 
correspondence 1, 9: and 10 hold, th a t  the  number of consu ltan ts
I
evaluating  the  employee and the  employee's growth need stren g th
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should In te ra c t in  determining the  s tren g th  of the  tendency fo r  
th e  employee to  f i l e  a  grievance. S im ilarly , ru le s  of correspondence 
1 , 9 t and 11 , when combined, w ill y ie ld  the  p red ic tio n  th a t  a  
p u b lic /p riv a te  d is tin c tio n  in  th e  change a g e n t's  evaluation w ill  
combine m u ltip lic a tiv e ly  w ith growth need s tren g th  to  determine 
th e  s tren g th  of th e  tendency to  f i l e  a  grievance.
Magnitude and delay of reinforcem ent combine m u ltip lic a tiv e ly  
to  determine response s tren g th  in  escape conditioning ( e .g . ,
Woods & Feldman, I 966) .  The d is tin c tio n  in  th e  e ffe c ts  of d if fe re n t 
magnitudes o f reinforcem ent i s  more pronounced a t  sh o rt delays, and 
the d is tin c tio n  of th e  e ffe c ts  of delay  o f reinforcem ent i s  g re a te r  
a t  la rg e  magnitudes of reinforcem ent in  co n tra s t to  small rewards. 
Analogous p red ic tio n s  a re  derived by combining ru le s  of correspondence 
1, 7, and lO; 1, 8 , and 10; 1, 7, and 11; or 1, 8 , and 11. 
I l lu s t r a t iv e ly ,  one would expect to  see more pronounced e ffe c ts  
on th e  s tren g th  of the  tendency f o r  an employee to  f i l e  a  grievance 
f o r  a  pub lic  observation program when the  delay between f i l in g  a  
grievance and cessation  of the  change ag en t's  observation has been 
minimal  than vdien th a t  delay  has form erly been lengthy.
In escape conditioning, response strength is an increasing 
function of the percentage of trials on which a noxious drive is 
present (e.g., Franchina, I 966, I 969 ; Seybert & Weiss, 1974; 
Steigleder et al., I 98O; Weiss, Boyer, Lombardo, & Stich, I 973) .
By combining ru le s  of correspondence 1 and 12, i t  can be p red ic ted  
th a t  the  s tren g th  of the  tendency fo r  an employee to  f i l e  a
3?
grievance will be an increasing function of the percentage of 
days on which the employee is observed by the change agent.
The above predictions illustrate rather than exhaust the 
derivations potentially available when using escape conditioning 
as a model for job redesign. As can be seen, learning theory 
integrates a wealth of laws with an elegant specificity uncharacter­
istic of theorizing in job redesign. This specificity allows precise 
relationships to be tested so that a more thorough knowledge is 
feasible concerning the variables influencing the effects of 
evaluative observation in job redesign.
Avoidance Learning
Another learning paradigm of potential heuristic value in 
job redesign is avoidance learning whereby a response allows the 
individual to avoid rather than escape the noxious stimulus analog, 
in this case the change agent evaluating the employee. This procedure 
would involve having some cue precede the onset of the evaluation 
by the change agent. This cue would have regularly preceded the 
change agent's observation in the past so that it eventually came 
to signal the presence of the change agent. For example, a notice 
to employees might be sent the day before the consultant were to 
arrive. Alternatively, if the change agent were an external 
consultant, a specific individual from within the organization 
might personally inform the employees of the consultant's impending 
arrival (e.g., the employee's supervisor). In either of these 
hypothetical situations, a discrete stimulus (a memo, an individual)
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would reg u la rly  precede the  change ag en t's  presence.
Upon emission of the  appropriate response, observation by the  
change agent would be avoided f o r  th a t p a r t ic u la r  " t r i a l ” . Several 
in te re s tin g  avoidance response analogs seem p lau sib le  in  th e  f i e ld  
s i tu a tio n  in  addition to  the  one described fo r  instrum ental escape 
conditioning, f i l in g  a  grievance. For example, absenteeism allows 
th e  worker to  avoid th e  change ag en t's  observation fo r  th e  period 
o f withdrawal from work (perhaps coinciding with th e  change ag en t's  
presence). A lte rn a tiv e ly , q u ittin g  work avoids the  change ag en t's  
obseirvation on a more permanent b a s is . Lateness or accidents o r 
in ju r ie s  may a lso  be considered as avoidance responses, Passmore 
( I 979) ,  fo r  example, reported  an organization th a t  was not successfu l 
in  implementing work re s tru c tu r in g ; p r io r  to  change, in ju r ie s  were 
a t  a  high le v e l , Passmore a ttr ib u te d  th is  problem to  " s tre s s  due 
to  supervisory demands to  increase production" (p . 321). The high 
le v e l of in ju r ie s  can be th e o re tic a lly  explained as an avoidance 
response to  the  aversive supervisory demands, s im ila r to  an avoidance 
response d irec ted  toward an evaluative change agent.
Most of the  analogies previously  drawn between escape conditioning 
and job redesign can be applied to  the  avoidance conditioning 
paradigm, perm itting  a la rg e  number of te s ta b le  im plica tions. The 
avoidance learn ing  paradigm in  which one s itu a tio n  has been associated  
with an aversive drive while one has not (one-way avoidance) seems 
c lo se ly  analogous to  th e  s itu a tio n  where work has been assoc ia ted  
w ith evaluative observation v ia  th e  job enrichment program while
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the  home s itu a tio n  i s  " sa fe " . In  th i s  avoidance learn ing  s itu a tio n , 
increases in  d rive in te n s i ty  f a c i l i t a t e  the  acq u is itio n  of the 
avioidanceresponse ( e .g . , Mackintosh, 197^1 Moyer & Kom, i $ 66) .  
Therefore, th e  analogs involving d rive  in te n s ity  which were 
previously developed can he of fu r th e r  serv ice  in  th e  present 
extension. For example, absenteeism would be f a c i l i t a te d  to  a 
g rea te r degree when i t  perm its the  worker to  avoid a  group of 
consultants scheduled to  evaluate th e  worker in  co n trast to  the  
avoidance of a  s in g le  evaluating consu ltan t. S im ila rly , absenteeism 
should be f a c i l i t a te d  to  a  g re a te r  degree i f  i t  perm its the  employee 
to  avoid a  public  program of evaluation ra th e r  than a  p riv a te  
evalua tiona l program.
Punishment
The punishment learn ing  paradigm can a lso  be exp lo ited  fo r  
job redesign . An instrum ental response th a t  has already been 
estab lished  i s  suppressed in  the  punishment s i tu a tio n . In  job 
redesign , th e  aversive observation by th e  change agent could function 
as a  punishing stim ulus.
While an a rb itra ry  response th a t  has been learned  can be 
suppressed in  the  punishment paradigm, i t  might prove worthwhile 
to  examine in  an analy sis  of job redesign some p o te n tia lly  in te re s tin g  
responses th a t  could be punished by arranging a contingency between 
a  given response and aversive observation by the  change agent. For 
example, an enriched job often  has the  employee engaging in  severa l 
new behaviors: tak ing  add itio n a l responsibilities (represented
through overt behaviors which the  employee perform s), performing 
an increased v a rie ty  of ta sk s , engaging in  self-m onitored q u a lity  
co n tro l, e tc . I f  aversive observation by th e  change agent follows 
these novel behaviors, th e  s i tu a tio n  i s  analogous to  a punishment 
paradigm. Thus, even though th e  contingency between these  new 
d esirab le  behaviors and the  punisher might be considered to  be 
u n in ten tio n a l on the p a rt of the  implementers of the  program, the 
e ffe c ts  can s t i l l  be the  suppression of these  d esirab le  behaviors. 
Hackman ( l9 7 5 a )  alluded  to  such a  s itu a tio n  occurring in  an 
ap p lica tio n  of job enrichment. In  one case, superv iso rs, having 
lo s t  many aspects of t h e i r  m anagerial ro le s , took to  superv ising  
in  such an aversive manner than th e  previously  exh ib ited  gains 
in  performance were no longer observed, i . e . ,  suppressed.
In  learn in g , a  c o u n te r- in tu itiv e  r e s u l t  has been demonstrated 
fo r  the  punishment paradigm. Namely, th a t  a  response which i s  
r e la t iv e ly  poorly learned  (one th a t  has received  re la t iv e ly  few 
rewarded t r i a l s )  i s  more r e s is ta n t  to  the  e f fe c ts  of punishment 
than  one th a t  has received  sev e ra l ad d itio n a l reinforcem ents 
( e .g . ,  Karsh, 1 ^ 6 2 }  M ille r, I 960) .  Thus, in  job redesign , one 
would expect g re a te r  suppression when a  change agent i s  observing 
an employee performing a response th a t  has been repeated ly  engaged 
in  and rewarded than one th a t  i s  f a i r l y  novel. For example, 
management may f in d  th e  change a g e n t's  presence se rio u sly  d is ru p ts  
th e  performance of co n s is ten tly  productive workers to  a  g re a te r  
degree than workers who perform a t  a  le s s  c o n s is te n tly  high
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le v e l of p roductiv ity . This would occur in  sp ite  of the  fa c t 
th a t  the excelled performance of the  consisten tly  productive workers 
has been repeatedly  rewarded in  the  p ast.
In  learn ing , i t  has been found th a t the  suppression' o f:an  on­
going response i s  an increasing  function of the  in te n s ity  of the  
punishm ent,(e.g ., Appel, I 963; Appel & Peterson, Church,
Raymond, & Beauchamp, 1967) .  Some of the  drive in te n s ity  analogs 
previously de'veloped can be of serv ice  in  the present extension.
For example, since a  pub lic  evaluation was conceptualized as 
more aversive than a p riv a te  evaluation, a  public evaluation 
by the  change agent i s  p redicted  to  suppress responding on the 
new ta sk  to  a g rea te r degree than a p riv a te  evaluation. S im ilarly , 
the  analog of drive in te n s ity  employing the  number of consultants as 
the  c r i t i c a l  variab le can be u t i l iz e d . Thus, the  employee's taking 
in i t ia t iv e  should be suppressed to  a g rea te r extent i f  th is  response 
d e livers  a  group of change agents than i f  one change agent i s  present 
when th is  response occurs.
Discussion
Many of the  learn ing  th e o re tic a l processes previously described 
and re la te d  by analogy to  job redesign variab les are predicted  to  
a f fe c t no t only the conditioning of the  aversive drive to  the  change 
agent or evaluator, but may be u ltim ate ly  responsible fo r  the  
program's " fa ilu re " . Many fa i lu re s  are d ire c tly  a ttr ib u ta b le  to  
implementation e ffo r ts  in  which the  didve induced by evaluative 
observation i s  aroused. The aversive nature of the  drive i s
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often  amazingly cleax, although up to  th is  point no d ire c t t i e  to  
d rive  theory had heen made. I l lu s tr a t iv e  examples w ill now he 
presented and discussed.
Rush (1971)I fo r  example, c ited  a  job enrichment fa ilu re  
which h ighlights some o f the processes previously described:
A tra in in g  s p e c ia lis t  in  an organization which 
recen tly  t r ie d  a  contro lled  experiment in  job 
enrichment s ta ted , "our f i r s t  t ry  a t  job enrichment 
was unsuccessful in  changing work a ttitu d e s  or gaining 
higher p roductiv ity . We don’t  consider the e f fo r t  a 
complete fa ilu re  because we’ve learned a lo t  from i t — 
mostly about what problems we have to  overcome in  
fu tu re  e f fo r ts , 'ne of the major impediments is  
supervision i t s e l f .  Despite d e ta iled  instruc tions 
about introducing job changes, our supervisoirs 
wouldn’t  l e t  up on th e ir  contro ls. Apparently they 
f e l t  threatened in  giving up some of th e ir  supervisory 
p rerogatives, and they wouldn’t  give people the freedom 
to  work independently by planning and contro lling  th e ir  
own jobs," (p, 27)
S im ilarly , Hackman (1975a) analyzed those s itu a tio n s  which led  
to  job enrichment fa ilu re s . He noted one p a rtic u la r  case in  which 
managers began "standing over th e ir  employees’ shouldez^ and 
correcting  each e rro r  they could find" (p, 132), The development 
of "resentment" in  the employees being supervised in  th is  manner 
as c ited  by Hackman i s  expected by the presen t th eo re tic a l analysis 
o f manipulating the streng th  of the learned drive. I f  the 'observation 
was extremely harsh and pun itive , as i t  seems to  have been from the 
descrip tion , then a strong drive should have resu lted  and read ily  
have been conditioned to  the supervisors, Hackman advised th a t 
when implementing job enrichment programs " i t  i s  expecially  c r i t ic a l  
fo r  management to  abandon a punitive  stance and to  encourage free
43
discussion and analysis  of the p ro jec t a s  i t  develops" (p. 135)*
He fu r th e r  remarked th a t while evaluation of a  p ro jec t i s  im portant:
fo r  the  evaluations to  he v a lid  and usefu l, top 
management needs to  create an organizational climate 
in  which the evaluation i s  viewed as an occasion fo r  
learn ing  ra th e r than fo r  c r i t ic iz in g  . . . performance 
and competence, (p. 137)
The present learn ing  th e o re tic a l analysis incorporates Hackman’s
proscrip tion  of a "punitive stance" and h is  p rescrip tion  fo r  "free
discussion and analysis  of the p ro jec t as i t  develops" with a
network of other re s u lts  found in  job redesign and learn ing . The
former (a punitive stance) e l i c i t s  so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  in  the
observer's  presence, thus impairing the emission of correct responses
on the  redesigned task ) as well as perhaps conditioning d is lik e
(see, e ,g , ,  Lott & L o tt, I 968; Weiss & M iller, l9?i)» resentment,
avoidance, e tc . In  con trast, a p a r tic ip a tiv e  approach associates
po sitiv e  consequences with the observer through the  employee's
active  p a rtic ip a tio n  in  the  new program and the  s o lic ita t io n  and
encouragement of h is /h e r  opinions. Thus, p a rtic ip a tio n  could
countercondition any negative associations th a t have already
developed toward the observer. Research and p rac tice  support the
view th a t  p a rtic ip a tio n  can have po sitiv e  consequences when
u til iz e d  in  job redesign (e ,g ,,  Hackman, 1975a; Huse, 1975; Rush,
1971).^
In  the case previously described and c ite d  by Hackman (l975a), 
he noted th a t supervisors began evaluating th e i r  employees in  an 
aversive manner because they found themselves in  a  p o sition  without
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much to  do. Schlesinger and Walton (1978) noted th a t th is  frequently
i s  a  problem in  work re s tru c tu rin g ; th a t supervisors have what they
termed "freed-up capacity". Schlesinger and Walton fu r th e r observed
th a t th is  "freed-up capacity" could be u ti l iz e d  by, in  essence,
job redesign fo r  the supervisors where they take on task s  th a t were
tra d it io n a lly  the ro le  of middle management. They reported,
however, th a t
th is  type of tra n s fe r  has tended not to  happen in  
p rac tice , Perhaps i t  i s ,  in  p a r t, because supervisors 
performing middle management functions are p o ten tia lly  
as threatening to  some middle managers as workers 
performing supervisory ro le s  are to  some supervisors, (p. 321)
The present theory, while concentrating on job redesign fo r  the  lower-
lev e l employee, i s  p o te n tia lly  applicable to  redesign fo r  the supervisor
as w ell.
Effectance and C onflict 
"Effectance" has been extensively  employed in  psychological 
research and theoriz ing  as an aversive motivator of behavior (e .g .,  
Byrne, 1971; Byrne & Clore, I 967; Lombardo, Libkuman, & Weiss, 1972; 
Lombardo, Weiss, & Buchanan, 1972; Weiss, Boyer, Colwick, & Moran,
I 97I ;  Weiss, Lombardo, Warren, & Kelley, I 97I ) ,  White (1959) 
o rig in a lly  defined the effectance motive as "an organism's capacity 
to  in te ra c t e ffec tiv e ly  with i t s  environment" (p. 297). The 
effectance motive i s  considered to  include, among other th ings, 
a  desire  to  have an in d iv id u a l's  own stimulus world certa in  and 
pred ictab le  (Byrne, I 97I ) .
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Berlyne ( I 965) noted th a t  stim ulus p ro p e rtie s  such as "novelty", 
"chamge", "su rp ris ingness", " incongru ity", "complexity", "am biguity", 
and " in d is tin c tiv e n e ss" , a l l  involve un certa in ty  and c o n f lic t—"the 
simultaneous in s tig a tio n  of incom patible responses" (pp. 24j-246). 
Theoiry and research  have shown th a t  c o n f lic t  functions as a  source 
o f aversive drive ( e .g . ,  Brown & Parber, I 95I ; B ollard  & M ille r,
I 95O: M ille r, 1944. 1959; M ille r & B o llard , 1941: Weiss, I 963:
Yelen, I 979 , I 980) .
As aversive m otivators of behavior, effectance and c o n flic t 
could be of h e u r is t ic  value in  research  and theory  in  o rgan izational 
behavior. U ncertainty and u n p re d ic ta b ility  occur in  the  workplace, 
often  a t  an in tense  le v e l . For the o rganization  as the  u n it  of 
study, u n certa in ty  and u n p re d ic tab ility  a re  thought to  be 
increasing  techno log ica lly , economically, le g a lly , s o c ia lly , 
p o l i t ic a l ly ,  e tc . ( e .g . ,  Bennis, I 966; F ried lander & Brown, 
l9?4; G reiner, I 967; Huse & Beer, I 97I ;  Lawrence & Lorsch, I 967) . 
These changes are  p red ic ted  to  influence the  "behavior" and s tru c tu re  
of the organization as i t  attem pts to  adapt and cope w ith th is  
un certa in ty .
The focus of th is  paper i s ,  however, on ind iv idual behavior 
as the  u n it of a n a ly s is . U ncertainty can a lso  abound in  the 
in d iv id u a l 's  stim ulus environment ( e .g . ,  " ro le  c o n f l ic t" , " ro le  
ambiguity", e t c . ) ,  w ith ensuing consequences fo r  ind iv idua l 
behavior (see , e .g . ,  McGlean, 1975)• For example, the  ind iv idua l 
might attem pt to  escape the  u n p re d ic ta b ility  in  the workplace by
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s e t t in g  up a r ig id  system of ru le s  and s tru c tu re s  to  deal with 
th e  u n certa in ty . Such an approach a t  th e  o rgan izational le v e l 
has heen id e n tif ie d  as "bureaucracy". An ind iv id u a l who r ig id ly  
s e ts  up and conforms to  ru le s  beyond those requ ired  by the 
organization might be id e n tif ie d  p e rsonally  by co-workers as a  
"bureaucra t" , However, ju s t  as bureaucracy i s  proscribed  as an 
o rgan izational s tru c tu re  in  uncerta in  environments ( e .g . ,  Bennis,
1966; Lawrence & Lorsch, I 967) , so might i t  be in e ffe c tiv e  as an 
ind iv idua l response (c f . Schein, 1973)•
I f  the  u n ce rta in .y in  the in d iv id u a l 's  work environment i s
ubiquitous and inescapable, then the  ind iv id u a l may respond by
resign ing  o r, i f  a l te rn a te  employment o p p ortun ities  a re  unavailab le ,
psychological s tr e s s  symptoms may r e s u l t  (McLean, 1975)• I f ,
however, the  u n certa in ty  in  the  in d iv id u a l 's  environment i s
assoc ia ted  w ith a  sp e c if ic , d isc re te  stim ulus, then th e  prompt
removal of th a t  stim ulus, as a  source of d riv e , would be re in fo rc in g ,
the presence of th a t stim ulus would energize dominant responses,
and i t s  presence would a lso  be capable of suppressing on-going 
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responding.
The ty p ic a l rou tin e  ta sk  asso c ia ted  with many organizations 
fo r  which job redesign programs are  ta rg e ted  would very  l ik e ly  
no t be associated  with a high degree of u n certa in ty  or u n p re d ic tab ility . 
In  co n tra s t, such a  ta sk  might be described  as extremely p red ic tab le . 
However, the  stim ulus p ro p e rtie s  of "novelty", "change", "com plexity", 
e t c . ,  which involve c o n f lic t (Berlyne, I 965) ,  a l l  seem to  describe
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the  new task  in  a  job redesign program, p a r tic u la r ly  fo r  the  case 
of job enrichment. Therefore, c o n flic t and e ffectance , as sources 
of d riv e , seem to  be introduced in to  the  work environment when 
the  job enrichment program i s  implemented. Hackman (l975a), 
fo r  example, noted th a t ty p ic a lly  when job enrichment i s  introduced 
"the changes . , , c rea te  a  good deal of uncerta in ty  in  the 
organization" described by workers as " chaos" (p . 131). Again, 
as was previously  described fo r  so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n ,  the combination 
of an elevation  in  general d rive le v e l (in  th is  case, sources 
being co n flic t/e ffec tan ce ) and a novel ta sk  in  which dominant 
responses are  in c o rre c t, contribute  to  the a n tic ip a ted  gains in  
performance not being re a d ily  apparent.
Learning Paradigms 
The b en efits  of extending a  wide v a rie ty  of learn ing  th e o re tic a l 
p r in c ip le s  and paradigms beyond a rudimentary le v e l fo r  job redesign 
have been previously  described and exem plified fo r  evaluative 
observation as a source of d rive . To i l lu s t r a t e  the  p o te n tia l 
so c ia l richness unique to  an analysis  of effectance and co n flic t 
as motives, some exemplary analogies w ill  be drawn. Many of the 
analogs generated fo r evaluative observation as th e  source of 
d rive could be appropria te ly  extended fo r  the c o n f lic t and 
effectance a n a ly s is .
C lass ica l Conditioning
Rather than contemplating the change agent as a  functional 
conditioned stim ulus analog as previously was demonstrated fo r
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evaluative observation as a  source of d rive , an in te re s tin g  
ap p lica tio n  of the c la s s ic a l  conditioning of c o n f lic t and 
effectance in  job enrichment could employ the o rganizational 
development program i t s e l f  as the  conditioned stim ulus analog•
A cquisition . I f  a job enrichment program was associated  with 
uncerta in ty , u n p red ic tab ility , change, e tc , (c o n f lic t/e f fe c ta n c e ) , 
then i t  i s  p red icted  th a t  i t  would become a  conditioned source of 
aversive d rive since acq u is itio n  of a  conditioned drive develops 
with repeated assoc ia tions of a  stim ulus and an aversive d riv e .
As such, employees would be pred icted  to  develop a  strong d is lik e  
fo r  the  program re su ltin g  from such acq u is itio n  t r i a l s  and may 
bring  pressure  fo r  the removal of the  conditioned aversive program. 
The conditioning of a tt i tu d e s  such as the  example of d is lik e  
used here toward a  conditioned stim ulus analog has been extensively  
tre a te d  in  theory and research  in  learn ing  (see , e .g . ,  Byrne, I 97I ;  
L ott & L o tt, 1968, 1972; S taa ts , I 975; Weiss & M ille r, I 97I ) .
Since drive s treng th  i s  an increasing  function  of the  number 
of acq u is itio n  t r i a l s ,  job enrichment programs which are  associated  
with repeated episodes of "chaos" w ill  be more d is lik e d  than change 
e f fo r ts  in  which the  uncerta in ty  become a tten tu a ted  more quickly. 
Ju s t as evaluative observation of the  worker was shown to ;
(a) a ffe c t  performance on the  redesigned ta sk , (b) re in fo rce  
contingent escape responses, and (c) suppress punished 
responses, so the p resent analog of acq u is itio n  w ill  be expected 
to  influence not only the employee's a t t i tu d in a l  responses to  the
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aversively  conditioned program, but a lso  w ill  a f fe c t  behavior in  
(a) performance on the redesigned ta sk , (b) escape conditioning, 
and (c) punishment s i tu a tio n s .
The o rgan izational development l i te r a tu r e  supports the 
hypothesis th a t  aversive reac tio n s  can be conditioned to  a  change 
program, Researchers o f o rgan izational development have frequen tly  
noted th a t  the  commencement o f a  change program produces re s is tan ce  
behaviors in  the a ffec ted  employees. These re s is ta n c e  behaviors 
can take a  v a rie ty  of forms (see , e .g . ,  Cartw right, 1951» Ooch &
Rrench, 19^8; Drazin & Joyce, 1979» French e t  a l . ,  1958» Huse, 1975» 
Marrow, 1975» Trumbo, 1961). The change i s  considered to  be a  
th re a t which may or may no t be consciously perceived by the 
employee (Huse, 1975» Hiosh, 1971» Trumbo, I 96I )  and can be 
"extrem ely in tense" (Huse, 1975) »
In  sp ite  of the  aversive assoc ia tions a  change program can 
c rea te , learn ing  th e o re tic a l techniques could be employed to  
"immunize" the worker to  i t s  aversive n a tu re . For example. M ille r 's  
( I960) technique of increasing  re s is ta n c e  to  s tre s s  by gradually  
exposing the su b jec t to  the  s t r e s s  could be employed. Support 
fo r  th e  successfu l e ffe c ts  of a  comparable procedure was presented by 
Rush ( I 97I)» "To avoid problems, i t  was decided to  move slowly and 
to  explain fu l ly  the  in te n t and method of the  planned changes" (p. 66). 
I t  i s  in te re s tin g  to  fu r th e r  note the  reason fo r t h i s  learn ing  
th e o re tic a lly  appropriate  decision : "That f i r s t  conference 
demonstrated th a t  an across-the-board  change would probably be
d isru p tiv e  and create  considerable anxiety  among the  work force" 
[emphasis added] (p. 68) .  In  th is  i l lu s t r a t io n ,  the  reason fo r  a 
learn ing  th e o re tic a lly  appropriate decision was a lso  based on a 
learn ing  th e o re tic a lly  appropriate  v a riab le : change in  the  work 
environment being analogous to  an aversive source of d rive . Thus, 
the  decision  of management in  th is  i l lu s t r a t io n  to  "move slowly" 
may be in te rp re te d  according to  th e  p resen t an aly sis  as wise ( th is  
was the  conclusion management a lso  made regarding th is  p a r tic u la r  
decision they reached) since i t  conceivably exposed the employees 
gradually  to  the  change and th e re fo re  re su lte d  in  le s s  detrim ental 
e f fe c ts  than i f  the  change was sudden—e .g . ,  fewer re s is ta n c e  
behaviors, perhaps le s s  suppression of attendance and turnover 
than might have been caused by punishment, e tc .
E x tin c tio n . I t  i s  p red icted  th a t with time many job 
enrichment programs can become le s s  drive arousing in  comparison 
to  th e i r  i n i t i a l  chaotic s ta te .  Aldag and B rief (1979) observed 
th a t employees have occasionally  complained th a t th e i r  enriched tasks 
have re lapsed  to  th e i r  former, unchallenging condition. I f  the  
program i s  no longer associated  w ith c o n flic t or e ffectance , then 
an analog of ex tin c tio n  would be p o sited . (However, a t  the  same 
tim e, the  i n i t i a l  purposes fo r  redesigning the ta sk  would no longer 
be f u l f i l l e d  i f  the  ta sk  i s  once again mundane.)
E xtinction  could a lso  be pred ic ted  to  occur simply by an 
elim ination  of the  "chaos" which might exclusively  be associated  
with the program's I n i t i a l  implementation. This may be a  fu r th e r
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explication» in  add ition  to  the  one previously  s ta te d , fo r  H erzherg's 
(1968) ,  P r ie ^ a n d e r  & Brown's ( I 974) , and Rush's ( I97I )  observations 
th a t a  d e b il i ta t io n  in  performance occurs a t  th e  ou tset of a  
redesign e f fo r t .
Again, th e  p rin c ip le s  of learn in g  can be exp lo ited . I t  i s  
p red ic ted  th a t since strong  d rives are more re s is ta n t  to  ex tinc tion  
than weak ones ( e .g . .  M ille r. 1951)s programs associated  with 
lengthy periods of chaos w ill  be more r e s is ta n t  to  ex tinc tion  
than those which have been asso c ia ted  vrith u n certa in ty  th a t was 
r e la t iv e ly  sh o rt- liv ed  in  n a tu re .
C ounterconditioning. Perhaps, however, th e  ex tinc tion  procedure 
would be too laborious fo r  both employees and management since a 
strong re s is ta n c e  to  ex tin c tio n  i s  often  encountered with learned 
d riv e s . A p re fe rab le  procedure, th e re fo re , might be to  reduce 
the  aversion conditioned to  the  job enrichment program by counter­
conditioning i t .  Perhaps, as was p reviously  described, involving 
the.employees by allowing them to  p a r tic ip a te  in  the  program could 
countercondition th e i r  d is l ik e  fo r  i t  which was produced by 
asso c ia tio n s  with c o n f lic t and u n certa in ty . For example. Rush 
( I 97I )  s ta te d  th a t " le s s  re s is ta n c e  to  change i s  l ik e ly  to  r e s u lt  
i f  employees con tribu te  ideas to  th e  planning of th e  changes and 
p a r t ic ip a te  in  implementing them" (p. 30) .  Such p a rtic ip a tio n  in  
an o rgan izational development program can occur a t  various lev e ls  
and stages (see , e .g . ,  Goch & French, 19^8; Huse, 1975). For example, 
the  p a rtic ip a tio n  could be complete and begin in  a  steige a t  which
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decisions are made concerning how the joh should he enriched. In 
a  c la s s ic  f ie ld  experiment, Coch and French (19^8) found th a t 
re s is ta n c e  to  change developed in  a  con tro l group which was not 
allowed to  p a rtic ip a te  in  designing changes in  work ro u tin es  and 
time allowances to  a much g re a te r  ex tent than in  experim ental 
groups which p a rtic ip a ted  in  the  change. In  add ition , experim ental 
groups which were allowed to  f u l ly  p a r tic ip a te  in  designing the  
changes showed le s s  re s is ta n c e  than an experimental group which 
had le s s  p a rtic ip a tio n  "breadth. R esistance behaviors th a t  were 
observed included turnover, low e ffic ien cy  ra tin g s , aggression, 
r e s t r ic t io n  of production, lack  of cooperation, and grievances.
The present learn ing  th e o re tic a l  analysis  allows an examination 
of the  s itu a tio n s  in  the  Coch and French experiment as w ell as a 
v a rie ty  of hypothetical s itu a tio n s  in  Tdiich p a rtic ip a tio n  could 
have d if f e r e n t ia l  e f fe c ts  on employee responses. I f  th e  p a r tic ip a tio n  
was extremely rewarding, i t  should more g re a tly  in h ib it  the  aversive 
d rive conditioned to  the  program. I t  can be hypothesized th a t 
t o t a l  p a r tic ip a tio n  would be more rewarding than lim ited  p a rtic ip a tio n . 
Thus, fo r  example, to t a l  p a r tic ip a tio n  would "be p red ic ted  to  
more e ffe c tiv e ly  countercondition the  d is l ik e  developed toward the 
program than would lim ited  p a r tic ip a tio n .
Reinstatem ent. One o ther learn ing  procedure which might be 
in te re s tin g  to  examine in  the  presen t an a ly sis  i s  re instatem ent of 
th e  learned drive by p resen ta tio n  of the  unconditioned stim ulus 
a f te r  i t  has been extinguished (Rescorla & Heth, 1975)• For job
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enrichment, th is  would be p red ic ted  to  occur i f  the chaos 
assoc ia ted  with the  program reappeared sometime a f te r  being 
absent. This might occur i f  some change took place because of the  
outcomes of the  program or purely  due to  th e  n a tu ra l cycle of 
events involved in  the  program. Whatever i t s  cause, the  renewed 
u n p red ic tab ility  and c o n flic t would be p red ic ted  to  re-arouse 
th e  extinguished d is lik e  fo r  the  program.
Escape Conditioning
Some of th e  p o te n tia lly  in te re s t in g  responses which employees 
make which are instrum ental in  perm itting  them to  escape from the  
uncerta in ty  an.d c o n flic t produced by a job enrichment program can 
be delineated . Examples of re s is ta n c e  behaviors documented in  the  
l i te r a tu r e  include s tr ik e s , slowdows, un ion ization , increased 
e rro rs , absenteeism, turnover, grievances, insuboixiination, lo ss  
a £  lo y a lty  to  the  company, low e ffic ien cy , aggression, e tc .  (see , 
e .g . ,  Coch & French, 19^8; Huse, 1975)• Some of these  responses 
may be more e ffe c tiv e ly  employed as instrum ental escape behaviors 
in  the  present an a ly s is , o thers might more appropria te ly  be analyzed 
v ia  an avoidance learn ing  paradigm.
The reinforcem ent in  escape conditioning need not be lim ited  
to  the  procedure of d rive reduction  u t i l iz e d  prev iously . Reinforcement 
in  escape conditioning can a lso  occur through a  procedure in  which 
th e  sub jec t emits a  response which in h ib its  th e  anxiety  or noxious 
stim ulus induced by the aversive d rive  ( e .g . ,  M ille r, I 95I ;  Weiss, 
I98O). Analogously, in  the  area  of job enrichment, a  response
which in h ib its  the  uncerta in ty  or c o n f lic t  assoc iated  with the  new 
program should be re in fo rced . An i l lu s t r a t iv e  response th a t i s  
discussed in  the  job enrichment l i t e r a tu r e  might be termed "job 
growth". When a  job becomes in t r in s ic a l ly  appealing to  the  worker 
so th a t  i t  e l i c i t s  fe e lin g s  of p rid e , knowledge, re sp o n s ib il ity , 
m eaningfulness, e tc .  (compatible w ith Hackman & Oldham's, l975> 
" c r i t i c a l  psychological s ta te s " —"experienced meaningfulness of work", 
"experienced re s p o n s ib il i ty  fo r  work outcomes", and "knowledge of 
r e s u l ts  of work a c t iv i t ie s " ) ,  these  responses could in h ib it  those 
responses induced by the  program i t s e l f  s ince i t  has become a source 
of aversive d riv e . I f  one of these  in h ib itin g  responses was made 
contingent upon an instrum ental response, then th a t  response should 
be re in fo rced . I t  i s  hypothesized by proponents of job enrichment 
programs th a t  such in h ib ito rs  w ill  even tually  be e l ic i te d  by thé 
redesigned, more complex ta sk  ( e .g . ,  Hackman & Lawler, 1971;
Hackman & Oldham, 1975; Herzberg, I 968 , l9 7 ^). I f  th i s  a sse rtio n  
i s  v a lid , then the v a riab les  in fluencing  th is  process can be 
sp ec if ie d  and the  r e s u l ts  can be p red ic ted  by the  use of learn ing  
theory . For example, the  e f fe c ts  of delay  of reinforcem ent, magnitude 
of reinforcem ent, e tc . ,  could be p red ic ted  fo r  these  responses in  a 
manner s im ila r  to  th a t  previously done fo r  evaluative  observation.
Rules of Correspondences Dependent V ariab les. As with aversive 
observation, the  instrum ental escape response may be d irec ted  a t 
removing the  source of d rive  th a t  has been c la s s ic a l ly  conditioned to  
the  job enrichment program. Ju s t as f i l i n g  a  grievance was previously
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examined a s  an instrum ental response analog fo r  escaping evaluation 
by a  change agent, so could f i l in g  a  grievance be instrum ental in  
in te rru p tin g  a program associated  w ith e ffectance  or c o n f lic t .  
A lte rn a tiv e ly , a  r e s t r ic t io n  of output o r slowdown by the  employees 
could r e s u l t  in  temporary (o r permanent) cessa tion  o f th e  program.
Again, the  d isc re te  t r i a l s  analog w il l  be employed; th e re fo re , 
the  program w ill  be considered as being in te rru p ted  fo r  some 
period  of tim e, analogous to  a  t r i a l  in  le a rn in g . The response 
employed fo r  i l lu s t r a t iv e  pui^oses w ill  be r e s t r ic t io n  o f output, 
and the  s tren g th  of the  tendency to  r e s t r i c t  output w ill  be used as 
an analog of response s tren g th .
Rules of Correspondence; Independent V ariab les, Some i l lu s t r a t iv e  
independent v a riab les  can a lso  be generated. Corresponding to  a  
re in fo rced  t r i a l  in  learn ing  would be a  t r i a l  on which r e s t r ic t in g  
output in te rru p ted  the  program, A non-reinforced  t r i a l  analog i s  
afforded by the s itu a tio n  in  idiich r e s t r ic t in g  output does no t a f fe c t  
the cessation  of the job enrichment program. E x tin ctio n , p a r t ia l  
reinforcem ent, and continuous reinforcem ent analogs are  obvious 
extensions of re in fo rced  and non-reinforced t r i a l  combinations.
As previously  discussed, in te n s i ty  o f the  aversive d rive  which 
the program e l ic i te d  could be manipulated by the  number o f acq u is itio n  
t r i a l s —the ex ten t of the asso c ia tio n  with "chaos". S im ila rly , 
the ex ten t to  lAich the  program's u n certa in ty  permeates the  employee's 
e n tire  work environment could function  as an analog of d rive  in te n s ity . 
For example, the  u ncerta in ty  may comprise u t te r  chaos, thus
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functioning  as an analog of high drive in te n s ity , or i t  might he 
abbreviated  to  one p a r tic u la r  ta sk  which the employee performs, thus 
being analogous to  low d rive  in te n s ity .
The variab le  of growth need s tren g th  might a lso  be employed 
as a  d rive  in te n s ity  va riab le  fo r  c o n flic t/e ffe c tan c e . Perhaps 
in d iv id u a ls  with low growth need s treng th  have a low to lerance  
fo r  un certa in ty  in  the  work environment in  add ition  to  or in stead  
of being in to le ra n t to  having th e i r  performance on a  ta sk  observed. 
U nfortunately, the  l i te r a tu r e  on growth need s treng th  does not 
perm it the  determ ination of which of these explanations might more 
su ita b ly  represen t th i s  v a riab le . In  f a c t ,  th e  general u t i l i t y  of 
growth need s tren g th  as an ind iv id u a l d ifference  moderator of 
responses to  job enrichment has been questioned (O 'R eilly , P a r le t te ,  
& Bloom, I 979) • The in te re s te d  reader i s  re fe rre d  to  Spence and 
Spence ( I 966) fo r  th e i r  conclusions concerning the d i f f ic u l ty  in  
form ulating comprehensive and e x p lic it  th eo rie s  of sp e c if ic  
p e rso n a lity  c h a ra c te r is tic s . Their observations seem p a r tic u la r ly  
appropria te  fo r  growth need stren g th  since the s i tu a tio n  fo r  which 
th i s  v a riab le  i s  re lev an t, the  app lica tion  of job enrichment, i s  
i t s e l f  cu rren tly  poorly understood, Spence and Spence concluded 
th a t  when such a s ta te  of a f f a i r s  e x is ts , a theory about the 
s i tu a t io n  i t s e l f  i s  n ecessita ted . The present learn ing  th e o re tic a l 
a n a ly s is , while not offered as a  comprehensive theory of growth 
need stren g th , i s  an attempt to  incorporate such a  p e rso n a lity  
v a riab le  in to  a  broader th e o re tic a l  network.
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An ind iv idua l d ifference  v ariab le  th a t has already been 
more firm ly  grounded in  theory and research  i s  locus of con tro l.
Feinberg, M ille r, Weiss, S te ig led er, and Lombardo (in  press) demonstrated 
th a t u n p re d ic tab ility  leads in te rn a l locus of con tro l ind iv iduals 
(whose dominant mode of responding i s  a c tiv e , and idio tend to  re ly  
on s k i l l  and a b i l i ty  in  determining th e i r  outcomes) to  ac tiv e  
responding, while leading ind iv iduals id e n tif ie d  as ex ternal locus 
of con tro l (whose dominant mode of responding i s  passive, and >dio 
tend to  r e ly  on luck or chance in  determining th e i r  outcomes) to  
passively  respond; i . e . ,  "learned h e lp lessness". Based on the  
find ings of Feinberg and h is  colleagues, i t  can be hypothesized 
th a t ex tern a l locus of con tro ls would f in d  the  uncerta in ty  connected 
with a  job enrichment program very d e b il i ta t in g  and they could 
demonstrate a  learned helplesness type of e f fe c t , while in te rn a l 
locus of con tro l in d iv idua ls  could "shine" in  such a  tu rbu len t 
environment. This ind iv idual d ifferen ce  v a riab le , locus of con tro l, 
however, i s  not conceptualized as a  d rive in te n s ity  analog but i s  
a  conceptualization  of hab it h ierarchy  (Feinberg e t  a l . ,  in  p re ss) . 
Therefore, the  main e ffe c t  locus of con tro l i s  p red icted  to  have 
concerns ta sk  performance ra th e r  than a ffec tin g  escape conditioning 
or punishment. As a  source of d riv e , u n certa in ty  i s  p red icted  
to  influence the in te rn a l locus of con tro l in d iv id u a l 's  a b i l i ty  
to  master th e i r  new, complex ta sk  by energizing a  dominant ac tiv e  
response tendency. By energizing a  dominant passive response tendency, 
u ncerta in ty  i s  p red ic ted  to  c rea te  "help less" ex tern a ls .
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An in d iv idua l d ifference  v ariab le  could a lso  be created in  
the  work environment i t s e l f —task  competency. Employees who are  
made to  f e e l  competent in  the job enrichment program may fin d  the 
un certa in ty  in  th e i r  environment le s s  arousing than w ill  employees 
tdio are  made to  fe e l  incompetent. Thus, competency i s  used in  
th is  case as a  d rive  in te n s i ty  analog. J u s t  such a  learn in g - 
th e o re tic a l analy sis  o f competency has been made by S te ig leder 
e t  a l , ;  1978. Although a  fee lin g  o f competency could be imposed 
on the  employee by another person ( e .g . , a  superv iso r, consultan t, 
q u a lity  con tro l in sp ec to r) , i t  could a lso  be self-im posed o r could 
simply be due to  a  perceived or a c tu a l lack  o f a b i l i ty  concerning 
the ta sk  requirem ents, of the  redesigned job.
P red ic tio n s , Some i l lu s t r a t iv e  p red ic tio n s  can be made 
given th a t  the  above analogies hold. For example, since  increases 
in  d rive  r e s u l t  in  increases in  response s tren g th , an employee 
would have a  s tro n g er tendency to  r e s t r i c t  h is /h e r  output i f  a 
program had been assoc ia ted  with considerable uncerta in ty  over 
a  long period o f time than i f  th a t  un certa in ty  was minor and/or 
Tzrief, Since in  escape conditioning continuous reinforcem ent 
r e s u l ts  in  a  g re a te r  response s tren g th  than p a r t ia l  reinforcem ent, 
an employee who was always successfu l in  in te rru p tin g  the program 
by r e s t r ic t in g  h is /h e r  output (continuous reinforcem ent analog) 
w ill  have a  s tronger tendency to  r e s t r i c t  output than an employee 
who was only p a r t ia l ly  successfu l on previous occasions in
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in te rru p tin g  the  program (analog of p a r t ia l  reinforcem ent),
However, s ince  p a r t ia l  reinforcem ent a lso  produces a g re a te r  
re s is ta n c e  to  ex tin c tio n  than continuous reinforcem ent ( e .g . ,
Bower, I 96O; M ille r, l9 5 l) i  ^x i employee who was not constan tly  
successfu l in  in te rru p tin g  the  program hy r e s t r ic t in g  output would 
he more r e s is ta n t  to  e x tin c tio n  than one who always was successfu l.
With competency of the  employee as a  d rive  in te n s i ty  analog, i t  
can a lso  he p red ic ted  th a t employees made to  f e e l  incompetent 
would have stronger tendencies to  r e s t r i c t  th e i r  output than 
employees made to  f e e l  competent.
Avoidance Conditioning
I f  employees w ill  le a rn  to  make a  response to  escape the  
joh enrichment program which has become a  learned  source of d rive , 
they  should le a rn  to  avoid i t  as w ell. Avoidance responses in  
th e  forms of ta rd in e ss , absenteeism, increased  acc iden ts, or 
turnover could occur. The cue which precedes th e  avoidance 
response need not he lim ited  to  an ex te rn a l stim ulus. Responses 
and d rive  themselves produce c h a ra c te r is t ic  s tim u li to  which avoidance 
responses can he conditioned (see , e .g . .  Brown, l953i B ollard  &
M ille r, 1950; M ille r, 1959)• For example, the  mere thought of the  
jo h  enrichment program with i t s  accompanying uncerta in ty , complexity, 
u n p re d ic tab ility , d iso rd e r, and chaos could lead  the  employee to  
c a l l  in  s ick  to  avoid the  s i tu a tio n . A lte rn a tiv e ly , q u ittin g  
th e  joh and thereby avoiding the  aversive program on a  permanent 
basis  could ensue. Coch and French (19^8), fo r  example, found th a t
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the  r a te  of q u ittin g  in  a  co n tro l group which did not enjoy the  
b en e fits  of p a r tic ip a tio n  was 1"^ in  the f i r s t  40 days a f te r  work 
re la te d  changes were in troduced . In  comparison, experim ental groups 
with varying le v e ls  of p a r tic ip a tio n  had no turnover during th is  
same period  of tim e. (The reader i s  re fe rre d  to  e a r l ie r  
m ateria l concerning the  counterconditioning hypothesized to  r e s u l t  
from p a r t ic ip a t io n .)
J u s t  as the  law from one-way avoidance learn ing  in  which 
increases in  d rive  in te n s i ty  f a c i l i t a t e  avoidance learn in g  was 
used fo r  evaluative  ouservation as a  source of d riv e , so can i t  
be extended fo r  th e  p resen t an a ly s is  of e ffec tance  and c o n f lic t .  I t  
can th e re fo re  be p red ic ted  th a t  i f  competency of the  employee functions 
as a  d riv e  in te n s i ty  analog, employees fe e lin g  incompetent with 
th e ir  enriched job would have s tronger tendencies to  c a l l  in  s ick  
than employees fe e lin g  competent. A lte rn a tiv e ly , i f  a  program has 
been assoc iated  w ith an excessive degree of "pandemonium", 
employees w ill  have a  strong tendency to  absent themselves from 
th is  aversive s i tu a t io n .
Punishment
I f  th e  job enrichment program has become conditioned to  function  
as an aversive source of d riv e , then i t  should be fu n c tio n a lly  
capable of punishing responses th a t  the  employee might otherwise 
make in  the  work environment. The organization  may unw ittingly  
suppress an employee's attendance since th e  aversive program i s  
experienced contingent upon th e  worker making th is  attendance response.
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A lterna tive ly ! an employee’s enjoyment of and s a t is fa c t io n  with 
h is /h e r  job may be suppressed i f  the  job enrichment program has 
become a  source of aversive d riv e . R esults compatible w ith such 
p red ic tio n s  have been found in  the job redesign l i t e r a tu r e .
Rush (1971)1 fo r  example, reported  a  case in  which a con tro l group 
w ithout enriched jobs was more s a t i s f ie d  with th e i r  jobs than were 
experim ental groups with en rid ied  jobs. Management found these 
r e s u l ts  su rp ris in g , but i f  the  program was associated  w ith aversive 
events i t  could have functioned to  punish s a t is fa c tio n  responses 
in  the  experimental groups. While these  aversive events may no t 
have been lim ited  to  o r even included c o n flic t o r effectance as 
sources of aversive d riv e , the  p resen t analysis has attem pted to  
show th a t  m ultip le  sources of aversive drive can p o te n tia lly  be 
introduced concomitant with a  job redesign e f fo r t .
Since suppression of respaid ing  i s  an increasing  function  of 
th e  in te n s ity  of the  punishment, the analog of acq u is itio n  developed 
e a r l i e r  can be of se rv ice : A program associated  w ith su b s ta n tia l 
c o n f lic t and effectance i s  p red ic ted  to  become h igh ly  aversive . 
Therefore, employees experiencing a program than has been completely 
chao tic  should show g re a te r  suppression of attendance o r s a tis fa c tio n  
than  employees experiencing a  le s s  d iso rderly  program.
Competition
As was previously s ta te d , i t  i s  possib le  th a t  sources of drive 
o th er than those o rig in a tin g  from evaluation , effectance  or c o n flic t 
could be connected w ith a job redesign e f fo r t .  For example, the
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program may spur employees to  compete with each o ther. Competition 
has heen shown to  possess the  fun c tio n a l a t tr ib u te s  of aversive 
d rives (S te ig leder e t  a l , ,  I 98O; S te ig leder e t a l . , 1978)• Rush 
( I 97I)  reported  a case of job redesign in  which competition developed 
concerning the goals s e t by the workers fo r  h igher p ro d u c tiv ity . He 
observed th a t  the  workers "soon re a liz e d , however, th a t  the  goals 
were too challenging, and se t more r e a l i s t i c  ones" (p. .
Rush fu r th e r  noted th a t  attem pts were made to  "promote cooperation". 
I f  competition was introduced in  the work environment, performance 
on a  redesigned ta sk  would be expected to  be impaired ra th e r  than 
f a c i l i t a te d .  U nfortunately, Rush presented no da ta  concerning 
performance during th i s  com petitive episode although he d id  rep o rt 
an " i n i t i a l  drop in  p ro d u c tiv ity " . We might fu r th e r  in fe r  th a t 
performance was de trim en ta lly  a ffec ted  by Rush's previously  quoted 
statem ent th a t  "the goals were too challenging".
Competition, as an aversive source of d riv e , could become 
associated  with the  program i t s e l f  or some o th e r stim ulus in  the  
work environment. As a  consequence of such conditioning, the  
stim ulus associated  with competition would develop the  capacity  
to  a ffe c t performance on the redesigned ta sk , to  serve as a  negative 
re in fo rce r which would be escaped or avoided, and to  be capable of 
suppressing behavior. An i l lu s t r a t io n  of how competition could occur 
in  job redesign might be illum inating ; a  sp ec if ic  employee in  a  
work group might take a  job enrichment program as an occasion fo r  
competing with fellow  workers ra th e r  than fo r  "growing" on the job.
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I f  th i s  com petitive employee had no p r io r  conditioned asso c ia tio n s  
(p o s itiv e  or negative) and was, th e re fo re , fu n c tio n a lly  n e u tra l, 
a  conditioned stim ulus analog can be posited . I f ,  p r io r  to  job 
enrichment, p o s itiv e  a ffe c tiv e  consequences were associated  with 
the  now-competitive employee, a  counterconditioning analog i s  
p la u s ib le . This employee, by being p a ired  with com petition, 
might become the  victim  of aggression i f  such a  response successfu lly  
term inated the  com petition.
Conformity
Nonconformity has a lso  been analyzed in  learn in g  th e o re tic a l 
term s. Finding oneself in  th e  p o s itio n  of being a  nonconformist 
has been shown to  function  as an aversive d rive and sub jec ts  w ill 
learn  to  escape such a  s itu a tio n  (Seybert & Weiss, 197^). I f  the  
in troduction  of a job redesign  program places an employee in  a 
s itu a tio n  in  which he/she becomes a  nonconformist, t h i s  should be 
aversive. The program i t s e l f  may be assoc ia ted  w ith th is  source 
of aversive d rive  or the  work group could become aversive . The 
employee could, fo r  example, escape or avoid th e  work group, 
performance on the  redesigned ta sk  could be a ffec ted  by the  work 
group 's presence, and th e i r  presence could become punishing.
The hypothetical nonconformity s itu a tio n  might occur in  job 
redesign i f  a  production norm develops with the  new ta sk  which the  
employee cannot achieve. The employee could respond by increasing ly  
being absent from work, q u ittin g  the  job , f i l in g  a  grievance, or 
perhaps even applying fo r  a  tra n s fe r  in to  another work group.
Learning theory  p re d ic ts  th a t a  job redesign program which i s  associated  
w ith nonconformity w ill  be escaped or avoided—i . e . ,  " re s is te d " . 
U tiliz in g  data  from group dynamics research , Cartwright (1951) 
developed a p rin c ip le  # iic h  supports th i s  learn ing  th e o re tic a l  
p red ic tio n : "E ffo rts  to  change in d iv id u a ls  or subparts of a  group
which, i f  successfu l, would have the  r e s u lt  of maJcing them dev iate  
from th e  norms of the  group w ill encounter strong res is tan ce"  (p. 389) .
General D iscussion 
The preceding an a ly sis  has focused on how aversive sources of 
d rive  could become connected to  d if fe re n t aspects of a  job redesign  
e f fo r t ,  s p e c if ic a lly  the  change agent, th e  program i t s e l f ,  or even 
a  worker or a  work group. The e f fe c ts  of th i s  conditioning on 
the  i l lu s t r a t iv e  responses o f subm itting grievances, r e s t r ic t in g  
output, turnover and absenteeism, e t c . ,  were a lso  delineated .
There are p a r tic u la r  fa c to rs , which, i f  p resent in  the  workplace, 
w ill  prevent the  development of the  learned  d rive  to  a  change agent, 
the  program, a worker, or a  work group. The p r in c ip le s  governing 
th e  operation of these fa c to rs  w ill  now be discussed.
Compound Conditioning
The c la s s ic a l  conditioning of a  learned drive depends not only 
upon a given stim ulus' own asso c ia tio n  with a  d riv e  (primary or 
acqu ired ), but a lso  the  asso c ia tio n  between the  d rive  and o ther 
s tim u li p resen t in  the  environment. These o ther s tim u li may "compete" 
with a  p a r tic u la r  stim ulus so th a t  in  s p ite  of a  connection, no 
conditioning w ill develop. In  learn in g , a procedure re fe rre d  to
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as "blocking" has been in v estig a ted  ( e .g . ,  Kamin, I 968 , I969;
R escorla & Wagner, 1972; Wagner, I 969) '  In  blocking, conditioning 
K il l  not develop to  one stim ulus i f  th a t  stimulus i s  paired  with 
another cue Trtiich already s ig n a ls  the  aversive d riv e . This procedure 
might be u se fu lly  examined fo r  job redesign as w ell. For example, 
a  change agent may f a i l  to  become a learned  source of drive even 
though th a t change agent has co n sis ten tly  delivered  punitive , 
harsh evaluations of the  worker. This would be p red ic ted  to  occur 
i f  another person such as th e  employee's supervisor, functioning 
as  a  conditioned stim ulus analog, was present with th e  change agent 
when th e  aversive evaluation was made and the supervisor had 
previously  evaluated the  employee on successive occasions in  a  
harsh , or otherwise noxious manner. In  essence, since the  supervisor 
has repeated ly  been asso c ia ted  with evaluative observation, he/she 
would already function  as a  r e l ia b le  source of aversive d rive . 
Therefore, th e  change agent, in  compound with th e  supervisor, 
s ig n a ls  nothing new in  th e  environment concerning evaluation.
I f ,  however, idien th e  change agent and the  supervisor make a 
combined assessment of th e  worker and i t  i s  much more derogatory 
than th a t  made by th e  employee's supervisor alone, then the 
conditioning of the  aversive d rive to  the  change agent would be 
p red ic ted . This i s  because in  learn ing  an increase in  the  in te n s ity  
of th e  drive when th e  two s tim u li a re  presented in  compound re s u l ts  
in  conditioning or "unblocking" ( e .g . ,  Kamin, I968) ,  Since a  public  
ap p ra isa l was considered to  be analogous to  high drive  in te n s ity
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and a  p riv a te  ap p ra isa l was considered to  function  analogously to  
low drive in te n s ity , then i f  the change agent and the  supervisor 
make a  combined harsh ap p ra isa l in  public  and th e  su p erv iso r 's  
solo evaluation was always performed p riv a te ly , conditioning of
9
the  aversive d rive  i s  p red ic ted  to  develop to  the  change agent.
I f  the  v a riab le  d if fe re n tia tin g  th e  superv isor and the 
change agent was not th e i r  d i f f e r e n t ia l  reinforcem ent h is to ry  as 
when the supervisor was previously  p a ired  w ith the  learned drive  
while the  change agent had no such p r io r  a sso c ia tio n s , but in s tead  
was the  d ifference  in  the  degree of "saliency" between the  two, 
"overshadowing" would be the  appropria te  learn in g  procedure 
r a th e r  than blocking ( e .g . ,  Kamin, I 969) .  The sa liency  of a 
conditioned stim ulus need not be lim ited  to  i t s  physical p ro p e rtie s . 
Therefore, th e  power d i f f e r e n t ia l  between the  superv isor and a 
change agent might a f fe c t the conditioning of each. In  learn ing , 
i f  two s tim u li d if f e r  in  saliency , th e  more in tense  conditioned 
stim ulus w ill  more re a d ily  become a  source of learned  drive because 
i t ,  in  essence, overshadows or overpowers the  o ther stim ulus.
This occurs even though both s tim u li, in  compound, have been paired  
w ith the  aversive drive ( i . e . ,  th e re  a re  no d iffe ren ces  in  th e i r  
reinforcem ent h is to r ie s  with the source of d r iv e ) . For job redesign , 
i f  th e  superv isor had more d ire c t  power over th e  employee and was, 
in  essence, analogous to  being a  more s a l ie n t  stim ulus fo r  the 
employee than the  change agent, then th e  supervisor would be 
p red ic ted  to  become a learned  source of d rive while the change agent
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would n o t. Such r e s u l ts  are p red ic ted  to  occur even though both, 
to g e th e r, have harsh ly  evaluated the  employee.
Blocking, unblocking, and overshadowing can a lso  be analyzed 
fo r  th e  s itu a tio n  in  which the  job redesign program i t s e l f  i s  
considered as a  conditioned stim ulus analog. I f  uncerta in ty  i s  
already prevalent when a  job change program i s  introduced and 
th is  u n certa in ty  does not increase  or become more aversive fo r  
the  employee, the  program should not become a  learned source of 
d rive ( i . e , ,  blocking i s  p red ic ted ) . I f  the  program su b s ta n tia lly  
increases th e  un certa in ty  in  th e  work environment, then i t  would 
be p red ic ted  to  become a  learned  source of d rive ( i . e , ,  unblocking 
i s  p red ic ted ). I f  the  program i t s e l f  i s  a  more s a lie n t conditioned 
stim ulus analog than another stim ulus th a t  i s  concurrently  introduced 
and assoc ia ted  w ith the  u n certa in ty , i t  would be p red ic ted  to  
overshadow th a t stim ulus. For example, a  change agent may be a  
more s a l ie n t  stim ulus than a  job redesign program (perhaps because the  
consultant i s  a  more d isc re te , observable stim ulus and a so c ia l 
stim ulus as w e ll). In  such a  case, even though both the  program 
and th e  change agent are  assoc ia ted  with uncerta in ty , c o n f lic t, or 
evaluative observation, only the  change agent w ill  become a  learned 
source o f d riv e . Therefore, the  change agent w ill  be th e  object 
which induces so c ia l f a c i l i t a t io n ,  he/she w ill  be the  one to  whom 
escape and avoidance responses w il l  be d irec ted  toward, and h is /h e r  
presence w ill be punishing.
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Conclusions
The presen t an a ly sis  of job redesign has tended to  emphasize
how negative e f fe c ts  could occur in  job redesign  s itu a tio n s . This
type of an aly sis  has been in sp ired  by the  recen t find ings th a t
job redesign  i s  not always successfu l (see , e .g . ,  Hackman, 1975&,
1975^1 Passmore, l979î Rush, l97l)«  Passmore (1979) noted severa l
"roadblocks" fo r  e f fo r ts  in  work re s tru c tu r in g . He ind ica ted  th a t ;
th e  knowledge th a t  successfu l work re s tru c tu r in g  i s  
not always easy to  achieve i s  spreading; and while 
we have begun to  hear of e f fo r ts  th a t  have fa i le d  
a f te r  th e i r  in troduction , one must wonder how many 
e f fo r ts  have been abandoned before they  ever reached 
th e  experim ental phase. . . .  He suspect th a t  the  
number of such aborted attem pts g re a tly  exceeds the 
number of g lo r i f ie d  successes due to  d i f f i c u l t i e s  
encountered e a r ly  on in  th e  process, (p . 3I 9)
Many of the  roadblocks Passmore sp ec ified  have already  been analyzed
in  learn in g  th e o re tic a l  terms or are  amenable to  such an an a ly sis ;
For example, "p ressures fo r  unifo rm ity"; "employee re s is ta n c e  due
to  lack  of e a r ly  involvement"; "pressure from com petitors to
maintain/improve p ro d u c tiv ity /q u a lity " ; " c o lle c tiv e  bargaining
dynamics"; "unfavorable r a t io  of psychological costs  to  b en efits
fo r  employees"—po ssib ly  analogous to  a  lack  of p o s itiv e  rewards
or the  absence of counterconditioning; and " in su ff ic ie n t tra in in g
fo r  employees and supervisors fo r  new ro le s " . S im ilarly , many of
the "b a rrie rs"  to  job redesign described by Rush are  in te rp re ta b le
from a learn ing  th e o re tic a l  vantage p o in t.
The fa i lu re s  of job redesign could be a ttr ib u te d  to  fa c to rs
other than those e laborated  on in  th i s  an a ly s is . However, the
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fa c to rs  analyzed in  th is  paper may be re lev an t to  not only 
understanding the  f a i lu re s  of job redesign and the  process whereby 
they  occurred (or could occur), but a lso  to  understanding how 
f a i lu r e s  might be prevented. This could a id  in  precluding job 
enrichment, as a  job redesign technique, from becoming " ju s t  
another behavioral science fad" (Hackman, 1975a) and th e re fo re  
d iscarded as a  to o l fo r  improving th e  workplace, Hackman (l975’o) 
cautioned th a t  "work redesign as an o rgan izational change s tra teg y  
w ill  f in d  i t s e l f  a t  d e a th 's  door" (p. 99)* The presen t an a ly sis  
provides the  kind of c lea r guidance needed to  avoid these  p e r i ls  
by making the p re sc rip tio n s  involved in  implementing job redesign 
more e x p lic it  and understandable.
Along the road to  understanding more about job redesign , the  
p resent an aly sis  has generated a  p a tte rn  of u se fu l, q u a n tita tiv e ly  
p rec ise  p red ic tio n s  th a t  have not been generated by in tu i t io n  but 
are lo g ic a lly  derived from a common th e o re tic a l  o rig in . The 
f r u i t f u l  p o s s ib i l i t ie s  which th ese  p red ic tio n s  bear fo r  research  
in  job redesign a re  p le n t i fu l .  The knowledge about applying job 
redesign techniques in  the  workplace i s  not only increased , but 
the  p rospects fo r  job redesign as a  research  a rea  becoming 
much more s c ie n t i f ic  in  the  process are a lso  g re a t. Few researchers  
would question the  p leasing  na tu re  of these  g o a ls.
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Footnotes
1. A source of drive can be hypothesized to  be present 
which would, energize hab it s tren g th  in  th is  experiment. Subjects 
were aware th a t  they were in  an experiment and th e  object of 
observation, Spence & Spence ( I966) ,  fo r  example, noted th a t 
" i t  could be argued th a t Ss perceive psychological experiments as 
being threatening" (p. 30?), (See a lso  Machol, 19?50
2. For in v estig a to rs  in te re s te d  in  determining a  g rad ien t 
o f generaliza tion  and th e re fo re  req u irin g  the measurement of 
psychological s im ila r ity  a ttr ib u te d  to  various s tim u li, see 
Weiss (1963) .
3 . Although learned drives have been observed to  be r e la t iv e ly  
re s is ta n t  to  ex tinc tion  ( e .g . .  M ille r, I 93I ;  Weiss, I98O), th e  
d riv e  conditioned to  the  change agent would be p red ic ted  to  
extinguish  i f  he/she completely ceased in  engaging in  noxious 
evaluations of the  worker. Therefore, when the  change agent i s  
used in  subsequent learn ing  paradigms, i t  w ill be assumed th a t  
h is /h e r  a b i l i ty  to  function as a  learned source of drive w ill
no t have been extinguished. Procedurally , th is  could occur
no t only through a  re lian ce  on the  acq u is itio n  procedure described
but a lso  v ia  a  procedure known as reinstatem ent (Rescorla & Heth, 1975) •
In  t h i s  procedure, the  learned drive p ro p ertie s  of th e  change agent
could be re in s ta te d  by having th e  employee evaluated, although the
change agent would not n ecessa rily  be d ire c t ly  connected with the
evaluation.
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k .  Day and Hamblin (1$64), fo r  example, found in  a  labora to ry  
experiment th a t aggressive responses were d irec ted  toward a  
supervisor with pun itive  and/or close supervisory s ty le s .  In  
ad d itio n , sub jects had lowered p ro d u c tiv ity  ra te s  w ith these 
aversive s ty le s  of supervision in  con trast to  general, non- 
p u n itive  supervisory s ty le s . The authors in te rp re ted  th e i r  
an a ly sis  v ia  a  fru s tra tio n -ag g ress io n  hypothesis ( e .g . ,  M ille r, 
however, because the  ta sk  employed by Day and Hamblin was 
described as novel and complex, th e  p resen t analy sis  could ascribe  
the  lowered p ro d u c tiv ity  to  " so c ia l fa c i l i ta t io n "  re su ltin g  from 
increased drive generated by c lose  and/or pun itive  superv ision .
5 . Measures of response s tren g th  bear monotonie re la tio n sh ip s  
to  ex c ita to ry  p o te n tia l .  For p a r tic u la r  measures th i s  may be 
l in e a r  or 8-shaped. Consequently, a  good approximation can be 
made to  any o rd inal v a riab le .
6 . I t  has been assumed here th a t p a r tic ip a tio n  i s  re in fo rc in g . 
This i s  a widely held  though o ften  im p lic it b e lie f  in  o rgan izational 
behavior and organ izational development ( e .g . ,  G reiner, I 967; 
Herzberg, 1974; Kahn, 1975> Marrow, 1975; Schuster, I 979) .  
Experimental research  which supports th i s  assumption i s  av a ilab le , 
however. For example, the  opportunity  to  speak in  re p ly  has been 
shown to  function as a  re in fo rce r  ( e .g . , Weiss, Boyer, Colwick, & 
Moran, 1971; Weiss, Lombardo, Warren, & K elley, l9 7 l) .  Also, i t  
has been shown th a t  an argument which supports an opinion can 
function  as a re in fo rc e r  ( e .g . ,  Weiss, I 968) , and th a t information
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i t s e l f  cam be re in fo rc in g  (Weiss & Weiss, l9 ?0 ). I t  cam be argued 
th a t  these  and o ther re in fo rc in g  events can occur when p a rtic ip a tio n  
i s  employed in  the  workplace (c f . Marrow, 1975) • P a rtic ip a tio n  
gives the  employee access to  inform ation, i t  allows the  employee 
to  express h is /h e r  opinion, auid i t  cam produce arguments ( e .g . ,  
v ia  th e  employee's peers) which support the  employee's opinions.
?5 Lawrence (1975) noted th a t  the  un certa in ty  associated  
w ith jobs has increased in  the  l a s t  f i f t y  years. Lawrence s ta te d  
th a t  p o s itiv e  aspects of un certa in ty  r e s u l t  by allowing in d iv id u a ls  
to  u t i l i z e  more completely th e i r  problem-solving cap ac itie s  (he 
noted th a t  th is  capacity  has a lso  in c reased ). The present conception 
of un certa in ty , unlike Lawrence's, emphasizes how i t  can be 
aversive . Lawrence, h im self, noted th a t  h is  own research  supported 
a view th a t such uncerta in ty  i s  not always desired  (Turner & Lawrence, 
1965) .  The p resen t analysis  may a l le v ia te  such a  discrepancy, 
although the  recognition  of some re lev an t in d iv idua l d ifferences i s  
incorporated l a t e r  in to  the  theory .
8. Rush ( I 97I )  even noted th a t  by employing the  word "program" 
i t s e l f  to  describe a  job redesign e f fo r t ,  im plications of i t  
being a  "luxury" or a "fad" can become b a rr ie rs  to  success a t  a 
l a t e r  p o in t. For example, i f  changes occur in  the  o rg an iza tio n 's  
environment, management w ill  often  re s o r t  to  cancelling  these 
lu x u rie s . (See, e .g . ,  S ta a ts , 1975» fo r  a  learn ing  th e o re tic a l 
analy sis  of the  formation of a t t i tu d in a l  responses to  verbal 
s tim u li.)
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9. One p o te n tia l problem with th is  analy sis  re s id es  in  the 
change from the  superv isor alone observing the  employee to  two 
ind iv idua ls  evaluating th e  employee (the  superv isor and th e  change 
agen t). I f  the  change from one observer to  two was a  s ig n if ic a n t 
increase  in  d rive  in te n s ity , then unblocking would be p red ic ted , 
re su ltin g  in  conditioning of the  aversive d rive  to  the  change agent. 
To e lim inate  such a  problem in  th i s  an a ly s is , th e  superv isor could 
i n i t i a l l y  evaluate the  employee w ith another person present (h is /  
her a s s is ta n t)  and th a t  person would subsequently be absent when 
the  change agent evaluated the employee with the  superv isor. In 
o ther words, th e  change agent i s  su b s titu te d  a t  a  l a te r  po in t in  
time fo r  th e  a s s is ta n t (c f . Cramer, Weiss, B ailing , & S te ig leder, 
1981).
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CHAPTER I I I
A LEARNING THEORETICAL ANALYSIS OP THE HAWTHORNE STUDIES^
In troduction
The research  conducted a t  the Hawthorne p lan t of the  Western 
E le c tr ic  Company has "been tre a te d  by scho lars  in  widely d iverse  
manners. I t  has been condemned completely (Carey, I 967) ,  c r i t ic iz e d  
in  p a rt (Argyle, 1953» Sykes, I 965)» defended (Landsberger, 1958; 
Shepard, 1971)» and. re in te rp re te d  in  various l ig h ts  ( e .g . .  Acker & 
Van Houten, l97^; B e ll, 19^7; Hare, 19&7; Kahn, 1975î Lawler,
1975; Parsons, 1974; P e th ia , I 979) .  D espite the  numerous problems 
in  research  methodology and in te rp re ta tio n , the  Hawthorne research  
i s  genera lly  considered to  be a  c la s s ic  study in  management ( e .g . ,  
Cass & Zimmer, 1975; Chase, 19^5; Landsberger, I 958; Shepard, 1971).
The Hawthorne s tu d ie s , p a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  case of the  Relay 
Assembly Test Room, can be examined o r in te rp re te d  as a  s e r ie s  of 
f i e l d  s tu d ie s . A co n tro lled  experiment was not achieved although 
th i s  was th e  i n i t i a l  in te n tio n  of the  in v e s tig a to rs  (Carey, I 967 ; 
R oeth lisberger & Dickson, 1939» see e sp e c ia lly  pp. 183-186; 
Whitehead, 1938). In  s p ite  of th i s  l im ita tio n , however, the  re p o rts  
of th e  Relay Assembly Test Room and th e  o ther Hawthorne s tu d ie s , 
provide an amazing amount of so c ia l observational "data".
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Because th e  Relay Assembly Test Room was in  essence a  
f i e ld  s i tu a tio n , innumerable sources of both p o s itiv e  and negative 
reinforcem ent were undoubtedly p resen t, ju s t  as they  are in  other 
n a tu ra l s itu a tio n s  (see , e .g . ,  B ollard  & H ille r , 1950; M iller & 
DoUard, 19^1). Most in v estig a to rs  have emphasized the former; 
fo r  example, Parsons (l97^) u t i l iz e d  an operant conditioning 
perspective and focused on the  inform ation concerning the opera to rs ' 
output and f in a n c ia l rewards received , noting th a t  both functioned 
as p o s itiv e  re in fo rce rs  of behavior. S im ilarly , Lawler (1975) 
noted th a t wage incen tives were t ie d  to  performance and thereby 
influenced behavior. Kahn (1975) examined the  increased  opportunity 
of the  employees in  the  Relay Assembly Test Room fo r  p a rtic ip a tio n  
(c f . Schein, 1975)» P a rtic ip a tio n  a lso  can be viewed as a  re in fo rce r 
( r e fe r  to  Chapter I I ,  note 6).
There i s  a lso  ample evidence of aversive m otivators and 
re in fo rce rs  of behavior in  the  Relay Assembly Test Room. The 
present theory w ill attem pt to  red ress  the  imbalance created  by the  
emphasis thus f a r  placed on p o s itiv e  re in fo rce rs  in  the  Hawthorne 
s tu d ies  by focusing on the  negative re in fo rce rs  th a t  were e x is te n t.
Recently in v estig a to rs  have observed th a t th e  Hawthorne 
s tu d ie s , p a r tic u la r ly  the  Relay Assembly Test Room, have not 
evinced the  ro le  of p o s itiv e  incen tives fo r  the  observed increased 
output ; bu t, ra th e r , when re in te rp re te d , there  seems to  be evidence 
fo r  negative fa c to rs  in  the  s itu a tio n  (Acker & Van Houten, 197“̂ ; 
F a r r is ,  19&9; Franke & Kaul, 1978). Thus f a r ,  however, learn ing
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theory  has not been employed as a  th e o re tic a l to o l to  a s s is t  in  
analyzing what p rec ise ly  would be th e  ro le  of negative s tim u li in  
th e  work environment in  th e  Hawthorne s tu d ie s , or to  e j^ la in  the 
various ways in  which th ese  negative fa c to rs  might a ffe c t employee 
behavior. Learning theory  i s  e sp ec ia lly  su ita b le  fo r  such a  ta sk ; 
i t  has been employed to  p red ic t and exp>lain behaviors motivated by 
a  ïfide v a rie ty  of so c ia lly  in te re s tin g  aversive sources of drive 
( e .g . ,  behavior motivated by a ltru ism : Weiss, Boyer, Lombardo,
& S tich , 1973; Weiss, Buchanan, A l ts ta t t ,  & Lombardo, 19?1; 
competitions S te ig led er, Weiss, B alling , Wenninger, & Lombardo, 
I 98O; S te ig led e r, Weiss, Cramer, & Peinberg, l9?8; co n flic ts  
Berlyne, I 965; M ille r, I 9# ;  Weiss, I 963; conformity: Seybert & 
Weiss, 1974; effectances Byrne, I 97I ;  Byrne & Glore, 1967:
Lombardo, Libkuman, & Weiss, 1972; Weiss, Lombardo, Warren, &
K elley, 1971; evaluative  observations C o ttre l l ,  I 968; Lombardo & 
Catalano, 1975; Shea, Routh, C o ttre l l ,  & Brecht, 1973; Weiss & 
M ille r, I 97I ;  fea rs  C ecil, Weiss, & Peinberg, 1978; M ille r, l95l)* 
Since many s o c ia lly  in te re s t in g  sources of aversive motivation 
have been made understandable in  learn ing  th e o re tic a l  term s, th e i r  
fu r th e r  extension to  a  c la s s ic  s e r ie s  of s tu d ies  in  management might 
be h ighly  b en e fic ia l in  generating an understanding o f th is  m ateria l 
guided by th eo ry .
The I l lu s t r io u s  "Hawthorne E ffec t”
The "Hawthorne e ffec t"  i s  one of the  more widely-known 
p rin c ip le s  of the  so c ia l sciences. P ra c tic a l ly  ever textbook
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in  o rgan iza tional behavior r e fe rs  to  i t  in  one form of another
and researchers  attem pt to  con tro l or discount i t s  infamous e ffe c ts
on th e i r  sub jec ts  (see , e .g . ,  Cook, I 962, 19&7; Machol, 1975;
Somner, I 968; c f .  Rubeck, 1 9 7 5 ) •
The d e fin itio n s  of the  Hawthorne e f fe c t ,  while somewhat
varied , a l l  ex h ib it a  s im ila r theme. For example. Rush (l97 l)
s ta te d  a  d e f in itio n  which i s  ty p ic a l of most d esc rip tio n s  of the
Hawthorne e f fe c t ;  "What i s  popularly  c a lle d  the  'Hawthorne e f f e c t '
denotes higher p ro d u c tiv ity  among workers because they  are being
noticed" (p. 60) .  S im ilarly , B oettinger (1975) s ta te d  th e  following
concerning the  Hawthorne e f fe c t ;
The mere observation of human beings, th e  showing 
o f management concern, the  process of experiment, 
and the in te ra c tio n  of the  people w ith those 
conducting the  experiment—a l l  these  themselves 
were a  stim ulus to  progress (measured in  production 
e ffic ien cy ) which swamped the p u rity  of c la s s ic  
hypothesis te s t in g ,  (p. 26^)
Cook (1967) in d ica ted  th a t  th e  Hawthorne e f fe c t  i s ;
s a id  to  be caused by th e  sub jec t in  th e  experiment 
re a liz in g  th a t  he i s  a  p a r tic ip a n t in  an experiment 
and thus th e  object of sp ec ia l a tte n tio n , whether 
r e a l  or imagined. Such awareness gen era lly  i s  sa id  
to  have a  p o s itiv e  f a c i l i t a t iv e  e ffe c t on th e  s u b je c t 's  
performance during the  duration of th e  experim ental 
s i tu a tio n , (p . 1)
This paper w ill subsequently show th a t  the  key word in  the  above
statem ent by Cook may be "performance".
Social F a c il i ta t io n  and the  Hawthorne E ffec t
Zajonc ( I 965) th e o re tic a lly  d iscrim inated  audience e ffe c ts
on learn ing  from audience e ffe c ts  on performance in  h is  exemplary
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re c o n c ilia tio n  of co n flic tin g  d a ta  in  th e  fundamental so c ia l 
psychological research  a rea , " so c ia l f a c i l i t a t io n " .  The e ffe c ts  
of observation f a c i l i t a t e  performance of a  w ell-leam ed  ta sk  but 
have detrim enta l consequences fo r  the  learn in g  of a  novel ta sk .
By employing learn in g  theory , Zajonc was able to  make the  e ffe c ts  
of evaluative  audiences on behavior a  p red ic tab le  p rocess. F u rther 
e laborations and refinem ents of Zajonc*s o rig in a l th e o re tic a l  
proposal ( e ,g , ,  C o t tr e l l ,  I 968; Weiss & M ille r , I 97I )  have le d  
review ers to  conclude th a t  learn in g  theory  i s  the  most capable 
theory  advanced so fa r  in  th i s  p iv o ta l f i e ld  of research  (Geen &
Gange, I 977) ,
Learning theory  has made so c ia l  f a c i l i t a t io n  more understandable; 
i t  might s im ila r ly  expedite an understanding of the  Hawthorne e f fe c t— 
as i t  was o r ig in a lly  e ffec ted  and how i t  might subsequently be 
induced. For example, most experiments attem pting to  t e s t  or 
con tro l fo r  Hawthorne e ffe c ts  have not made the  c ru c ia l d is tin c tio n  
between learn ing  and performance and th e re fo re  have not examined 
the  ro le  of ta sk  complexity ( e ,g , .  Cook, I 967; F lohr, 1977; Haddad, 
Nation, & W illiams, 1975; Hakel, ELimoski, & Wood, 1975; Morse & 
Reiner, 195^; Olson, I 968) ,  Learning theo ry  p re d ic ts , however, 
th a t  th e  d rive induced by evaluative  observation (C o ttr e ll ,  I 968) 
w ill energize a l l  responses and th a t  th e  b en e fits  in  responding 
w ill accrue to  dominant h a b its . E rrors a re  often  th e  dominant 
response on a  novel, complex ta sk  and are  rampant when an evaluative  
audience observes the  learn ing  of such a  ta sk . A lte rn a tiv e ly ,
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co rrec t responses are g en era lly  dominant on a  w ell-leam ed  simple 
ta sk  and w ill be energized and em itted in  the  presence of evaluative 
o th e rs .
The I n i t i a l  Illum ination  Experiments a t Hawthorne
The o rig in a l Hawthorne e ffe c t was discovered in  a  s e r ie s  of 
experiments a t  th e  Hawthorne p lan t of the  Western E le c tr ic  Company. 
These experiments were designed to  assess the  e ffe c ts  of illum ination  
on p ro d u c tiv ity . In  the  f i r s t  experiment, th ree  departments were 
observed. The ta sk s  involved were re la y  assembly, c o il  winding, 
and the  in spection  of sm all p iece p a rts  (R oethlisberger & Dickson, 
1939).
The Hawthorne p lan t a t  the  time of th i s  study (1924) was 
ty p ic a l of o ther in d u s tr ie s  in  th a t  many of i t s  employees were 
engaged in  r e p e ti t iv e  work (R oethlisberger & Dickson, 1939!
Whitehead, 1938)• Whitehead e lab o ra te ly  described the  ta sk  of 
assembling re la y s  which was the  a c t iv i ty  in  the  study fo r  which 
th e  Hawthorne s tu d ie s  are  most widely known; the  Relay Assembly 
T est Room. A d e ta ile d  examination of th is  ta sk  in  learn ing  
th e o re tic a l  terms makes i t  possib le  to  id e n tify  i t  as a ta sk  on 
Tdiich dominant responses were co rre c t, p a r tic u la r ly  fo r  the 
experienced worker. A s im ila r  statem ent could be made fo r
the  ta sk  of c o il  winding which was the  task  stud ied  in  the 
subsequent illum ination  experiment. The ta sk , as described by- 
R oeth lisberger & Dickson was th a t  of winding small induction 
c o ils  on wooden spools. No sp e c if ic  descrip tion  of the  inspection
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ta sk  was presented. Therefore, our examination of th i s  i n i t i a l
experiment w ill  focus on th e  ta sk s  about which inform ation i s
2more abundant: re la y  assembly and c o il  winding. U nfortunately, 
i t  i s  not known how many of the  p a r tic ip a n ts  in  th i s  study were 
experienced workers.
I t  can be noted a t  th is  po in t th a t  a  major problem with 
these  i n i t i a l  s tu d ie s  i s  th a t  no formal tech n ica l rep o rt of them 
e x is ts .  However, one i s  s t i l l  perm itted to  make ce r ta in  assumptions 
of what d id  occur in  these  i n i t i a l  s tu d ies  and draw conclusions 
based on these  assumptions. N atu ra lly , some conclusions w ill  be 
more p rov isional than o th ers , based on the  d esc rip tio n  of the  
c r i t i c a l  v a riab les  fo r  a  learn ing  th e o re tic a l  an a ly s is .
I f  the  workers involved in  c o il  winding and re la y  assembling 
were of s u f f ic ie n t experience so th a t  we can charac te rize  them in  
learn ing  th e o re tic a l  terms as having dominant co rrec t h a b its , then 
th e  observation by the  experimenters would be p red ic ted  to  have 
energized these co rrec t h a b its  and thereby f a c i l i t a te d  performance. 
In  these  two departments such f a c i l i t a t io n  did  occur. Output d id  
Increase "more or le s s  continuously" w ithout any d ire c t  re la tio n  
to  in te n s ity  of illum ination  (Snow, 192?),
A subsequent experiment (employing c o il winders) varied  
illum ination  in  a  t e s t  group while attem pting to  keep illum ination  
constant in  a  con tro l group. Both groups were roughly matched on 
previous output and experience on the  ta sk . Again, i f  we assume 
th a t  workers in  both groups were o f s u f f ic ie n t experience so th a t
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th e i r  dominant responses were co rrec t, then th e i r  knowledge of the  
experiment w ith the  accompanying observation received  i s  p red ic ted  
to  have re su lte d  i n  an energ iza tion  of t h e i r  dominant co rrec t 
h a b its . The r e s u l ts  are  in  accord w ith th i s  p red ic tio n : "This 
t e s t  re su lte d  in  very appreciable production increases in  both 
groups and of almost id e n tic a l  magnitude" (Snow, 1927, p , 272),
A th ir d  experiment was conducted: th e  con tro l group experienced 
a constant le v e l of illu m in atio n , the  t e s t  group worked under 
conditions of decreasing in te n s i ty . With the  above s ta te d  
assumption concerning dominant co rrec t h a b its , i t  i s  p red ic ted  
th a t  performance w ill  again have been f a c i l i t a t e d  in  both groups. 
Such r e s u lts  were found u n t i l  the  lig h tin g  of the  t e s t  group was 
of such extreme inadequacy th a t  th e  workers complained th a t  they 
could not see th e i r  work. At t h i s  p o in t, production was no longer 
f a c i l i t a te d .  Snow (192?), however, s ta te d :  "The operatives could 
and d id  m aintain th e i r  e ff ic ie n cy  to  th i s  po in t in  s p ite  o f the  
discom fort and handicap of in s u ff ic ie n t illum ination" (p . 274),
The general conclusion of what caused th i s  and subsequent 
Hawthorne e ffe c ts  has. been prev iously  described . G enerally, i t  
i s  thought th a t  i f  a  worker i s  sub jec ted  to  considerable managerial 
a tte n tio n , he o r she w ill  f e e l  im portant and th e re fo re  content and 
productive. This i s  a  ty p ic a l and widely elaborated  textbook 
conclusion, th e  v a l id i ty  of which has been questioned by severa l 
scho lars ( e ,g , ,  Acker & Van Houten, 1974; Carey, 1967; Kahn, 1975; 
Parsons, 1974), The present learn ing  th e o re tic a l  in te rp re ta tio n .
82
s im ila r  in  some re sp ec ts  in  th a t  i t  a lso  in v e s tig a te s  th e  
"a tten tio n "  received  hy these  workers, i s  widely d isp a ra te  on a 
c ru c ia l dimension. The a tte n tio n  received hy these  workers i s  not 
conceived by the  p resen t analysis  as p o s itiv e  or ap p e titiv e  in  
n a tu re , Weiss and M ille r (19?1) c lea rly  in d ica ted  th a t  the  drive 
induced by audience observation i s  aversive o r noxious, as are  o ther 
so c ia l learned  d rives ( e .g . ,  Brown, i953f Brown & Farber, I 968; 
Weiss, 1980) .  The p resen t theory a lso  focuses on a  key v a riab le  
idiich in  th e  illu m in a tio n  experiments was co in c id en ta lly  favorable 
f o r  th e  f a c i l i t a t io n  of performance; ta sk  complexity. I f  the  
ta sk  had in s tead  been one which was h ighly  d i f f i c u l t  or i f  the  
workers had been inexperienced and th e i r  dominant responses had 
been in c o rre c t, then e rro rs  would have been energized w ith a 
reduction in  q u a lity  and a  d e b ili ta tio n  in  responding p red ic ted .
The F i r s t  Relay Assembly T est Room
Research re p o rts  describe th e  ta sk  o f assembling re lay s
as r e p e ti t iv e  ( e .g . ,  Cass & Zimmer, 19755 Chase, 19^5? Gange â
Fleishman, l959î Pennock, 1930; R oeth lisberger & Dickson, l939i
Whitehead, 1938). Whitehead sp ec ified  the  ta sk  and concluded th a t
s k i l l  was a  fa c to r  in  th a t  an u n sk illed  o r inexperienced "novice"
would f in d  re la y  assembly somewhat d i f f i c u l t .  Whitehead fu r th e r
ind ica ted  th a t  :
In  order not to  complicate a  study o f employee 
a t t i tu d e s  and motives w ith problems r e la t in g  to  the  
i n i t i a l  acq u is itio n  of s k i l l ,  the  o r ig in a l Relay 
Test Group were a l l  chosen from among those with 
considerable experience in  the  assembly of th i s  kind 
of re la y , (p. 14-)
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They were termed by Whitehead as "ex p e rts" . (The ta sk  fo r  th is  
p a r t ic u la r  group of operators was even modified by the  word 
"hab itual" by Whitehead [p . 1 4 ].)
Another fa c to r  introduced in  the  t e s t  room corroborates the  
assumption th a t  th e  workers' ta sk  was one fo r  which dominant 
responses were c o rre c t. The in v e s tig a to rs  a tten p ted  to  reduce 
the  number and frequency of changes in  re la y  type which the 
operators had prev iously  experienced in  th e i r  re g u la r  department 
( e .g . ,  Cass & Zimmer, 1975» R oeth lisberger & Dickson, 1939»
Whitehead, 1938). The e f fe c t  of th is  may be assumed to  have 
re su lte d  in  a  g re a te r  s im p lific a tio n  of th e  ta sk , re su lt in g  in  
th e  co rrec t h ab it being more dominant than i f  v a r ia b i l i ty  in  
r e la y  type was more pronounced.
One worker, designated as  Operator 5» was unlike th e  o ther 
operators in  sev e ra l re sp ec ts . Her discrepancy w ill  be shown to  
be s ig n if ic a n t fo r  the  p resen t theory on sev era l dimensions.
Concerning th e  ta sk  i t s e l f ,  f o r  Operator 5 two s ig n if ic a n t d e ta i ls  are 
ev ident: (a) she was the  l e a s t  experienced operator (R oethlisberger
& Dickson, 1939» Table 1, p . 23; Whitehead, 1938, Table 2, p. 16); 
and (b) she encountered the  g re a te s t number of changes in  re la y  
type (R oethlisberger & Dickson, 1939; Whitehead I 938 [see  e sp ec ia lly  
vo l. 2, graph K-63] ) ,  Whitehead, fo r  example, s ta te d  "Operator 5 
. . . changed type so often  as  p ra c t ic a l ly  to  never work fo r  a  whole 
day on any one type" (p. 7I ) .  The e f fe c t  of these  fa c to rs  fo r  
Operator 5 w ill  be assumed to  have been th a t :  (a) her ta s k  was
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more complex than the  o ther o p era to rs ' (because of a  g re a te r  number 
o f re la y  changes); and (b) her co rrec t hab its  f o r  th is  ta sk  were 
le s s  dominant in  her h ab it h ierarchy  than those charac te riz ing  the  
o ther operators (due to  her being le s s  experienced and having a  
more complex task)
Social F a c il i ta t io n  in  the  Relay Assembly Test Room
I t  would appear th a t  w ithin the  Relay Assembly Test Room a  ta sk  
was present th a t  was r ip e  fo r  f a c i l i ta t io n  e f fe c ts  on performance (with 
th e  exception of Operator 5 's  ta s k ) .  The question rem ains, however, 
Tdiether the  workers perceived an evaluative audience. I f  they did , 
then  the  requirements f o r  so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  have been f u l f i l l e d :
(a) a  simple ta sk  in  which dominant responses a re  co rre c t; and
(b) an evaluative audience which energized those dominant responses.
The evaluation in  a  so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  paradigm need not be 
e x p lic i t .  Im p lic it o r an tic ip a ted  observation can arouse the  
so c ia lly  learned  drive ( e .g . ,  Henchy & G lass, I 968) .  In  add ition , 
a  n eu tra l cue may be c la ss ic a l Ty conditioned to  th e  aversive drive 
and therefo re  serve as a  "symbolic audience" (Weiss & M ille r, l9 ? l ) .
A c la s s ic a lly  conditioned symbolic audience o r an an tic ip a ted  
audience a ffec ts  responding in  a  so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  paradigm.
Therefore, th e  Relay Assembly T est Room appears to  conform to  
th e  requirements of a  so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  paradigm. The workers 
in  the  Relay Assembly Test Room were aware th a t th e i r  performance 
was being continuously monitored, thus the  im plied presence of
85
evaluative o thers was p re sen t. A ll le v e ls  of the  organization 
were in te re s te d  in  the  find ings o f the  t e s t  room and the  operators 
were undoubtedly aware o f th i s .  Furthermore, Homans (1972) s ta te d  
th a t  "they knew th a t the  eyes o f th e  company were upon them" (p . Z k 7 )  
implying th a t  the  concept o f a  symbolic audience was a lso  operative 
f o r  the  workers in  th is  study.
There were a lso  sev era l instances in  which th e re  i s  good 
zreason to  assume th a t the  operators were confronted w ith an e x p lic it  
audience. The descrip tions of the  events in  the  Relay Assembly Test 
Room by R oethlisberger & Dickson (1939) and Whitehead (1938) 
o ffe r  many elaborations o f evaluative audiences fo r  th e  workers.
For example, a  d escrip tion  hy R oeth lisberger and Dickson of the  
t e s t  room i s  one which emphasized th e  existence o f m ultip le obseiTvers:
I t  would be in c o rre c t, then to  th in k  o f the 
Relay Assembly T est Room as a  sm all room in  which 
th e re  were only f iv e  g i r l s ,  th e  layout opera to r, and 
occasionally , an in spec to r. By Period X III th e re  was 
the  newly created department ch ief (the o rig in a l t e s t  
room observer), who spent a  good share o f h is  time 
in  the  room. And fu r th e r below him was th e  jun io r 
c le rk  and o ffice  boy, a  young I ta l ia n  boy in  h is 
l a te  teen s . At a  l a t e r  d a te , a  young woman also  
was added to  the  group. Her du ties  were mainly 
re la te d  to  s t a t i s t i c a l  s tu d ie s , but she in  f a c t  a lso  
contributed  her observations about what was going 
on. Besides these d a ily  con tac ts, a  number o f o ther 
people v is i te d  the  room. In  th e  beginning, th e  then 
superintendent of the Inspection  Branch, who was 
extremely in te re s te d  in  the  experiment, was a  frequent 
v is i to r .  There was an in te rm itte n t stream of o ther 
v is i to r s  o r consu ltan ts: in d u s t r ia l i s ts ,  in d u s tr ia l  
re la tio n s  experts, in d u s tr ia l  psychologists, and 
u n iv e rs ity  p ro fesso rs, (p . 180)
This d escrip tion  c e rta in ly  makes the po in t c ry s ta l c lea r  th a t
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evaluative observation d id  occur in  th e  Relay Assembly Test Room,
I t  should be emphasized th a t ,  unlike R oethlisberger and Dickson 
(1939)» the  p resent theory  does not view th is  observation as a  
p o s itiv e  incen tive  but as an aversive source of d rive which 
energized hab it s tren g th  and f a c i l i t a te d  performance. The fa c t  
th a t  m ultiple observers were present i s  p red ic ted  to  have fu r th e r  
heightened th is  drive since the  learn ing  process of summation of 
th e  d rive  induced by evaluative observation occurs when m ultip le  
observers are  p resent (see , e .g . ,  Weiss & M ille r, I 97I ) .  In 
add ition , the  presence of expert observers, as described by 
R oethlisberger and Dickson i s  a lso  p red ic ted  to  have heightened 
th is  drive (see , e .g . ,  C o ttre l l ,  1972; Lombardo & Catalano, 1975)» 
Thus, the  evidence fo r  the  presence of a  source of drive v ia  
evaluative observation i s  av a ilab le . The energ ization  of performance 
i s  the  c la s s ic  r e s u l t  a t tr ib u te d  to  th i s  study—h is to r ic a l ly  
described as a  continuously increasing  ra te  of output ( e .g .,
Argyle, 1953» Homans, 1973» Landsberger, 1953» Pennock, 1930; 
R oethlisberger & Dickson, 1939> cf* P e th ia , 1979). Not only 
does learn ing  theory  p red ic t these i l lu s t r io u s  r e s u l ts ,  but in  
add ition  some a u x ilia ry  r e s u l ts  repo rted  by R oeth lisberger and 
Dickson (1939) ere amenable to  an aly sis  as w ell. S p ec ific a lly , 
Operator 5» in  addition to  exh ib iting  le s s  f a c i l i t a t io n  of 
performance than the o ther workers throughout the  study, generally  
made more e rro rs  than the group average (R oethlisberger & Dickson, 
I 939» Table V, p. 80) .  Q uality  was measured by re p a ir  time—
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the  average number of minutes per week taken to  re p a ir  p a r ts  th a t 
were d e fec tiv e , some of which should have been discovered by the 
operator. This d is tin c tio n  in  Operator 5 's  e rro rs  was more pronounced 
ea r ly  in  the study when she su ffered  more re la y  type changes than 
th e  r e s t  o f th e  group (see Whitehead, I 938, vo l. 2, graph K-63) .
These r e s u l ts  a re  p red ic tab le  from learn ing  theory  since e rro rs , 
the  dominant response on a  complex ta sk , a re  energized when a  source 
of d rive i s  p resen t. Numerous experiments have su ccessfu lly  te s ted  
th is  p red ic tio n  in  a  so c ia l  f a c i l i ta t io n  paradigm ( e .g . ,  C o ttre ll ,  
1968; C o ttre l l ,  R i t t le ,  & Wack, I 968; Sasfy & Okun, 1 9 7 5 ) •
C lass ica l Conditioning
In  add ition  to  the  general presence of observers in  the  
t e s t  room, evidence supports the  assumption th a t  sp e c if ic  ind iv iduals 
were assoc iated  with evaluative  observation. I f  an in d iv id u a l, 
as a  conditioned stim ulus analog (see , e .g . ,  L o tt & L o tt, I 968, I 972) ,  
i s  repeated ly  assoc iated  with an aversive source of d riv e , then th a t 
ind iv idua l w ill  be p red ic ted  to  become a conditioned source of 
drive (Weiss & M ille r, l 9 ? l }  Weiss, I 980) .  The e f fe c ts  of such 
conditioning do not merely concern the  p reviously  mentioned so c ia l 
f a c i l i t a t io n  paradigm (in  which th e  presence of th e  person conditioned 
to  aversive evaluation would energize dominant responses), but a lso  
involve two o ther e f fe c ts  a ttr ib u te d  to  drives (a) the  sudden onset 
of d rive  i s  punishing ; and (b) i t s  prompt reduction  i s  re in fo rc in g  
( e .g . ,  Brown, 1933; Logan, l959« Lombardo, Libkuman, & Weiss, I 972; 
B ollard  & M ille r, I 93O; Spence, I 958) .  I t  can th e re fo re  be p redicted
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th a t  i f  an ind iv idua l was assoc ia ted  with aversive observation in  
the Relay Assembly Test Room, then: (a) c e r ta in  behaviors em itted
in  the  presence of th a t  person would have been punished ( e .g . ,  
ta lk in g  might have been suppressed) ; and (b) a  behavior which allowed 
the  operators to  escape or avoid th a t  person would have been 
re in fo rced , and th e re fo re  strengthened.
The Test Room Observer. The t e s t  room observer was s ta tio n ed  
as a  fu ll- tim e  occupant of the  t e s t  room. He kept complete records 
of what occurred in  the  t e s t  room and took notes of the  opera to rs ' 
conversations. Whitehead (1938) presented evidence which ind icated  
th a t th e  operators d is lik e d  th i s  p ra c tic e .
There are  some in stances in  which the  t e s t  room observer was 
described as being ev a lu a tiv e , p u n itiv e , o r th rea ten ing . For 
example, R oeth lisberger & Dickson (1939) repo rted  th a t  the  t e s t  
room observer "asked them [th e  opera to rs] why they  d id  not t r y  
to  increase the percentage by 10 per cent" (p . 42). This statement 
perhaps re f le c te d  a  su b tle  pressure which would be in  accord with 
a  view th a t  the  observation by th e  t e s t  room observer was not as 
n e u tra l or p o s itiv e  as R oeth lisberger 6 Dickson seemed to  have 
concluded. S im ilarly , R oeth lisberger & Dickson reported  th a t  "the 
observer c a lled  the  a tte n tio n  of Operator 3 to  th e  fa c t  th a t  her 
output was low yesterday" (p . 46 ). He a lso  was noted as th reaten ing  
th e  g i r l s  with a  prolonged period of e lim ination  of the  favored 
r e s t  pauses in  an e f fo r t  to  curb ta lk in g .
G enerally, however, d esc rip tio n s  of the t e s t  room observer
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Ind icated  th a t the  operators came to  regard  him as a  non-threatening 
observer, p a r tic u la r ly  vrtien he i s  compared to  some of the o ther 
observers ( e .g .,  the foreman). The process whereby th i s  ind iv idual 
would loose h is  i n i t i a l  a b i l i ty  to  f a c i l i t a t e  the  performance of 
the  operators would be p red ic ted  by learn ing  theory to  occur with 
the  passage of tim e, perhaps e ith e r  through counterconditioning or 
ex tin c tio n . In  counterconditioning, a  stim ulus which has been 
conditioned as an aversive e x c ito r i s  subsequently p a ired  with an 
ap p e titiv e  stim ulus. In  ex tin c tio n , the  stim ulus which has been 
associated  with an aversive stim ulus no longer receives such 
associations but i s  in stead  presented by i t s e l f .  Since the 
operators often discussed th e i r  fe a rs  and an x ie tie s  w ith the t e s t  
room observer and he attempted to  reassu re  them, i t  can be hypothesized 
th a t some counterconditioning did  occur. In  ad d itio n , th e  t e s t  
room observer attem pted to  and was successfu l in  securing p riv ileg e s  
fo r  the  operators which could fu r th e r  have transform ed th e  
associations the operators had of him to  p o s itiv e  ones ( e .g . ,  he was 
a ttr ib u te d  as being responsib le fo r  th e i r  receiv ing  pay fo r  time 
not worked as p a r t of the  experimental conditions in  Period 11).
The Foreman. Unlike the t e s t  room observer, th e  foreman 
was and seemed to  remain more firm ly  entrenched as a  conditioned 
aversive stim ulus. I f  the  foreman, indeed, functioned as a 
conditioned aversive stim ulus fo r  the  t e s t  room opera to rs , i t  
would be p red icted  th a t he was capable of energizing dominant 
responding on th e i r  ta sk , punish o ther behaviors by h is  presence.
and escape or avoidance responses would be d irec ted  toward him.
There a re  several in stances c ite d  by the various re p o rts  of 
the  Relay Assembly Test Room which support the previous assumption 
th a t  the foreman was connected with evaluative  observation as 
w ell as o ther aversive motives. For example, on severa l occasions 
the  foreman d isc ip lin ed , reprimanded, and threatened  the opera tors.
A quote from the d a ily  h is to ry  record  of June 21, l92? sub tly  
i l lu s t r a t e s  the  ro le  of the  foreman as an evaluative observers 
"The foreman informed the  group of th e i r  low a c t iv i ty  fo r  the  
p a s t week" (R oethlisberger & Dickson, l939i P* 37). R oethlisberger 
and Dickson ind ica ted  th a t  the  ro le  of the  foreman in  the  reg u la r 
department had been th a t o f d is c ip lin a r ia n . That he continued in  
th i s  ro le  i s  not su rp ris in g  and sev era l instances of th is  behavior 
are  d e sc r ib e d .H o w e v e r , given the  f lav o r of th e  rep o rts  of the 
various Hawthorne s tu d ies  in  vAich the  "human re la tio n s"  approach 
i s  introduced, i t  i s  somewhat su rp ris in g  th a t evidence supporting 
th e  presence of negative re in fo rc e rs  i s  availab le  a t  a l l ,  (The 
observations were adm ittedly influenced by the b ias  of the  in v estig a to rs  
and the  observers, Whitehead, 1938.)
The fa c t  th a t the foreman remained responsib le fo r  r a te  
rev is io n , promotions, and s im ila r  a c t iv i t ie s  (R oethlisberger &
Dickson, 1939)» supports an assumption th a t  he posse:sed  a  high 
degree of "punitive  power" (Weiss & M ille r, I 97I )  over the  operators 
and thus could e ffe c tiv e ly  function  as a  learned source of d riv e .
The p a r tic u la r  aversive d rive  which was conditioned to  the  foreman
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may have been a  combination of evaluative  observation and fe a r  
i t s e l f .  The evidence fo r  learned  d rives i s  th a t  they  are a l l  
based on some form of noxious d riv e , fe a r  being one such source 
( e .g . ,  Brown, 1 9 5 3 }  Cravens & Renner, l970j Mineka, 1975» Tfeiss 
& M ille r, I 97I ;  Weiss, I 980) .  The evidence fo r  fe a r  as a  learned  
drive in  th i s  study, when i t  was no t connected with aversive 
observation, w il l  subsequently be presented .
Operator 2 . The in troduction  of Operator 2 in  the  t e s t  
room a t  the  commencement of Period 8 i s  observed by severa l 
re p o rts  of th i s  study as being a  noteworthy event. Operator 2 
was described by R oeth lisberger and Dickson (1939) and Whitehead 
( I 938) as "am bitious". There i s  evidence presented by these  
sources th a t  fo r  the  o ther operators she was assoc ia ted  with 
evaluative observation. There i s  a lso  some suggestion th a t  her 
in troduction  in to  the t e s t  room and subsequent tak ing  of the  ro le  
of ev a lu a te r re su lte d  in  the  foreman no longer find ing  i t  as 
necessary to  perform th e  ro le  of evaluative  observer him self 
(R oeth lisberger & Dickson, 1939î Whitehead, 1938).
The follow ing are some i l lu s t r a t io n s  supporting the  assumption 
th a t  Operator 2 was assoc ia ted  with evaluative  observation:
"Op, 2 c r i t ic iz e d  Op, 4 fo r  not doing more" (Whitehead, 1938,
P» I 23) ;  "Op. 2 was admonishing Ops. 3 and 4 fo r  not working hard 
enough" (R oethlisberger & Dickson, 1939, P* 0 ;  Whitehead, I 938 , 
p . I 23) ;  "Operator 2 . . . began to  urge the  o ther g i r l s  to  
increase  th e i r  pace" (R oethlisberger & Dickson, I 939 , p. 63) ;
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"Operator 2 again a sse rte d  h e rse lf  by oirderlng the  o ther g i r l s  to  
re f ra in  from ta lk ing" (R oethlisberger & Dickson, 1939» P» 63) î 
"Operator 2 q_uite freq u en tly  admonished one of the slower g i r l s .  
E sp ecia lly  in  th e  ea r ly  p a rt of the  period  [Period I 3 ] she exerted 
p ressure  on Operator 3» w ith the r e s u l t  th a t  these  two g i r l s  did 
not ta lk  to  each o ther fo r  severa l days" (R oethlisberger & Dickson, 
I 939, p . 7^);^  "Op. 2 had the  d e f in ite  purpose of increasing  
output and, being the dominating member of the  group, she impressed 
th is  purpose on the  others" (Whitehead, 1938» P« 132).
Taken as a  whole, th e  evidence seems to  conclusively  support 
the assumption th a t  Operator 2 was a sso c ia ted  w ith evaluative  
observation. There i s  a lso  evidence presented by R oeth lisberger 
and Dickson (1938) and Whitehead (1938) to  in d ic a te  the  aversive 
aspects of th i s  ro le  of Operator 2 's .  She was described as being 
resen ted  by th e  o ther workers and she was sub jected  to  an tag o n istic  
remarks. For example, "Op. 4 remarked to  Op. 2, 'Oh shut up 
am bitious'"  (Whitehead, 1938, p. 123). Whitehead fu r th e r  noted 
th a t Operator 2 "was occasionally  re fe r re d  to  as 'am b itio u s '.
This e p ith e t was always used with a  note of i r r i t a t io n "  (p . l2 3 ).
Since th e  evidence seems to  conclusively  support the  assumption 
th a t  Operator 2 became a  conditioned source of d riv e , i t  i s  p red ic ted  
th a t  she would have energized the responses of the  operators on 
th e i r  ta sk . Operator 2 's  in troduction  in  Period 8 d id  e f fe c t  a 
s ig n if ic a n t in c lin e  in  the hourly output of the group (Franke & Kaul, 
I 978) .  The s t a t i s t i c a l  confirm ation of th i s  e f fe c t  by Pranke & Kaul
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w ill be discussed sh o rtly .
The Influence of Fear 
in  the  Relay Assembly Test Room 
A llusions have already been made to  the  ro le  of fe a r  or 
anxiety  in  the t e s t  room. Fear i t s e l f  has been given a p o ten tia l 
ro le  in  so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  as the  source of drive associated  with 
the  presence of o thers observing a  person perform a  ta sk  (Weiss & 
M ille r, I 97I ) , There a re , however, some instances in  the  Relay 
Assembly Test Room which more accura te ly  would be a ttr ib u te d  to  
f e a r  as an aversive drive without the influence of evaluative 
observation. These w ill  now be sp ec ified . The e ffe c ts  of fe a r  
on the  behavior of the  operators would be the same as those 
assoc ia ted  with o ther noxious d riv es .
The previously noted th re a ts ,  d isc ip lin a ry  ac tio n s, and 
reprimands the operators received from the foreman and other sources 
may more appropria te ly  be a ttr ib u te d  d ire c tly  to  fe a r  or anxiety.
One p a r tic u la r  instance i s  notable in  th is  regard ; Operators l a  
and 2a were dismissed from the t e s t  room and replaced a t  the end 
o f Period  7 due to  " lack  of cooperation" and " h o s t ili ty "  (Gass & 
Zimmer, l975i R oeth lisberger & Dickson, 1939» Whitehead, 1938). As 
p reviously  noted, a  s ig n if ic a n t r i s e  in  p roductiv ity  in  Period 8 
ensued. Since, as previously noted, th is  period a lso  concomitantly 
involved the  in troduction  of Operator 2, a  hypothesized learned source
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of evaluative  observation, we can p o s tu la te  th a t  two re la te d  
sources of d rive occurred a t  th i s  time to  e ffe c t the  energ ization  
of performance which was demonstrated to  have occurred hy Pranke and 
Kaul ( I 978). In  th e i r  pioneering s t a t i s t i c a l  analy sis  of the  data  
from some of the  Hawthorne s tu d ie s , Pranke and Kaul found th a t  these 
fa c to rs , the  in troduction  o f Operator 2 and the  f i r in g  of Operators 
l a  and 2a, were s ig n if ic a n t in  explaining much of the  variance in  
th e  group 's hourly  output d a ta  (79^) as w ell as weekly output 
da ta  (50^) • They termed th e  changes occurring a t  th is  time 
(beginning of Period  8) "managerial d is c ip lin e " , and found i t  to  
be th e  major explanatory v a riab le  in  accounting fo r  variance in  
both hourly and weekly output of the  group. While th e  t i t l e  
"managerial d isc ip lin e"  i s  somewhat m isleading fo r  th e  p resent 
an aly sis  since Operator 2 a lso  was sim ultaneously introduced, 
th e i r  find ings a re  p e rfe c tly  in  accord with and p red ic ted  by the 
p resen t theory.
The influence of th e  in d u s tr ia l  depression would a lso  appear 
to  be assigned a  ro le  connected with fe a r  as a  d riv e . The th re a t 
of being la id  o ff  and out o f work occasioned by th e  depression can 
be assumed to  have caused considerable anx iety . Evidence presented 
by Whitehead (1938) supports th is  contention, Por example, Whitehead 
noted th a t "the l a s t  two years of the  log are  f i l l e d  w ith preoccupations 
with resp ec t to  reduced weekly hours and 'la y  o f f s '"  (p , 164'),
Whitehead fu r th e r  reported  th a t  th e  operators were extremely 
"anxious about th e i r  fu tu res"  (p, I 83) ,  The operators were in  fa c t
eventually  la id  o f f , one by one, beginning w ith Operator 5 and 
concluding with Operator 2.
The depression began during Period I 5 . During Period 16, 
Whitehead (1938) ind ica ted  th a t  "the  operators knew th a t  th e ir  
a ssoc ia tion  w ith the  company was drawing to  i t s  close" (p , 214), 
Since d rive energizes hab it s tren g th  in  learn ing , th e  fe a r  
introduced a t  th is  time i s  p red ic ted  to  have energized the  
workers' performance. Output d id  in  fa c t  s ig n if ic a n tly  increase 
w ith th is  ad d itio n a l source of drive (Pranke & Kaul, 1978),
Rranke and Kaul found in  th e i r  s t a t i s t i c a l  analyses o f the  group 
hourly and weekly output d a ta  th a t the  economic depression was 
a  s ig n if ic a n t explanatory fa c to r  (accounting fo r  14^ of the 
variance fo r  hourly data  and 8% fo r  weekly d a ta ) .
The Influence of Conformity 
in  the  Relay Assembly T est Room 
Some examples of the  behavior of Operator 2 have been 
previously  described. As was noted, th i s  worker attem pted to  
induce the o ther operators to  produce a t  a  high r a te .  The workers 
in  the  Relay Assembly T est Room d id  appear to  adhere to  th is  norm 
of high p roductiv ity  which was la rg e ly  s e t  by Operator 2 and, 
eventually , they came to  enforce th is  themselves on any deviants, 
Seybert and Weiss (1974) have experim entally shown th a t 
nonconformity can function as a negative re in fo rce r  o f behavior.
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I f  i t  can be assumed th a t  when an operator in  the  Relay Assembly 
T est Room was low in  her p ro d u c tiv ity , she experienced some type 
of aversive consequence ( e .g . , c r itic ism ) from Operator 2 or 
some o ther group member, then  i t  i s  p red ic ted  th a t  the  operator 
to  whom the  c r itic ism  was d irec ted  would have attem pted to  escape 
from the  c r itic ism . One way to  do so could have been by increasing  
her p ro d u c tiv ity . Some of th e  evidence supporting the above 
assumption has been previously  de lineated . An exceedingly manifest 
example of such behavior i s  th e  follow ing quote from the  log of 
a  statem ent made by Operator 2 who was s ta te d  as being "provoked 
by the  output r a te  curves showing Ops. 3 , 4 , and 5 on a  downward 
trend"! "Oh! W hat's the m atter w ith those g i r l s .  I ' l l  k i l l  them" 
(Whitehead, 1938, p . 12?).
I t  might furtheimiore be p red ic ted  th a t  an operator could 
e ffe c tiv e ly  avoid Operator 2 's  caustic  c r itic ism  by performing 
a t  a  high r a te  of speed. Therefore, the  learn ing  paradigm of 
avoidance may a lso  be employed in  examining the  op era to rs ' 
behavior. In  th i s  case, conforming to  the group 's norm of high 
p ro d u c tiv ity  avoided the g ro u p 's , and p a r tic u la r ly  Operator 2 's ,  
wrath. In  ad d itio n , i f  c r itic ism  or some o ther aversive consequence 
followed a  bout of low p ro d u c tiv ity , then punishment may have 
played a  ro le  in  suppressing such nonconformist behavior—i . e . , 
suppressed the low p ro d u c tiv ity .
P r io r  to  th i s  sec tio n , the  focus of the  explanation of
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the  re s u lts  in  the Relay Assembly T est Room has been on one 
property  of d riv e—th a t  i t  energizes h ab it s tren g th . Ife have 
ju s t  seen, however, th a t  learn in g  theory has much more breadth 
and f l e x ib i l i ty  than th i s ;  instrum ental escape, punishment, and 
avoidance paradigms can a lso  be employed. The r e s u l t  o f th is  
f l e x ib i l i ty  and breadth i s  th a t  we can bring the  order of s c ie n t i f ic  
theory to  the  so c ia lly  r ic h  observations th a t have been described 
in  the various rep o rts  o f these  s tu d ie s .
Competition as a  Factor 
in  the  Relay Assembly T est Room 
The re p o rts  of the Relay Assembly T est Room c ite d  evidence 
supporting an assumption th a t  the opera to rs occasionally  competed 
w ith each o th er and w ith themselves ( try in g  to  beat former 
perform ances). Competition has been shown to  func tion  as an 
aversive d rive  (S te ig led er e t  a l . ,  I 98O; S te ig led e r e t  a l . ,
I 978) , Therefore, i f  com petition d id  occur in  the  Relay Assembly 
T est Room, an ad d itio n a l source of d rive  can be p o stu la ted  to  
have had i t s  e f fe c ts  in  th i s  s i tu a t io n .
The evidence supporting com petitive fa c to rs  in  the Relay 
Assembly T est Room i s  i l lu s t r a t e d  by the  following quotations : 
"Toward the end of I 929» Op* 4 's  r a te  of work had increased  so 
much as to  r iv a l  th a t  o f Op. 2; and the  superv isor en te rta in ed  
th e  idea th a t  Op. 4 was supplanting the o ther opera tor as the 
s t a r  e x h ib it of the T est Room" [emphasis added] (Whitehead, 1938,
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p, 143) ;  Operator 3 s ta te d , when questioned about her output,
"I'm  almost up to  Operator 4 and I  have a  bigger relay*' (R oethlisberger 
& Dickson, 1939, p . 3 7 )  » "Operator 2 sa id : 'We have to  make a  high 
percentage today to  make up fo r  yesterday, ' to  which Operator 3 
re p lie d , 'I 'm  going to  make more than you today '"  (R oethlisberger 
& Dickson, 1939, P« 63) ; "Frequent attem pts were made by certa in  
operators to  break th e  record fo r  a  day 's  work" (R oethlisberger & 
Dickson, 1939» P. 73)•
As can be seen, th e re  i s  ample evidence to  support an 
assumption th a t competition d id  occur in  the  t e s t  room. However, 
Whitehead ( I938) and R oeth lisberger and Dickson (1939) attempted 
to  deny i t s  presence. This i s  in  l in e  with the  h is to r ic a l  
emphasis on p o s itiv e  fa c to rs  which they supposed were responsible 
fo r  the  i l lu s t r io u s  r e s u l ts  of increased  p ro d u c tiv ity . As 
previously  s ta te d , such in te rp re ta tio n s  of the  Relay Assembly 
T est Room re s u lts  which are  based on p o s itiv e  in fluences have 
been serious challenged (Acker & Van Houten, 19?4; F a r r is ,  I 969;
Pranke & Kaul, I 978) .
The presence of competition appears to  be supported by the 
ireports of the events of the t e s t  room, some examples of which 
a re  delineated  above. I f  competition was p resent in  the  Relay 
Assembly Test Room as the evidence seems to  in d ic a te , then i t s  
e f fe c ts  would be congruent with the  e ffe c ts  of o ther sources of 
aversive drive (sp ec if ied  p rev iously ). Thus, fo r  example, another 
fa c to r  inducing the  f a c i l i ta t io n  of performance i s  im plicated in
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th e  present analy sis  of th is  c la s s ic  study.
The Second Relay Assembly Group 
A second re la y  assembly study was planned as th e  Relay 
Assembly Test Room study evolved. This study was much more 
abbreviated in  length  and in  the  fa c to rs  involved (both intended 
and unintended) than the Relay Assembly Test Room. The o rig in a l 
aim in  designing the  second re la y  assembly study was to  examine 
th e  influence of the  sm all group pay incen tive  and the  re su ltin g  
increased  p ro d u c tiv ity  which occurred in  th is  study i s  generally  
a ttr ib u te d  to  th is  fa c to r . Learning theory  c e r ta in ly  would not 
discount the  influence of a  wage incen tive  on performance when a  
d ire c t contingency i s  involved (see, e .g . ,  Parsons, 197^)•
However, as has amply been demonstrated thus f a r ,  the  f l e x ib i l i ty  
and breadth afforded by a  thorough extension of learn ing  theory 
perm its th e  explanation of so c ia lly  in te re s tin g  fa c to rs  found 
in  s itu a tio n s  such as the  Hawthorne s tu d ie s .
The second re la y  assembly t e s t  occurred in  the  main re lay  
assembly department. (Testing commenced November 16, I 928 and 
term inated March 14, I 929.)  A baseline  of output was measured 
(August 27 to  September 29, 1929) during which time th e  operators 
(f iv e  "experienced" operators) involved in  the study d id  not appear 
to  have been aware th a t th e i r  performance was being observed 
(see R oethlisberger & Dickson, 1939, P. 130» fh . 1 ). The operators 
in  the  study were "moved to  adjacent positions" and were paid in  
proporticn  to  the  performance of th e i r  group (R oethlisberger &
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Dickson, 1939). As of January 26, I 929 , the o p era to rs ' payment 
rev e rted  to  the  standard department-wide method• The measurement 
n ecessa rily  concluded when th e  sub jec ts  were tra n sfe rre d .
Support fo r  the  more favorable wage incen tive  was found. 
Production increased  (12.6^) when the  workers were moved and 
changed to  the  small group incen tive  (s ig n if ic a n tly , Pranke &
Kaul, 1978, fn . 9) and decreased when they  were rev erted  to  the  
department-wide method of payment. S oc ia l f a c i l i t a t io n ,  however, 
may have played some ro le  in  the  r e s u l ts  ; the  operators were aware 
th a t  they were involved in  an experiment during the  time th a t  they 
received  the  p re fe rred  in cen tiv e . Whether they were aware of the 
continued monitoring of th e i r  performance frtien they rev e rted  to  
th e  old method of payment i s  not d iscernable from the re p o rt of 
th is  study (R oethlisberger & Dickson, 1939)» However, the inform ation 
presented concerning output during th is  period could have been taken 
from departmental records w ithout the opera to rs ' knowledge (thus 
elim inating  evaluative  observation as a  source of d rive  fo r  th i s  
p e rio d ), ju s t  as i t  seems to  have been fo r  the base line  period .
I f  th is  did  occur, the  p resen t theory would p re d ic t a  decline in  
performance during th is  period , since the  source of drive was,
g
th e re fo re , no longer p resen t.
Evidence e x is ts  fo r  another source o f drive in  th is  study, 
namely, com petition. The operators in  the  Second Relay Assembly 
Group were reported  to  be competing w ith the Relay Assembly T est 
Room (R oethlisberger & Dickson, 1939, pp. 13^, 158).^ The influence
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of com pétition could a lso  have teen r e s t r i c te d  to  the  time of 
th e  p re fe rred  incen tive  system, i f  the operators were knowledgeable 
only a t  th is  time of the study.
In  conclusion, some evidence fo r  th re e  fa c to rs  in c it in g  
improvements in  performance fo r  th is  group e x is tss  (a) the  wage 
in cen tiv e , (b) evaluative observation, and (c) com petition. A ll 
are  amenable to  a  learn ing  th e o re tic a l an a ly s is—th e  wage incen tive  
as a  p o s itiv e  in cen tive , competition and evaluative  observation 
as learned , aversive sources of d riv e . While these  fa c to rs  a l l  
appear to  have been s^ u lta n e o u s ly  involved in  th is  study, learn ing  
theory  can explain  the  e f fe c ts  of each fa c to r  in d iv id u a lly  and 
th e i r  combined presences Given the  na tu re  o f the  ta sk , a l l  would 
have worked to  f a c i l i t a t e  output,
The Bank Wiring Observation Room
While f a c i l i t a t iv e  e f fe c ts  on performance were demonstrated 
in  th e  Hawthorne stu d ies  th a t  have been discussed.above, such 
r e s u l t s  were not obtained in  the  Bank Wiring Observation Room 
(R oeth lisberger & Dickson, 1939)* In  the  Bank Wiring Observation 
Room, exceedingly strong pressures fo r  conforming to  output norms 
were observed. The norm of w iring two equipments per day had 
developed and workers co n sis ten tly  followed th is  norm (R oethlisberger 
& Dickson, 1939î Homans, 1972; Lahdsberger, 1958).
As previously  noted, Seybert and Weiss ( I 974) em pirically  
demonstrated th a t  nonconformity functions as a negative re in fo rc e r  
of behavior. These in v estig a to rs  have subsumed and in te rp re te d
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th i s  so c ia lly  in te re s t in g  research  a rea  v ia  learn ing  theory.
The experim ental knowledge gained by Seybert and Weiss in  a  
c a re fu lly  con tro lled  labo ra to ry  s itu a tio n  can be extended to  
th e  observations reported  in  the  Bank Wiring Observation Room,
The pressu res fo r  conformity were extremely fo rce fu l in  
th e  Bank Wiring Observation Room, They included physical and 
verbal harrassment fo r  both over- and under-producing. I t  i s  
no t su rp ris in g , th e re fo re , th a t  a s tra ig h t- l in e  output was 
rep o rted . Escape conditioning, avoidance conditioning, and 
punishment paradigms are  a l l  u sefu l in  a s s is tin g  in  an explanation 
o f th e  behavior o f a c tu a l r e s t r ic t io n  of output which occurred 
and of the  employee fa b ric a tio n  of reported  output (R oethlisberger 
& Dickson, 1939)• Both enabled the employee to  avoid physical 
and verbal abuse o f co-workers. The abuse was used to  suppress 
nonconformist behavior, and an employee who was working too 
ra p id ly  could escape th e  physica l or verbal abuse from h is  peers 
by slowing down.
The p resen t theory can a lso  explain the  reasons behind the 
development of these  norms, R oeth lisberger and Dickson (1939) 
rep o rted  th a t th is  hab it of r e s t r ic t in g  output was not based on 
a  lo g ic a l assessment of the s itu a tio n , in  th a t  r a te  cu tting  had 
never occurred fo r  these  employees (o f, Sykes, I 965) .  However, 
R oeth lisberger and Dickson, d id  re p o rt th a t  the workers expressed 
fe a rs  o r an x ie tie s  of what would tra n sp ire  i f  they produced a t  a
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higher r a te .  Even though these  fe a rs  o r an x ie ties  might have 
heen vague, the  f a c t  th a t they ex isted  i s  im portant. Conformity 
o r  r e s t r ic t in g  output fo r  these workers can be explained as an 
instrum ental response which functioned f o r  them in  avoiding a 
fe a r fu l  s i tu a tio n  ( e .g . ,  la y o ffs , higher quotas, e t c . ) .  B ollard  
and M ille r (1950) have in d ica ted  th a t  th e  contingencies of a  
s itu a tio n  can be an tic ip a ted  and a f fe c t  behavior; they need 
no t be expressly encountered in  order to  function as contingencies. 
For example, the  worker could verbalize  o r th ink  of the  fe a rfu l 
s itu a tio n  ( e ,g , , being la id  o ff) which could then function  to  
increase  the m otivational construct, d riv e . This d riv e  could 
be occasioned by a  cue such as the  thought, " I ’m performing a t  a 
h igher r a te  than I  should," The workers could then make escape 
responses in  an attem pt to  reduce o r term inate the d riv e  associated  
w ith such aversive thoughts. These escape responses can take 
sev era l sp e c if ic  forms: the  development o f a  norm, the  punishment 
o f nonconformists, the r e s t r ic t io n  of one’s  own output, the mis­
rep resen ta tio n  o f output a c tu a lly  produced, e tc .  The reinforcem ent 
fo r  these behaviors would be a  temporary reduction in  the  fe a r  o r 
anxiety  associated  with the  thought o f over-producing ( e .g . ,  being 
la id  o f f ) . Since the  Bank Wiring Room study occurred during the  
depression when lay o ffs  were commonplace, fu r th e r  support fo r  
th e  assumption th a t  fea rs  o r an x ie tie s  d id  p e r s is t  i s  p revalen t, 
(Sykes, l95^i a lso  presented evidence supporting the  view th a t  
such fe a rs  were commonplace fo r  the  workers a t  the time of th is  
s tudy ,)
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Observation in  the  Bank Wiring Room
The con trast between the observation which occurred in  the 
Bank F irin g  Observation Room and in  the  Relay Assembly Test Room 
was emphasized by R oethlisberger and Dickson (1939), For example, 
they notedÎ
In  order to  con tro l the  fa c to r  of a tte n tio n  from 
ou tsiders  or people of high rank, i t  was decided 
th a t such people should not be allowed to  en te r the 
room during working hours unless i t  was necessary, (p. 398)
Furthermore, i t  was decided th a t "no records were to  be taken
which might tend to  make the  workers apprehensive or too consciously
aware th a t  they were being studied" (p. 388) ,  I t  was a lso  decreed
th a t the  observer "should not give orders or answer any questions
which n ecessita ted  the assumption of au thority" (p. 388). And
p a r tic u la r ly  re lev an t was the guideline fo r  the  observer th a t  "he
must above a l l  re f ra in  from evalua tiona l judgements" (p . 390)»
The way the men in  the  Bank F ir in g  Observation Room a t  f i r s t
responded to  th e  observer and how th is  changed i s  compatible with a
hypothesis th a t  the presence o f th e  observer was o rig in a lly  aversive
and then became n eu tra lized  and possib ly  eventually p o s itiv e  (v ia
ex tin c tio n  and counterconditioning re sp ec tiv e ly ) .
During the  f i r s t  few days the  men were in  the  
observation room, they  behaved qu ite  d if fe re n tly  
from the way they behaved in  the department. There 
was much le s s  ta lk in g  and they worked s te a d ily  u n t i l  
q u ittin g  tim e. The observer was apparently  regarded 
w ith d is t ru s t .  . . .
. . . The observer f e l t  the  a t t i tu d e  toward him 
was s im ila r to  th e i r  a tt i tu d e  toward the  foreman.
Fhenever the foreman entered th e  room, the men became 
abso lu tely  qu ie t and cast fu r tiv e  glances a t  him as
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he moved about. . . , The observer no ticed  th a t  
when he him self l e f t  the room the volume of 
conversation increased  and th a t  as soon as he 
came back the men a l l  became qu ie t ju s t  as they 
d id  when the foreman came in .
Toward the  middle o f the  week the  tension  
lessened . The men began to  ta lk  more loudly  and 
occasionally  someone would laugh. Any unusually 
loud no ise, however, whether i t  was a  laugh, a  
w h is tle , o r the  dropping of a  spool o f wire or 
so ld e r , seemed to  cause embarrassment to  the  person 
responsib le  and sev era l o f th e  others would glance 
over th e i r  shoulders toward the observer. With each 
unusual occurrence they  apparently  expected something 
to  happen. By Friday the  group 1 :^  become le s s  
tim orous. . . .
s 0 . By th e  end of th e  th ir d  week th e  observer 
was on f a i r ly  good terms w ith everyone in  the  
group and he was being included in  conversations 
which would be considerably a lte re d  a t  the  approach 
o f a  supeirvisor. This was taken as a  sure  sign 
th a t  he gained th e i r  confidence. (R oethlisberger 
& Dickson, 1939» PP* 398-400)
The preceding quotation  i s  highly supportive of a  learn ing  
th e o re tic a l  a n a ly s is . The observer was o rig in a lly  av ersiv e ; 
however, he subsequently lo s t  h is  a b i l i ty  to  function  as a 
source of aversive d rive  (v ia  e x tin c tio n ). I f  the  observer was 
o r ig in a lly  aversive fo r  th e  workers—as the  d rive  theory o f 
so c ia l f a c i l i t a t io n  would p red ic t to  occur when a s tran g er 
observes workers in  th i s  type of s itu a tio n —i t  i s  expected 
th a t the observer would f a c i l i t a t e  performance ( e .g . ,  "they 
worked s te a d ily  u n t i l  q u ittin g  tim e"), suppress behavior ( e .g . ,  
ta lk ing), and be escaped and/or avoided i f  the  s i tu a tio n  allowed 
i t .  Given th a t d ire c tiv e s  fo r  the  observer were such as to  make 
him unobtrusive and non-aversive ( e .g . ,  " re f ra in  from evaluational 
judgments"), i t  i s  p red ic ted  th a t  ex tin c tio n  would occur. The
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r e s u l t  'being th a t  the  observer would lo se  h is  capacity  to  
f a c i l i t a t e  performance, to  suppress behavior, and escape or 
avoidance responses would no longer be appropriate  or necessary.
The r e s u l ts  of the  Bank Wiring Observation Room are compatible 
w ith th is  an a ly s is .
Conclusions
The previous analyses of th e  various s tu d ies  in  th e  Hawthorne
p la n t of the Western E le c tr ic  Company examine th e  fin d in g s of
11these c la s s ic  s tu d ie s  from a  learn ing  th e o re tic a l  framework.
Several unique explanations are  o ffered  fo r  many of th e  re s u l ts  
found i n  these s tu d ie s . Learning theory was shown to  be capable 
o f y ie ld ing  in te rp re ta tio n s  not only of the  i l lu s t r io u s  r e s u l t  
o f increased  output (the  "Hawthorne e f fe c t" ) ,  bu t to  th e o re tic a l ly  
p re d ic t when such a r e s u l t  should occur and when i t  should no t,
Carey ( I 967) has described  a number of weaknesses in  the  
experim ental methodology of th e  Hawthorne researches, p a r t ic u la r ly  
in  th e  Relay Assembly T est Room, By u t i l iz in g  the  Hawthorne research  
as a  source of observational ra th e r  than expeiim ental d a ta , one 
can enjoy much of th e  so c ia l richness av a ilab le  in  th e  accounts of 
these d e ta iled , lengthy  in v e s tig a tio n s . However, t h i s  so c ia l w ealth 
i s  o ften  obtained a t  th e  cost of no t being able to  d e lin ea te  exact and 
p rec ise  re la tio n sh ip s . Therefore, numerous explanations a re  p lau sib le
fo r  the  various s tu d ie s . The p resen t an a ly sis  i s  no t o ffered  as 
the  only worthy explanation of the  various Hawthorne s tu d ie s .
Parsons' (l97^!'i 1978) explanation, f o r  example, appears capable
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of handling many of the  re s u lts  in  the  Relay Assembly Test Room 
(o f . Pranke & Kaul, 1978, fn , I 3 ) as w ell as many of the  re s u lts  
o f the  o ther s tu d ie s . The present an a ly sis , a lso  based on learn ing  
theory , although employing paradigms o ther than operant conditioning, 
can in te rp re t  many r e s u l ts —some of which have been noted £is 
anomalies.
Parsons (l9 ?4 ), in  regard to  the  t r a d it io n a l  explanation of 
th e  Hawthorne e f fe c t—" th a t the  re la y  assemblers kept increasing 
th e i r  production simply because they knew they were in  an experiment"- 
put fo r th  the question: "But ju s t  what i s  such awareness and how 
can i t  bring about such a  profound e ffec t?"  (p. 930). The present 
learn ing  th e o re tic a l analysis e x p lic i t ly  addresses th is  question 
and many others th a t  are  p e rtin e n t to  the  various s tu d ies  undertaken 
in  t h i s  c la ss ic  research .
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Footnotes
1, The organization of th is  chapter i s  in  accord with 
th e  customary treatm ent of th e  group of s tu d ies  undertaken a t
th e  Hawthorne p la n t of the  Western E le c tr ic  Company. R oethlisberger 
and Dickson (1939) presented the  s tu d ies  in  h is to r ic a l  fashion 
and although they d id  compare and co n trast events in  the  separate 
s tu d ie s , they were considered to  be sep ara te , occurring a t  
d if f e re n t  time periods and in  d if fe re n t lo ca tio n s  of the  p lan t.
When a  th e o re tic a l  analysis  perm its the inc lusion  of more than 
one o f these  s tu d ie s , as the  p resen t theory does, the  analysis  
i s  ty p ic a lly  organized by study (see, e .g . .  Parsons, 197^)*
2. The ta sk  of inspecting  sm all p iece p a rts  would appear 
to  be more complex than c o il  winding and re la y  assembling. The 
r e s u l ts  in  th is  department T '.;e highly v a riab le . Output "bobbed 
up and down" according to  Snow (1924-). In  th e i r  rep o rt o f the 
Bank Wiring Observation Room, R oethlisberger and Dickson (1939) 
more fu l ly  described the  ta sk  o f inspection  in  general a t  
Hawthorne. This d esc rip tio n  i s  compatible w ith a  view th a t 
would ascribe  g re a te r  complexity to  an in sp e c to r 's  ta sk . The 
f a c t  th a t  in specto rs a t  Hawthorne were accorded a  r e la t iv e ly  
high inform al so c ia l s ta tu s  i s  a lso  congruent with such a  view, 
since ta sk  demands and s ta tu s  appeared to  be somewhat co rre la ted  
in  the  p la n t (see R oeth lisberger & Dickson, 1939)»
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3 . R oeth lisberger and Dickson (1939) a lso  reported  th a t  
Operator 5 was le s s  dexterous and in te l l ig e n t  th a t the  o ther 
operators (as measured by a  s e r ie s  of t e s t s ) .  This could have 
combined with the o ther fa c to rs  unique to  her s itu a tio n  to  make 
th e  ta sk  fo r  her more complex than th a t fo r  the  o ther opera tors.
I t  would furthermore be assumed th a t  as th e  experiment in  the  
Relay Assembly T est Room progressed, Operator 5 's  re la t iv e  
inexperience would become a  fa c to r  of dim inishing re levance.
She was gaining su b s ta n tia l experience in  assembling re la y s  in  the  
t e s t  room. Parsons (197^) noted th a t one must acknowledge th a t 
th e  operators were becoming more s k i l l f u l  and th a t  th i s  con tribu ted  
to  th e  increased output observed. For Operator 5 th is  increased  
s k i l l  and the reduction  in  change in  re la y  type la te  in  the  
experiment (see Whitehead, 1939* vo l. 2, graph K-63) could be 
assumed to  make her s i tu a tio n  le s s  d is s im ila r  from the  o ther workers 
a t  th is  l a t e r  in te rv a l.
4 . P e th ia  (1979) included a  24th period , as described by 
Whitehead (1938). Franke and Kaul (1978) d id  not include th is  
period in  th e i r  s t a t i s t i c a l  analyses in d ica tin g  th a t "during th is  
f in a l  period , a l l  f iv e  operators were la id  o ff and rep laced  by 
more sen io r workers idio were inexperienced in  the assembly of 
re lays" (fn , 6, p. 627) .  The p resen t theory  would a lso  exclude 
th is  period  from analysis  based on th e o re tic a l  reasons in  th a t  
d iffe ren ces  between "novices" and "experts" (W hitehead's terminology) 
are  p red ic ted .
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5. The foreman’s previous a sso c ia tio n  with aversive events 
f o r  the operators may have re su lte d  in  the  blocking of any 
s ig n if ic a n t aversive assoc iations fo r  the  t e s t  room observer, 
s in ce  he was a  s tran g er fo r  th e  opera tors. In  blocking, a  h igh ly  
conditioned cue can block th e  formation of conditioning to  a  novel 
cue vAien th e  two cues ( in  th i s  case, th e  foreman and the t e s t  
room observer) are  presented in  compound (see, e .g . ,  Rescorla & 
Wagner, 1972).
6 . The d a ta  fo r  Operator 3 in  Period  13 jumps to  6^-.3 u n its  
per hour from 59*7 u n its  p e r hour (Pranke & Kaul, 1978, Appendix 2 ).
7. Operator 2 seem s.to have been something of a  Stakhanovite 
(see , e .g . ,  Granick, 195^)» I t  i s  d i f f i c u l t  to  imagine th a t  the  
unpleasant, aversive c h a ra c te r is tic s  of Operator 2 would not have 
been more re a d ily  recognized had th is  been a  study of an "em ulation 
campaign" in  a  Soviet fa c to ry .
8 . Although no observer was p resen t to  measure performance 
in  th i s  study, th e  mere knowledge of a  t e s t  s itu a tio n  has been 
asso c ia ted  with inducing d rive  in  a  so c ia l f a c i l i ta t io n  paradigm 
(see Weiss & M ille r, l97l)« Refer a lso  to  the previous m ateria l 
on the  c la s s ic a l  conditioning of symbolic audiences.
9. Competition may a lso  have been induced in  the  Relay 
Assembly Test Room idien the  Second Relay Assembly Group commenced 
and a llu s io n s  were made concerning r iv a lry  (see R oeth lisberger & 
Dickson, 1939, P* 13^). The second study occurred during Period 
13 in  the  f i r s t  study. A r i s e  in  performance did occur a t  th is  
tim e (see Pranke & Kaul, 1978, Appendix 1).
I l l
10. The number of changes in  re la y  type were more su b s ta n tia l 
fo r  th e  Second Relay Assembly Group than there  were in  the Relay 
Assembly Test Room. This was p a r t ic u la r ly  acute f o r  Operator R  ̂
during the  period  when a l l  were re tu rn ed  to  the  department-wide 
method of payment. Her performance drops considerably a t  th i s  
times when "she was req^uired to  assemble from $ 0  to  6o d if fe re n t 
types of re la y s  daily" (R oeth lisberger & Dickson, 1939» P* 132). 
(The average number of changes in  th e  reg u la r department was I 5 .)
11. One of the  s tu d ie s , the  Mica S p li t t in g  T est Room, i s  
not covered in  the  p resen t an a ly s is . This study involved a ta sk  
req u irin g  a  high degree o f s k i l l  according to  R oeth lisberger and 
Dickson (1939) and may have been "complex" even though the workers 
were experienced. The d a ta  in  th i s  study seemed to  in d ica te  th a t 
r e s t  pauses re su lte d  in  favorable increases in  output (Pranke & 
Kaul, 1978, fn . 9) ,  as might be expected with a  ta sk  requ iring
a  high degree of s k i l l .  In  ad d itio n , th e  th re a ts  and fea rs  
asso c ia ted  with the  depression induced a decline  in  p ro d u c tiv ity  
r a te  in  these su b jec ts . Learning theory  would p re d ic t such a 
decline  i f  the  ta sk  was complex and dominant h ab its  were not those 
of high or rap id  ra te s  of performance (Drive in te ra c ts  with h ab it 
to  y ie ld  ex c ita to ry  p o te n tia l) .
II2
CHAPTEH IV
A LEARNING THEORETICAL ANALYSIS 
OF ATTITUDE FORMATION AND CHANGE TOWARD LABOR UNIONS
Introduction
In  recen t years, the  a b i l i ty  of pub lic  sec to r employees to  
unionize and c o lle c tiv e ly  bargain has been s ig n if ic a n tly  d e terred  
(Colton, 19785 Kruger & Rodgers, I 978) . Unlike the  period of the 
1960 ' s  when fe d e ra l, s ta te ,  and lo c a l le g is la tio n  created  an 
upsurge in  pub lic  sec to r unionization (Hallem, W alther, B r i l l ,  
Lebow, & Wade, 1972), recen t le g is la tio n  has no t been auspicious 
fo r  th e  public  sec to r employee (e .g . ,  C a lifo rn ia 's  P roposition  I 3 ) .  
In  an in terv iew  of approximately 50 rep resen ta tiv es  of labor and 
government, Ledbetter (1976) ind ica ted  th a t  " leaders of many 
municipal unions around the  country are  worried th a t  public 
employees are losing  public support and bargaining powers only 
re c en tly  secured" (p . 1 ) . Ledbetter fu r th e r  repo rted  th a t "almost 
a l l  of those interviewed agreed th a t  public  employees . , . were 
going to  face tough negotia tions and an unsympathetic public fo r  
a t  le a s t  the next few years" (p. b6).
Public opinion toi-rard labor unions and th e i r  leaders  has a lso  
become em bittered (e .g . ,  "Approval of Labor Unions Sinks," 1979;
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"President Johnson and the  P ub lic", I 969; "Survey Finds", 1978).
Kruger and Rodgers ( I 978) , fo r  example, noted th a t;
Due la rg e ly  to  the public c r itic ism  d irec ted  a t  
pub lic  unions, the  AFL-CIO leadersh ip  became 
. concerned th a t  i t  was lo sing  c lou t among 
congressional a l l i e s  because of the  AFSCME-APL- 
CIO a f f i l i a t io n .  AFSCME even tually  withdrew i t s  
APL-GIO membership, (p. Z ? 0 )
Negative a t t i tu d e s  toward governmental employees can be 
p a r tic u la r ly  detrim ental since the  public can put th e i r  a tt i tu d e s  
in to  ac tio n  and a f fe c t  the employee economically (W oUett, 196^ ) . 
This i s  notably acute fo r  public  employees a t  the  lo c a l le v e l 
(Torrence, 1979)• To da te , no theory has been employed to  explain 
or p red ic t the form ation or change of the  sentim ents regarding 
public sec to r unions. A theory  which explains not only how 
negative a tt i tu d e s  are  formed but a lso  p re d ic ts  how they might 
be changed would be a  usefu l a id  in  understanding the availab le  
l i t e r a tu r e ,  guiding new research , and a lso  in  p ra c tic a l  app lications 
( e .g . , so th a t unions are  no longer confronted w ith an unrelenting 
p u b lic ).
A ttitude  form ation and change has been a  p iv o ta l research  
area  in  so c ia l psychology. Numerous th e o rie s  have been developed 
to  p red ic t and explain  the research  in  th i s  f i e ld  ( e .g . .  Cognitive 
Dissonance Theory; e .g . ,  F estinger, 1957; Nicklund & Brehm, I 976; 
Balance Theories; e .g . ,  Heider, 1958; Osgood & Tannenbaum, 1955; 
Learnii.g Theory; e .g . ,  Lott & L o tt, I 968, 1972; McGuire, 1957; 
Sazran, 1938; S ta a ts , 1975; Weiss, I 962, I 968) .
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The in te n t of the present analysis  i s  to  u t i l iz e  learning 
theory as a  model to  p red ic t and explain the  formation and change 
of a tti tu d e s  toward labor unions, emphasizing a ttitu d e s  toward 
government employees—the public sec to r. The learn ing  paradigm 
emphêisized in  the  present th e o re tic a l analysis  w ill be c la ss ica l 
defense conditioning. I t  should be noted th a t o ther learning 
paradigms could conceivably be employed in  f r u i t f u l  th e o re tic a l 
analyses of a tt i tu d e s  toward labor unions ( e .g , ,  c la s s ic a l reward 
conditioning, instrum ental escape conditioning, instrum ental 
reward conditioning, avoidance le a rn in g ); however, the  present 
analysis  w ill be r e s tr ic te d  to  a c la s s ic a l  defense conditioning 
an a ly sis .
Boundary Conditions 
In  any science, a  theory of the kind proposed here w ill often 
e ffe c tiv e ly  reach phenomena considered unusual o r inexplicable 
while excluding some commonplace events. This i s  because boundary 
conditions are employed fo r  th e o re tic a l reasons th a t often are 
not compatible with conventional usages. Since a  c la s s ic a l 
defense conditioning model i s  to  be u t i l iz e d  in  the present 
an a ly sis , c e r ta in  phenomena w ill  be amenable to  analysis  while 
o ther events w ill be outside of the th eo ry 's  intended scope.
The present th eo ry 's  intended scope i s  p rim arily  focused on 
those indiv iduals who are affec ted  by a s tr ik e  which they find  
aversive. At the  ou tset i t  can be seen th a t c e r ta in  id e n tif ia b le
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s itu a tio n s  w ill be outside of these sp ec ified  boundaries. Some 
i l lu s t r a t iv e  s itu a tio n s  outside of the boundaries of the  present 
c la s s ic a l  defense conditioning model can be sp ec ified .
C lassica l Reward Conditioning fo r  Union Members. I t  i s  qu ite  
p lausib le  th a t union members would assoc iate  p o s itiv e  stim uli 
with the union, n ecessita ting  the use of a c la s s ic a l reward 
conditioning model. A study by Goldberg (157^ ) , fo r  example, 
i l lu s t r a te s  how a s tr ik e  might become a t tra c t iv e  ra th e r  than 
aversive fo r  union members. Goldberg c la s s if ie d  community 
environments during a  I 966 New York C ity teachers* s tr ik e  based 
on union members' perceptions of community approval (c la s s if ie d  
as signing p e ti t io n s , joining p icket l in e s , and o ffering  homes 
fo r  union a c t iv i té s ;  disapproval was c la s s if ie d  as verbal abuse, 
demands to  keep lo c a l schools open, and physical a tta ck s) .
Goldberg co rre la ted  these perceptions of community support with 
s tr ik e  s o lid a r ity . Higher percentages of s tr ik e  so lid a r ity  were 
re la te d  to  g re a te r  perceptions of community approval. In  add ition , 
teachers reported  higher lev e ls  of tension when le s s  approval and 
more disapproval were perceived. Community support would appear to  
endow a s tr ik e  with ap p etitiv e  c h a rac te ris tic s  fo r  the union 
members. In  such a  case, a  c la ss ic a l defense conditioning model 
might be appropriately  replaced by a c la s s ic a l reward conditioning 
model.
Avoidance Conditioning fo r Union Members. Seidman, Edge, and 
K elley (l97^) found th a t a m ajority of Hawaiian fa c u lty  were
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favorably disposed to  co llec tiv e  'bargaining. This favorable 
a tti tu d e  appeared to  be beised on a key stimulus associated with 
unionization—protection against unfair treatm ent. I f  the union 
i s  associated  with p ro tec tion  against unfair treatm ent, then i t  can 
be hypothesized th a t unionization might function as an avoidance 
o r escape response analog from an aversive stimulus analog— 
u n fa ir treatm ent. This l in e  of analysis, while p o ten tia lly  
f r u i t f u l ,  i s  beyond the boundaries of the present c lass ica l defense 
conditioning model.
C onflict fo r  Union Members. A d iffe ren t way to  view the 
s tr ik e  as a  stimulus analog fo r  the union member would be v ia  a  
c o n flic t paradigm (e .g .,  M iller, 1959)* The s tr ik e  fo r  a
union mem'ber may have appetitive  stimulus p roperties ( e .g . , 
associated  with an tic ipated  sa la ry  ra ise s )  as w ell as negative 
stim ulus porperties ( e .g . ,  p resen tly  being without a  paycheck).
This i l lu s t r a t iv e  s itu a tio n  would be more compatible with a conflic t 
paradigm than c la s s ic a l defense conditioning. Cole (I969) analyzed 
the c o n flic t vdiich can be created fo r  the individual represented 
by a  union sponsoring a s t r ik e .  Cole surveyed New York teachers 
a f te r  a  highly successful s tr ik e  to  examine so c ia l support stim uli 
and conformity pressures re levan t to  s tr ik e  behavior. Of the 
teachers who indicated th e ir  friends supported the s tr ik e , a  large 
proportion (69^) a lso  s truck . Few ( 2 6 ^ )  struck when le ss  than 
h a lf  of th e i r  friends supported the s tr ik e . Four types of con flic t 
("cross pressures") were examined and found to  lead to  some form of
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avoidance behavior ( e .g .,  ca lling  in  s ick  ra th e r  than walking in  or 
crossing a  p icket l in e ) .  In  addition , those teachers fearing  
sanctions fo r  s tr ik in g  were more l ik e ly  to  avoid the  s itu a tio n  
than those without such fe a rs . The study by Cole, then, ind icates 
th a t the c r i t i c a l  s tim u li fo r  a union member can a t times be 
co n flic tin g , requ iring  a  su b s titu te  in  the  th e o re tic a l model 
employed.
C onflict fo r  the Community. A s tr ik e  could a lso  p o ten tia lly  
have co n flic tin g  associations fo r  the community. For example, 
the  community could id e n tify  with the s tr ik e rs  and the p o sitive  
benefits  the union would gain from the s tr ik e  could be psychologically 
or a c tu a lly  shared ( e .g . ,  the public p ro f its  from b e tte r  eduction 
fo r children v ia  sm aller classrooms or la rg e r budgets). Lieberman 
(1956) ,  fo r  example, c ite d  two cases in  which community support 
fo r  s tr ik in g  teachers was displayed (in  a  p o ll and an e lec tio n ).
Flango and Dudley (1978) id e n tif ie d  c lasses of people l ik e ly  to  
support s t r ik e r s .  They found th a t young people, c itiz en s  favoring 
increased c i ty  wages, sem i-sk illed  and unskilled  workers, black 
people, and c itizen s  d is s a tis f ie d  with police treatm ent responded 
favorably in  th e i r  a tti tu d e s  toward s t r ik e rs .  I f  i t  can be assumed 
th a t these segments of the public id e n tif ie d  with the union, then 
we can conclude th a t the  s tr ik e  as a stim ulus analog could become 
a ttra c t iv e  which would preclude a  c la s s ic a l defense conditioning analysis . 
I t  can be hypothesized th a t some of the variab les which would 
e l i c i t  id e n tif ic a tio n  with a  s tr ik in g  union are p o te n tia lly
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Quantifiable, One key variable that might cause an individual 
or group to identify with a striking union could be "perceived 
similarity" between the group (or individual) and the union.
The re levan t dimensions of th is  s im ila r i ty  might vary s itu a tio n a lly . 
I l lu s t r a t iv e ly ,  th e  f i r e f ig h te r  and p o lice  occupations are o ften  
considered s im ila r  in  p ro fessio n al re s p o n s ib i l i t ie s  and re lev an t 
q u a lif ic a tio n s . I f  perceived s im ila r ity  re s u l ts  in  id e n tif ic a tio n , 
then a  s t r ik e  by one group could be reac ted  to  in  a  s im ila r (and 
perhaps p o s itiv e ) manner by the  o ther group. Some anecdotal 
support fo r  th i s  id e n tif ic a tio n  between f i r e  and po lice  serv ices 
might be hypothesized from "sympathy s tr ik e s"  of one occupation 
fo r  an o th er 's  grievances.
Rules of Correspondence 
In  attem pting to  explain  and p red ic t a t t i tu d e s  toward labor 
unions, analogies between c la s s ic a l  defense conditioning v ariab les  
and labo r re la t io n s  w ill  be drawn. These analogies are presented 
below and enumerated f o r  l a t e r  refe rence .
Independent Variables
ITnconditioned Stimulus Analog. A stim ulus which i n i t i a l l y  
e l i c i t s  a  r e l ia b le  response i s  re fe rre d  to  as an unconditioned 
stim ulus (UCS). The response which the  unconditioned stim ulus 
co n sis ten tly  evokes i s  c a lled  an unconditioned response (UCR).
In  c la s s ic a l  defense conditioning, an aversive ra th e r  than 
a ttra c t iv e  unconditioned stim ulus i s  employed. The labo r re la tio n s
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l i te r a tu r e s  freq u en tly  conceptualize a  s tr ik e  o r s t r ik e  th re a t 
by public  sec to r  workers as analogous to  an aversive stim ulus, 
e l ic i t in g  responses such as  f e a r  or anxiety  among the  public  
served by those workers, Hallem e t  a l .  (1972) ,  fo r  example, 
noted th a t  i n i t i a l  a ttem pts a t  organizing po lice  were blocked 
because of th e  "public  suspicion  and fe a r  of p o lice  s tr ik e s"  (p . 90? )  • 
Even the  word "s tr ik e "  i t s e l f  has been noted to  produce negative 
"emotional overtones” (Lieberman, 1 9 5 ° ) •
The aversive charac te r of th e  s t r ik e  can r e s u l t  from an 
absence of necessary  se rv ice s , p a r t ic u la r ly  in  th e  pub lic  sec to r. 
S tr ik in g  p o lice  and f i r e f ig h te r s  can leave a  c i ty  besieged by 
crime and violence (C lark, 1972). S im ila rly , numerous deaths 
and il ln e s se s  were a ttr ib u te d  to  a  New York C ity  tru c k  d r iv e rs ' 
s t r ik e  ("Ransomed C ity ,"  I 968; S te tson , I 968; Tolchin, I 968) .
The above illustrations in d ica te  th a t  the  s t r ik e  has been 
depicted  as possessing noxious p ro p e rtie s , supporting the  adoption 
o f a  c la s s ic a l  defense conditioning model. For p resen t purposes, 
th e  s tr ik e  w ill  be employed as an aversive stim ulus analog (1 ) .
Unconditioned Response Analog. The analog of th e  unconditioned 
response e l ic i te d  by the  s t r ik e  or s t r ik e  th re a t w ill  be conceptu­
a liz e d  as some negative a ffe c tiv e  response such as fe a r ,  anx iety , 
o r a  negative a t t i tu d e  regard ing  the  s tr ik e  (2 ). The following 
a re  i l lu s t r a t iv e  negative a ffe c t iv e  responses c ite d  in  the  labor 
re la t io n s  l i te r a tu r e s  presumed to  be caused by the  s t r ik e  or 
s t r ik e  th re a t :  (a) a  f e a r fu l  and suspicious public  (Hallem e t  a l . .
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1 0 7 2 ) ;  (b) "h esitan t"  and "defensive" goveirriments (Kheel, loSo):
(c) negative a t t i tu d e s  toward s tr ik in g  teach ers  by governmental 
rep re se n ta tiv e s , s tu d en ts , and p aren ts, S p e c if ic a lly , a  s t r ik e  
being re fe rre d  to  as "an ir re sp o n s ib le  a c tio n " , "a  bad example 
to  s tu d en ts" , "a  d e lib e ra te  d isreg ard  fo r  the  p u b lic  w e lfa re" ,
"a  conscious defiance of th e  law", and "a  b la ta n t misuse o f power"
(Kassem & M utterer, I 97I ,  p . 82); (d) a  teachers* s t r ik e  e d ito r ia liz e d  as a 
"vicious power play" ("D estructive  S tr ik e s ,"  1$68); (e) p e rs is te n t 
"anger and m  w ill"  p red ic ted  to  r e s u l t  from an 18-day s t r ik e  in  
Pennsylvania (A lderfer, l 9 ? 2 ) ;  and (f )  p e rtin ac io u s " co n flic t"  
and "b itte rn e ss"  engendered by the  s t r ik e  (Bybacki & Rybacki, 1979)*
The measurement of a t t i tu d in a l  responses in  "management" 
samples has g en era lly  re f le c te d  negative sentim ents regarding the  
s t r ik e .  A m ajority  o f school adm in istra to rs  surveyed in  19^6 were 
opposed to  th e  r ig h t  o f teachers  to  s t r ik e  and improve conditions 
of work (Lieberman, 1956). More re c en tly , general d isapproval of 
college p res id en ts  f o r  f a c i l ty  s t r ik e s  has been documented 
(S p ritz e r & Odewahn, 1978). S im ila rly , a  scan t (26 . ^ )  favorable 
opinion fo r  th e  p ub lic  employee's r ig h t  to  s t r ik e  in  a  sample of 
adm in istra to rs of various New York C ity  agencies was revealed  
(inmerman, 1973). The community has a lso  been shown to  be opposed 
to  te ach e rs ' s tr ik e  a c t iv i ty  ( e .g . ,  Lieberman, I 956) .
Negative a t t i tu d e s  regarding the  s t r ik e  a re  p a r t ic u la r ly  
acute fo r  public  sec to r  employees. This was demonstrated by 
McClain (1973) in  a  survey of freshmen a t  Texas Tech U niversity .
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Fewer respondents were favorable to  the  s tr ik e  p ra c tic e  fo r  po lice  
and f ir e f ig h te r s  (2 3 .:^ ) , governmental o ffice  and p o s ta l workers 
(29 . ^ ) »  teachers (46.2^), o r garbage workers ( 4 8 .^ )  than fo r  
general labo rers  and construction workers .
The negative a tt i tu d e  regarding the  s tr ik e  in  public  sec to r 
employment i s  a lso  re f le c te d  in  curren t le g is la tio n  which generally  
adopts an i l le g a l  s tr ik e  model (W ellington & W inter, I 97I ) ,
Exceptions to  th is  le g is la t iv e  s tr ik e  ban ra re ly  permit "essen tia l"  
serv ice  personnel from s tr ik in g  (B arre tt & Loebel, l97^)= K ieta 
( I97O) s ta te d  th a t  " i f  le g is la tio n  i s  any in d ica tio n  of public 
opinion, i t  i s  safe  to  assume th a t the  public i s  so lid ly  opposed 
to  s tr ik e s  in  government" (p. 226) .  IO.eta*s statem ent has been 
supported by case and f ie ld  s tu d ies  ( e .g . ,  A lderfer, 1972, 1974; 
Anderson, I 969; Nesvig, I 968; Rains, I 969; Young & Brewer, l970).
For example, Anderson ( I 969) re la te d  work stoppages to  the amendments 
of New York's Taylor Law which provides " s t i f f e r "  p en a ltie s  fo r  
s t r ik e r s  than d id  the  o rig in a l law, A lderfer (1972, 1974) reported  
th a t a  ten -and-a-half day teacher s t r ik e  re su lted  in  s tuden ts ' 
req^uest fo r  an in junc tion . (Reports ind ica ted  c it iz e n  reactions 
of the  s tr ik e  being "outrageous", " s i l ly " ,  "undignified", and 
"dowright s tu p id " . ) Young and Brewer ( I 970) examined the  responses 
of governments to  s tr ik e s  and s tr ik e  th re a ts  (between Ju ly , I 965 and 
December, 19^9)• He found th a t  nine governments had in s tig a ted  
le g a l action  (court in junctions) to  r e s t r a in  s t r ik e r s ,  s ix  had 
th reatened  to  f i r e  s t r ik e r s ,  and two goveimments had a rrested
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s t r ik e r s .  Rains ( I969) and Nesvig ( I 968) re la te d  the  passage of the  
Condon4îaldih Act in  New York to  the Buffalo teach e rs ' s tr ik e  of 
19^7 . This le g is la tio n  imposed severe pen a lties  fo r  s tr ik e  
a c t iv i ty ,  Nesvig a lso  in d ica ted  th a t th e  le g is la tio n  of e igh t 
a n t i - s t r ik e  laws including the  T aft-H artley  Act was concomitant 
w ith th is  s t r ik e .  The fe a r  of s tr ik e  a c t iv i ty  may have been 
generated by th is  f a i r ly  novel s tr ik e  w ithin the pub lic  sec to r.
This analysis  i s  supported by Nesvig *s account of the  ty p ic a l 
p a tte rn  of a  lo c a l government's re a c tio n  to  an i n i t i a l  confrontation 
with "employee defiance" : " F ir s t  comes su rp rise . . . . Then may 
come exasperation, perhaps anger, and a  fee lin g  of helplessness" (p, 130),
S im ilarly , th e  Boston P olice  S tr ik e  of I 9I 9 caused much 
opposition to  the  r ig h t  of puH ic  employees to  s t r ik e  and even 
to  unionize (Hallem e t  a l , , 1972), Public  o f f ic ia ls  ( e ,g , .
P residen t Wilson, Calvin Coolidge) ejcpressed ra d ic a l, negative 
sentim ents about the  s t r ik e  against a  "sov^eign" a u th o rity  
(Nesvig, 1968) ,
P o in ter and Graham ( I 97I )  reported  th a t  h o sp ita l adm in istra to rs 
fe a r  co lle c tiv e  bargaining i t s e l f  because of the  fe e lin g  th a t 
"recognition of a  union i s  a  d ire c t  in v ita tio n  to  s tr ik e "  (p, 56). 
Thornton and Weintraub (1974) re f le c te d  a  s im ila r a t t i tu d e ;  they 
noted th a t "the  granting  of co lle c tiv e  bargaining r ig h ts  to  teachers 
increases the  p ro b ab ility  th a t  s t r ik e s  w ill  occur" (p, 39).
The preceding c ita tio n s  seem to  in d ica te  th a t  negative 
a ffe c tiv e  responses can be e l ic i te d  by the  s tr ik e  in  th e  form of
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a tt i tu d e s , sentim ents, le g is la tio n , and re la te d  behaviors. Such 
findings ind ica te  th a t s tr ik e s  function as a  UCS which e l i c i t s  a 
negative a ffec tiv e  UCR, as in  c la s s ic a l defense conditioning.
Conditioned Stimulus Analog. In  c la s s ic a l conditioning, a 
previously n eu tra l or in d iffe ren t stim ulus i s  paired with the 
unconditioned stim ulus. The n e u tra l stim ulus i s  termed a  conditioned 
stim ulus (CS), Since the in te re s t  of the p resent analysis concerns 
a tt i tu d e  change and formation toward labor unions, the labor union 
w ill function as a  conditioned stim ulus analog (3 ). A ttitude objects 
have been repeatedly  tre a te d  as conditioned stim u li ( e .g .,  Byrne,
1969, I 97I ;  Byrne & Clore, I 967; Doob, 19^7; Lott & L o tt, I 968,
1972; S taa ts  & S taa ts , 1958). Therefore, there  i s  ample precedent 
fo r  the  present conceptualization of the  labor union as a  conditioned 
stim ulus analog.
Analogs of V ariations in  Reinforcement. Several other analogs 
in  labor re la tio n s  can be drawn from c la s s ic a l conditioning.
For example, a  re in forced  t r i a l  in  c la s s ic a l conditioning occurs 
lAen the conditioned stimulus i s  paired  with the unconditioned 
stim ulus (the re in fo rce r in  c la s s ic a l conditioning). A reinforced  
t r i a l  analog in  labor re la tio n s  would be the  association  of the 
s tr ik e  and a  labor union (4 ). Continuous reinforcement in  c la s s ic a l 
conditioning i s  the  association  of the  conditioned stim ulus and the 
unconditioned stim ulus on every t r i a l ,  analogous to  a s itu a tio n  
in  which the  union th reatens a  s tr ik e  a t  each bargaining session 
with management (5) .  P a r t ia l  reinforcem ent occurs when the conditioned
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stim ulus and th e  unconditioned stim ulus a x e  not p a ired  on every 
t r i a l .  An analog of p a r t ia l  reinforcem ent in  labor re la tio n s  
might he a  hypo the tical s i tu a tio n  of strUkes and/or s t r ik e  th re a ts  
being posed on some po rtion  of the  bargaining sessio n s, but not a t  
each session  (6) ,  An ex tin c tio n  t r i a l  occurs when th e  re in fo rce r 
(lies) i s  w ithheld; analogously, in  labo r r e la t io n s , an ex tinc tion  
t r i a l  might be a  bargaining session  T-rith the  union not s tr ik in g  
or th rea ten in g  to  s t r ik e  (? ) .
Unconditioned Stimulus In te n s ity  Analogs. The s tren g th  or 
in te n s i ty  of the  unconditioned stim ulus can be varied  in  c la s s ic a l  
conditioning. In  lab o r r e la t io n s , a  number of p o te n tia l  analogs 
fo r  the in te n s i ty  of the aversiveness of the  unconditioned stim ulus 
can be proposed. I l lu s t r a t iv e ly ,  th e  dura tion  of a  s t r ik e  (8) , 
the  number of people involved in  a  s t r ik e  (9) ,  or the  e s s e n tia l i ty  
of th e  serv ice  being w ithheld (lo ) a re  p o te n tia l  analogs of 
unconditioned stim ulus in te n s ity .
Conditioned Stimulus Saliency Analog. The p ro p e rtie s  of th e  
conditioned stim ulus can a lso  a f fe c t  conditioning; the  saliency  or 
in te n s i ty  of th e  conditioned stim ulus can a lso  be manipulated, A 
conditioned stim ulus ' sa lien ce  or in te n s i ty  i s  not lim ited  to  the  
a c tu a l p ro p e rtie s  of the  stim ulus. Other fa c to rs  which a id  in  being 
able to  d is tin g u ish  or perceive the  conditioned stim ulus can a f fe c t  
i t s  sa lien cy  ( e ,g . ,  Logan, 195^; Mackintosh, 1974, 1975; Pearce &
H all, 1980; Wagner, 1978). A p o te n tia l analog to  conditioned stim ulus 
sa lien cy  might be the  p ress coverage which the  union receives.
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making i t  a  prominent conditioned stim ulus (11),
Analogs of V ariations in  Arrangement o f CS and UCS. The 
temporal re la tio n sh ip  between the  conditioned stim ulus and the  
unconditioned stim ulus may a lso  be m odified. In  c la s s ic a l 
conditionings fo u r  types o f connections between th e  conditioned 
stim ulus and th e  unconditioned stim ulus have been delineated  and 
system atica lly  in v estig a ted : (a) Delay conditioning==the conditioned
stim ulus precedes and overlaps th e  onset o f the  unconditioned stim ulus. 
The o ffse t o f both s tim u li occurs concom itantly; (b) Trace 
conditioning—th e  onset and o ff se t  of th e  conditioned stim ulus 
precede th e  onset of the  unconditioned stim ulus; (c) Simultaneous 
conditioning—th e  conditioned stim ulus and unconditioned stim ulus’ 
onset and o f f s e t  are tem porally id e n t ic a l ;  (d) Backward conditioning— 
th e  unconditioned stim ulus precedes the  conditioned stim ulus.
Each of the  temporal p a irin g s  o f th e  conditioned stim ulus 
and th e  unconditioned stim ulus in  c la s s ic a l  conditioning can be 
extended to  la b o r  re la t io n s . Delay conditioning might occur i f  
a  union’s  c o lle c tiv e  bargaining n eg o tia tio n s  are  reported  by the  
media to  the  p ub lic  p r io r  to  and throughout th e  repo rting  of a  
s t r ik e  (12). Trace conditioning could occur i f  a  union i s  reported  
as being " in  n e g o tia tio n s" . Subsequently, a  tim e period in tervenes 
w ith  no inform ation concerning th e  union following which the  media 
a i r s  the  f a c t  th a t  the  union has s tru ck  (13)• Simultaneous 
conditioning might be conceived as the  h y p o the tica l s itu a tio n  in  
which no p r io r  account of n eg o tia tions a re  d isclo sed , ju s t  simply
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th e  coverage o f the  s tr ik in g  union (1 ^ ). Backward conditioning 
could occur i f  the  s t r ik e  were made known in  advance of the 
p a r tic u la r  union involved ( e .g . ,  "Newscapsule: S tr ik e , d e ta i ls  
a t  ten") ( I5) ,
Analogs o f CS In term ittency  and Constancy. In  c la s s ic a l  
conditioning, researchers  have con trasted  the  e f fe c ts  of p resenting  
a  constant and an in te rm itte n t conditioned stim ulus. Such a  
v a riab le  could he f r u i t f u l ly  extended to  labo r re la t io n s  since 
the  rep o rtin g  of a  lab o r union in  n eg o tia tions can be re la t iv e ly  
constant p r io r  to  s t r ik e  a c t iv i ty  (16) or in te rm itte n t whereby 
nego tia tions break o ff  and resume o r a re  reported  ir re g u la r ly  (1? ) . 
Dependent Variables
Conditioning i s  p red ic ted  to  develop as s t r ik e s  or s t r ik e  
th re a ts  are assoc iated  w ith th e  union. I t  i s  p red ic ted  th a t  
eventually  the  labo r union should be capable o f e l ic i t in g  a  
response comparable to  th e  negative a ffe c tiv e  response e l ic i te d  
by the  s tr ik e »  The response e l ic i te d  by the  conditioned stim ulus 
subsequent to  a  s e r ie s  of re in fo rced  t r i a l s  (see analog #^) i s  
termed the  conditioned response. Although th e re  may be s l ig h t  
q u a lita tiv e  or q u an tita tiv e  d iffe ren ces  between th e  conditioned 
and unconditioned responses, the  two a re  s im ila r . For example, 
unconditioned eyeblink responses to  a i r  puffs may be s tronger 
than those eyeblinks e l ic i te d  by th e  conditioned stim ulus; however, 
both responses can be topographically  id e n tif ie d  as eyeblinks.
A ttitu d es . One p o te n tia l  analog to  the  conditioned response
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in  lab o r re la tio n s  i s  a  negative a t t i tu d e  toward a  lab o r union ( IS )« 
Reports of negative a tt i tu d e s  toward lab o r unions a re  present 
in  lab o r re la tio n s  l i te r a tu r e s .  An extreme example i s  the  fo llow ing: 
"Organized lab o r, a  smug, overfat slugabed in  the  general economy i s  
m ilitan t on the  march in  a l l  branches o f the  c iv i l  service" (Raskin, 
1968, p . 27) .  Union members have a lso  been id e n tif ie d  a s  "unreasonable, 
s e lf is h , and greedy” (Rybacki & Rybacki, 1979, P» lo5)«
Several s tu d ie s  have em pirically  documented th e  existence of 
negative a t t i tu d e s  toward unions. For example, a h igher proportion  
of a n ti-c o lle c tiv e  bargaining a tt i tu d e s  fo r  p res id en ts  than fo r  
fa c u lty  on sev e ra l a t t i tu d in a l  items was found by Kennelly and 
Peterson (l97^) in  & la rg e  sample of u n iv e rs ity  in s t i tu t io n s .
Since facu lty  can a lso  a sso c ia te  p o s itiv e  s tim u li w ith unionization  
( e .g . ,  higher s a la r ie s ,  g re a te r  b e n e f its ) , th i s  r e s u l t  would be 
p red ic ted  by th e  p resen t c la s s ic a l  conditioning theo ry  although 
e x p lic i t  responses of union members have been placed outside the  
boundaries o f th e  theory .
K aufler ( I 967) s ta te d  th a t  the  m ajority  of school boards in  
education p re fe r  to  forego c o lle c tiv e  bargaining and th a t  they  
hold an ti-union  sentim ents. Since school boards a re  e lec ted , we 
could assume th a t  they  attem pt to  r e f le c t  a c tu a l community opinion 
on these  is su e s . In  ad d itio n , d a ta  are  availab le  which r e f le c t  
opposition to  unionism in  higher education: S p r itz e r  and Odewahn
( I978) found general opposition toward co lle c tiv e  bargaining fo r  
fa c u lty  in  a  sample of ch ief u n iv e rs ity  executives. In  ad d itio n .
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a  su b s ta n tia l nimber (85 . 9^ ) of th e  adm in istra to rs be lieved  th a t  
the  community d id  not support unionism. Whether or no t th is  
b e l ie f  re f le c te d  a c tu a l community support i s  debatable j however, 
i t  may be a  more covert measure o f the  ad m in is tra to rs ' own a t t i tu d e s .  
S im ila rly , an o f f ic ia l  p o licy  may r e f le c t  such covert a tt i tu d e s  
(Odewahn & S p r itz e r , 1976). The p o lic ie s  o f higher education 
in s t i tu t io n s  were examined and found to  be gen era lly  unfavorable 
to  unionism (Odewahn & S p r itz e r , l9?6) *
Immerman (1973) found th a t  a  s u b s ta n tia l m ajo rity  (73*6^) of 
government executives in  Hew York C ity  he ld  unfavorable opinions 
toward public  employee unionism. These opinions were e l ic i te d  
by covert methodologies, perhaps revealing  "deeper-rooted fee lings"  
(immerman, 1973) • Davis and West (1979) a lso  found th a t  su b tle  
phrasing of questions evoked negative a t t i tu d e s  toward unionization  
in  a  sample of county government superv iso rs.
L eg is la tio n . An increment in  s t r ik e s  o r s t r ik e  th re a ts  
( r e fe r  to  analog #4) can a lso  a f fe c t  th e  le g is la t io n  enacted 
re le v a n t to  unionism. For example, pub lic  p o licy  o r le g is la tio n  
re la te d  to  c o lle c tiv e  bargain ing , th e  r ig h t  to  s t r ik e ,  o r the  
agency shop are p o te n tia l  conditioned response analogs. These 
analogs w ill  be comprehensively examined as a  s in g le , general 
analog—r e s t r ic t iv e  le g is la t io n  ( I 9) .  For example, a  decrease in  
pub lic  support (14^) f o r  p u b lic  s e c to r  union shops and an increase 
in  support (1^ )  f o r  the  r ig h t  to  work in  pub lic  employment (without 
union membership) were the  find ings of a n a tion  survey comparing
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pulxLic a t t i tu d e s  in  197^ and 1975 (Kruger & Rodgers, 1978),
P red ic tio n s
The p resen t c la s s ic a l  conditioning theory  can explain  many 
events th a t  have occurred in  th e  f i e l d  of lab o r re la t io n s  as w ell 
a s  p re d ic t sev era l law ful re la tio n sh ip s  which o ften  have not 
been examined by in v e s tig a to rs  in  th i s  f i e ld .  . The novel p red ic tio n s  
generated by th i s  theo ry  can d ir e c t  fu tu re  resea rch  along unique 
and system atic p a th s.
While th e  above ru le s  o f correspondence do not exhaust the  
p o te n tia l analogs th a t  could be drawn between c la s s ic a l  conditioning 
and lab o r re la t io n s ,  th e y  are s u f f ic ie n t ly  i l lu s t r a t iv e  to  in d ica te  
th e  p o te n tia l f ru i tfu ln e s s  th a t  can be re a liz e d  by applying c la s s ic a l  
defense conditioning to  lab o r r e la t io n s .  These ru le s  o f correspondence 
w ill  now be u t i l iz e d  to  derive p re d ic tiv e  re la tio n sh ip s  between the  
independent and dependent v a ria b le s .
Reinforcement, In  c la s s ic a l  conditioning, th e  conditioned 
response i s  an in c reasing  func tion  of the  number of re in fo rced  
t r i a l s .  This i s  not sp ec if ie d  as a  simple l in e a r  re la tio n sh ip  but 
as a  negativ e ly -acce le ra ted  in c reasing  re la tio n sh ip  ( e .g . ,  Spence,
1956; R escorla à  Wagner, 1972; Weiss, I 968) , By combining ru le s  
of correspondence 4  and 18, i t  i s  p red ic ted  th a t  the  a t t i tu d e  
toward a  union w ill  be in c reasin g ly  negative as the  union in c reasin g ly  
r e l i e s  on s tr ik e s  o r s t r ik e  th re a ts .  For example, th e  declin ing  
tren d  in  approval o f labo r unions ( e .g . ,  "Approval of Labor Unions
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Siiiks," 1979) i s  p redicted  to  be a  function  of the "seventeen-fold 
increase" in  governmental employee work stoppages and job actions 
from 1958 to  1968 (Hallem e t  a l . ,  1972; Immerman, 1973).
P o te n tia l overt behaviors re su ltin g  from the negative 
a t t i tu d e s  generated by increases in  pub lic  employee m ilitancy 
(Hallem e t  a l . ,  1972; Immerman, 1973) might a lso  occur, Lou 
H arris  advised p o litic a n s  to  run on an ti-un ion  platform s in  l97o 
due to  public  animosity toward unions re f le c te d  in  opinion p o lls  
(Kruger & Rodgers, I 978; Heitzman, 1976). Several in v estig a to rs  
( e .g . ,  Colton, 1978; Weitzman, I 976; Williams, 1977) have documented 
successfu l cases of p o li t ic ia n s  follow ing the p rescrip tio n  to  run 
"eigainst the unions" ( e .g . ,  San F ran c isco 's  Board of Supervisors,
San D iego's Mayor, N orfo lk 's Council). New York C ity 's  Mayor 
Lindsay a lso  was found to  receive  strong public  support in  h is  
denunciation of a  s tr ik in g  union and of unions in  general (Raskin,
1968) .
A ttitude  change toward unions was demonstrated by Robertson
( I 979) in. a  sim ulation experiment with college s tuden ts. On four 
a t t i tu d in a l  items re la te d  to  unions and c o lle c tiv e  bargaining, 
management ro le  players became s ig n if ic a n tly  more anti-union a f te r  
c o lle c tiv e  bargaining sim ulation experiences (fo r  one sem ester), 
while union ro le  players became s ig n if ic a n tly  more pro-union. 
U nfortunately, the exact content of the sim ulation experiences i s  
unknown; however, i f  s tr ik e s  were threatened  by the union ro le  
p layers or i f  o ther aversive events were associated  with the union.
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the increase in  anti-union a tt i tu d e s  fo r  the management ro le  
p layers would be predicted  by the present theory. The present 
theory a lso  p red ic ts  a t t i tu d in a l  changes fo r  ro le  players 
representing  the public served by a s tr ik in g  union. Therefore, a 
sim ulation experiment examining the e ffe c t of co llec tiv e  bargaining 
dynamics on the public served by the union could be a f r u i t f u l  
a rea  of in v estiga tion  as w ell.
The wave of anti-union sentiments has a lso  been f e l t  by 
public employees themselves. Rybacki and Rybacki (1979) noted 
th a t a  large portion  of a  sample of unionized teachers (82^) 
f e l t  the  community u n fa irly  c r i t ic iz e d  them, perhaps a  r e s u lt  of 
the  g u lf created between the community and the s t r ik e r s .  Raskin 
( I 968) s ta ted  th a t " a l l  the fo rces f e l t  they were going downhill 
in  public resp ec t. 'People t r e a t  us lik e  d i r t , ' was the way one 
san ita tio n  worker phrased i t .  And the sense of second c lass  
c itizen sh ip  was even stronger among policemen and firemen" (p. 29) .  
Stone ( I 97I)  reported  th a t s tr ik e s  of po lice  in  New York C ity have 
re su lted  in  a decline in  th e ir  p re s tig e . (This i s  a lso  supported 
by M anfield’s , I 976, analysis concerning the decline in  p restige  
of public employment.) A san ita tio n  truck d riv e r in  New York City 
was quoted as sayings "The c iv ilia n s  . . , blame the  s tr ik e  on 
us , They th ink  because we work with garbage th a t  we're
garbage" (P r ia i, I 976, p. B5).
Kelley and Edge (l9?6) examined the e ffe c ts  of th is  decline 
in  general public opinion toward labor unions and th e i r  members.
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They noted th a t  in  two years (1972-1974) a tt i tu d e s  of the U niversity  
o f Hawaii fa c u lty  hecame le s s  "pro-union” (although no s t a t i s t i c a l  
t e s t s  compared these a t t i tu d e s ) , The authors ind ica ted  th a t  the  
decline  in  pro-union a t t i tu d e s  was caused by " c r i t i c a l ,  s ting ing  
remarks from the s ta te  le g is la tu re , a  budget cu t, and a  poorly 
accepted negotiated  contract" (p . 356) .
The decline in  organized la b o r 's  image and p o l i t ic a l  setbacks 
have been postu la ted  as two fa c to rs  con tribu ting  to  an increase in  
d e c e r tif ic a tio n  of unions by th e i r  members (Dworkin & E x te jt , 1979). 
The present theory  i s  capable of in teg ra tin g  th e  d a ta  on increases 
in  d e c e r tif ic a tio n  th a t  might r e s u l t  from these and re la te d  fa c to rs  
since i t  p re d ic ts  th a t  severa l va riab les  w ill  e f fe c t  a  decline  in  
la b o r 's  image and the  re la te d  p o l i t i c a l  setbacks i t  rece ives.
Due to  th e  type of re la tio n sh ip  found in  c la s s ic a l  conditioning 
between the conditioned response and the  number of re in fo rced  t r i a l s ,  
th i s  theory makes the  co u n te r-in tu itiv e  p red ic tio n  th a t  a t  some 
po in t the  harshness of the  a t t i tu d e  toward the union w ill s ta b i l iz e  
so th a t  fu r th e r  s tr ik e s  do not have fu r th e r  detrim ental consequences 
on a t t i tu d e s . In  add ition , i n i t i a l  encounters w ith s tr ik e s  w ill  
have g rea te r e f fe c ts  on a tt i tu d e s  than subsequent encounters 
( e .g . ,  the  increase from 1 to  5 s tr ik e s  w ill  have a  g rea te r impact 
on the harshness of a tt i tu d e s  than an increase from 30 to  35 s tr ik e s  
w il l ) .  For example, the  s in g le , aversive Boston Police S trik e  of 
I 9I 9 caused a  "serious blow" to  p o lice  unionism (Hallem e t a l . ,
1972) .  Such a  reac tio n  toward one s t r ik e  would be pred ic ted  to  be
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unduly severe "because the  s tr ik e  occurred e a r ly  in  conditioning 
ra th e r  than l a t e r .
Rules of correspondence 4 and I 9 can be combined to  y ie ld  the 
p red ic tio n  th a t  increased s tr ik e s  o r s t r ik e  th re a ts  by a  union would 
r e s u l t  in  inc reasin g ly  r e s t r i c t iv e  lab o r re la t io n s  le g is la t io n . This 
re la tio n sh ip  would a lso  be in  th e  form of a  negatively -accelera ted  
increasing  fu nc tion . Threfore, i n i t i a l  s tr ik e s  w ill  a ffe c t 
le g is la t io n  to  a  g re a te r  ex ten t than  s tr ik e s  occurring a t  a  
subsequent period in  th e  conditioning process, A lderfer (l9?4) 
reported  testim onies from a  le g is la t iv e  hearing of Pennsylvania's 
Public  Employee R elations Act (Act 195) which granted a  lim ited  
r ig h t  to  s t r ik e  fo r  p ub lic  employees. G enerally, those ind iv idua ls  
rep resen ting  government commented unfavorably on th i s  le g is la tio n  
in  co n tra s t to  union rep re se n ta tiv e s . In  the  extreme, one 
in d iv idua l not only expressed an unfavorable a t t i tu d e  toward th i s  
p a r t ic u la r  le g is la t io n , but a lso  favored lim itin g  c o lle c tiv e  
bargaining r ig h ts  fo r  pub lic  employees. Since th i s  le g is la tio n  
had been asso c ia ted  w ith many s t r ik e s ,  p a r t ic u la r ly  .in the  public  
schools, th e  p resen t theory  woijild p red ic t harsh  a t t i tu d e s , (A lderfer 
reported  th a t  159 s t r ik e s  had occurred in  th ree  years subsequent to  
th is  p iece of le g is la t io n ,)
. A nti-union le g is la t io n  fo r  governmental employees has become 
somewhat problem atic. For example, Weitzman ( I 976) s ta ted  th a t  "the 
inc reasin g ly  c h il ly  pub lic  clim ate fo r  government employees" (p. 243) 
was re la te d  to ;  (a) the  reduction by Congress of th e  fe d e ra l pay
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plan  increase from 8.66^ (recommended by the  C iv il Service Commission 
and the  O ffice of Management and Budget) to  5% i (b) s ta te  and fe d e ra l 
le g is la t iv e  candidates emphasizing opposition to  pub lic  employee 
spending; (c) AFL-CIO recogn ition  of Congressional a l l i e s  voting 
in  opposition to  labo r; (d) lo c a l and s ta te  demands fo r  union 
concessions ( e .g . , improved p ro d u c tiv ity ) ; and (e) the switch to  
non-support of comprehensive fe d e ra l le g is la t io n  fo r  labo r re la tio n s  
by many p o li t ic ia n s .
Powerful unions in  San Francisco have a lso  received  "backlashes" 
in  the  form of an ti-un ion  referenda (W illiams, 1977). For example, 
th e  pub lic  passed le g is la t io n  which req^uired th a t  any s tr ik in g  c ity  
employee be f i r e d ,  th a t  pay increases be r e s t r ic te d ,  and th a t  the 
v o te rs  themselves would be the  decision  makers during n ego tia tion  
impasses over wages.
The cou rts  have a lso  expressed an ti-un ion  behaviors. In  New 
York pun itive  ac tion  fo r  s tr ik in g  teach ers  was taken , no longer 
perm itting  th e  deduction o f union dues from paychecks—a " r ig h t 
p rized  by unions" (W illiams, 1977)• The Supreme Court a lso  ru led  
ag a in st pub lic  unions in  decreeing th a t  th e  Federal F a ir  Labor 
Standards Act minimum wage/maximum hour prov isions not be extended 
to  s ta te  and lo c a l  governmental employees (W illiams, 1977).
WoUett (1964) noted th a t  s t r ik e s  "a lie n a te  th e  pub lic  whose 
support i s  needed in  order to  finance improvements in  the  economic 
w elfare and work s i tu a tio n  of government employees" (p . I 3 ) ,  Thus 
a  s t r ik e ,  while perhaps re s u lt in g  in  immediate gains fo r  the  public
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employee, may re su lt in  long-term lo sses ,
Foegen (1972) indicated  th a t unlike employees in  the p riva te  
sec to r, public employees can be reached through law makers,
Torrence (1979) fu rth er specified  lo ca l governments as the ta rg e t 
fo r  f ru s tra te d  c itizen s  due to  th e ir  proximity. A U.S. Department 
of Labor o f f ic ia l  was reported as s ta tin g  th a t the  public saw 
New York City municipal unions in  a "bad lig h t"  due to  s tr ik e s  
and th e ir  f in an c ia l e ffe c ts  (Ledbetter, 1976).
The re s u lt  of these fru s tra tio n s  (from s tr ik e s  and increased 
taxes) could re s u lt  in  an ti-lab o r le g is la tio n  (Foegen, 1972). 
Increases in  opposition to  co llective  bargaining le g is la tio n  have 
been noted (Colton, 1978; Kruger & Rodgers, 1978). For example, 
Ohio, Texas, and C alifornia have been documented as lo c a l i t ie s  
where a lack of endorsement fo r co llec tiv e  bargaining leg is la tio n  
has occurred (Kruger & Rodgers, 1978). In  add ition , a  federa l 
d i s t r i c t  court upheld the f ir in g  of 100 s tr ik in g  teachers in  
Michigan which was presumably caused by "sour" public  a ttitu d e s  
(Kruger & Rodgers, 1978).
In  c la ss ica l conditioning, a  comparison between continuous 
reinforcement and p a r t ia l  reinforcement finds superior conditioning 
fo r  a  conditioned stimulus th a t has been continuously associated 
with an unconditioned stimulus than one th a t has been only p a r tia lly  
associated with the re in fo rcer ( e .g .,  F itzg era ld , 19^3; Gormezano & 
Moore, I 969; Wagner, S iegel, Thomas, & E lliso n , 1964). I t  i s  
therefo re  predicted th a t a union which s tr ik e s  or threatens to
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s tr ik e  a t  every bargaining session  w ill su ffe r  a  g re a te r  negative 
reac tio n  (a tt i tu d e s  and le g is la tio n )  than one which i s  le s s  
re g u la rly  associated  with s tr ik e s  or s tr ik e  th re a ts  (v ia  ru le s  
of correspondence 5» 6, and 18 and 5» 6, and 1$), Reinforcement 
might be hypothesized as being more prevalent in  the  pub lic  
sec to r than in  the  p riv a te  sec to r where th e  economic a d v e rs itie s  
of a  s tr ik e  can be abated through stockp iling  or wage-benefit 
tra d e -o ffs  (Clark, 1972; W ellington & W inter, l9 ? 0 ). The presence 
of a  p o te n tia l avoidance or escape response in  the  p riv a te  sec to r 
might reduce the  number of asso c ia tio n s  between th e  conditioned 
stim ulus analog, the  labo r union, and the  unconditioned stim ulus 
analog, th e  s t r ik e .  The re s u l t  of th is  s i tu a tio n  would then be 
a  weaker conditioned response in  the  p riv a te  sec to r than in  the  
public  sec to r (where asso c ia tio n s  between th e  union and the  aversive 
s tr ik e  are  more abundant).
E x tin c tio n . Withdrawing the  reinforcem ent (UCS) in  c la s s ic a l 
conditioning r e s u l ts  in  "gradual disappearance" of the  conditioned 
response (Mackintosh, 197^)• By combining ru le s  of correspondence 
7 and 18, i t  can be p red ic ted  th a t  a  cessation  of s t r ik e  a c t iv i ty  
by a  union would re s u l t  in  a  gradual reduction in  th e  negative 
a tt i tu d e  th a t had been conditioned to  the  p a r tic u la r  union 
(re su lta n t from p r io r  s tr ik e  a c t iv i ty —reinforcem ent), S im ilarly , 
ru le s  of correspondence 7 and I 9 can be combined to  p red ic t th a t 
term inating s tr ik e  a c t iv i ty  would r e s u lt  in  a  decline in  r e s t r ic t iv e  
le g is la tio n . This would not n ecessa rily  enfeeble th e  union i f
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unions were not almost exclu sive ly  dependent upon the s tr ik e  to  
red ress  grievances. For example, codetermination on the  West German 
model reduces the  frequency of s tr ik e s  id iile  strengthening the  
union (ap p lica tio n  to  the  pub lic  sec to r poses sp ec ia l problems),
Zack (1968) noted th a t pub lic  annoyance has re su lte d  from an 
increased s tr ik e  frequency in  p u b lic  employment. Therefore, he 
prescribed  th ir d  p a rty  in te rv en tio n s  fo r  f a c i l i t a t in g  nego tia tions 
and thereby c u rta ilin g  s tr ik e  a c t iv i ty .  The presen t theory  p red ic ts  
th a t  such a method, i f  i t  a c tu a lly  re su lted  in  a  decline in  s t r ik e s ,  
would be an e ffe c tiv e  method of changing pub lic  opinion since i t  
would be analogous to  ex tin c tio n .
Other da ta  re lev an t to  th e  ex tin c tio n  process are av ailab le  
in  the  find ings of M artin, Barclay, and B ia s a t t i  (1979) who 
em pirically  re la te d  managerial and union a t t i tu d e s  (measured v ia  
survey and in terv iew  techniques) and the  success of th e  union- 
management re la tio n sh ip  (measured v ia  the  "frequency of reported  
union-management problems", p , I 74) in  s ix  fe d e ra l government 
organizations a t  two separate  tim e periods ( I 972 and I 976) ,
While the  researchers were in te re s te d  in  th e  causal e f fe c ts  of 
a t t i tu d e s  on success, t h e i r  d a ta  do not allow a  determ ination of 
c au sa lity . However, th ey  d id  f in d  th a t a  reduction  in  th e  frequency 
of problems occurring in  the  union-management re la tio n sh ip  (re la te d  
to  grievance handling, n eg o tia tio n s , and c iv i l  serv ice  regu la tions) 
was s ig n if ic a n tly  associated  w ith favorable managerial a tt i tu d e s  
toward th e  union. Since union members were shown e a r l ie r  to  be
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not included in  the  p resen t th e o ry 's  intended scope and sub jec t to  
d if fe re n t p rin c ip le s , th e  lack  of a  s ig n if ic a n t re la tio n sh ip  
between union a t t i tu d e s  and frequency of problems poses no 
problems fo r  the  p resen t theo ry . The authors attempted to  explain 
t h e i r  r e s u lts  through a  notion th a t  managerial a t t i tu d e s , unlike 
union a t t i tu d e s , impinge on the  clim ate of the  union-management 
re la tio n sh ip  thereby a ffe c tin g  th e  success of th e  re la tio n sh ip .
The p resen t theory explains these  d a ta  v ia  the  process o f ex tin c tio n , 
the  decline  in  the  frequency of problems re su lte d  in  a  more favorable 
( le s s  unfavorable) m anagerial a t t i tu d e .
Counterconditioning, Another method of p o te n tia l u t i l i t y  fo r  
changing th e  a tt i tu d e s  formed about th e  union i s  counterconditioning. 
In  th is  procedure, a  stim ulus th a t  has been previously  associated  
w ith unpleasant s tim u li i s  assoc ia ted  with p leasing , a t t r a c t iv e  
s tim u li ( e ,g , , Melvin & Brown, 196^; Pearce & Dickinson, 1975)» 
Analogously, the  union prev iously  assoc iated  w ith s tr ik e s  o r o ther 
unpleasant s tim u li would become associated  w ith p leasing , a t t r a c t iv e  
events, Rybacki and Rybacki (1979)i fo r  example, suggested th a t  the  
union attem pt to  modify th e i r  image to  one of an "ongoing change 
agent in  th e  community" (p . I 67) by not confining i t s  exposure to  
negative events such as s tr ik e s  but a lso  incorporating  p o s itiv e  
id e n tif ic a tio n s . I f  th e  change was a  complete re v e rsa l to  p o s itiv e  
a sso c ia tio n s, counterconditioning would be p red ic ted .
The p resc rip tio n  of a  non-stoppage s t r ik e  whereby serv ices 
are  unin terrup ted  but lab o r and management both receive  f in a n c ia l
1 3 9
reductions during the s tr ik e  (Kassem & M utterer. l9 7 l) i s  also 
in te re s tin g  from a learning th e o re tic a l view. Kassem and M utterer 
noted th a t th is  procedure "may be the most e ffec tiv e  way of reducing 
negative public reactions to  teacher demands" (p. 86) ,  This 
recommendation would be supported i f  the  union, previously 
associated  with s tr ik e s ,  subsequently becomes associated with 
p o s itiv e  s tim u li, re su ltin g  in  counterconditioning. However,
Kassem and M utte rer 's  p rescrip tio n  seems ra th e r to  e n ta i l  n eu tra liza ­
tio n  of the  aversive unconditioned stim ulus analog, the  s tr ik e , 
which could a lso  be an e ffe c tiv e  method fo r  cu rta ilin g  negative 
a t t i tu d e s . Whether or not th is  i s  the most e ffec tiv e  method, 
however, i s  debatable.
G eneralization , In c la s s ic a l conditioning, the  conditioned 
response w ill generalize to  other s im ila r conditioned stim uli; 
however, the magnitude of the  conditioned response w ill decrease 
as th e  stim ulus becomes le s s  s im ila r to  the  o rig in a l conditioned 
stim ulus (e ,g , ,  S iegel, H earst, George, & O'Neal, I 968; Weiss, I 963) ,  
In  examining labor re la tio n s , in te re s t  l i e s  in  the  degree to  which 
a  negative a tt i tu d e  i s  re f le c te d  about a  given union (union A) 
based on p r io r  experience w ith another s tr ik in g  union (union X),
In  th is  example, union A has never struck , never threatened to  do 
so, but su ffe rs  h o s t i l i ty  based on generaliza tion . Why should th is  
generaliza tion  develop? G eneralization i s  f a c i l i ta te d  by s im ila rity  
between s tim u li. Thus, i f  union A i s  very s im ilar to  union X, 
generaliza tion  would be g rea te r than i f  union A i s  d issim ilar to
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union X, Whether union A i s  more or le s s  s im ila r to  union X than 
i s  union B could a lso  he examined. I f  union A i s  more s im ila r 
to  union X than i s  union B, then we could p red ic t g rea te r g enera liza­
tio n  o f negative a t t i tu d e s  to  union B than to  union A (given th a t  
union X has heen re in fo rced ; i . e . ,  associated  w ith s tr ik e s  and/or 
s t r ik e  th r e a ts ) .
Although s im ila r i ty  in  learn ing  experim entation has o ften  
heen confined to  physica l v a ria tio n s  in  s tim u li ( e .g . ,  along 
and ito ry  or v isu a l dimensions), those who have boldly  extended 
learn in g  p rin c ip le s  to  so c ia l behaviors have transcended a  pure ly  
physica l approach to  stim ulus s im ila r i ty  ( e .g . ,  M ille r &■ B ollard ,
19^1; Weiss, I 963; Weiss & M ille r, l9 7 l) .  The s im ila r i ty  among 
lab o r unions could be based, fo r  example, on the  occupation 
involved; p o lice  and f i r e  f ig h te rs  might be considered s im ila r  on 
th e  dimension of e s s e n t ia l i ty  and have common employment requirem ents.^ 
The example c ite d  e a r l ie r  of the  AFL-GIO's perception th a t th e i r  
re la tio n sh ip  to  public  unions had caused a l l i e s  in  Congress to  
become h o s ti le  toward them (Kruger & Rodgers, 1978; Weitzman, I 976) 
might be conceptualized as  a case of g en era liza tio n .
D iscrim ination. The a n ti th e s is  of gen era liza tio n  i s  
d iscrim ination . A procedure fo r  f a c i l i t a t in g  a  d iscrim ination  
is  ex tin c tio n . I f  union A repeated ly  does not s t r ik e  iM le  union X 
continues to  s t r ik e , ex tin c tio n  of the  generalized  negative a t t i tu d e  to  
union A should occur w ith a  re su ltin g  d iscrim ination  between the  
two unions.
IW
This procedure fo r  f a c i l i t a t in g  a d iscrim ination  may have
occurred in  th e  d a ta  repo rted  by Odewahn and S p ritz e r  ( I976) —th a t
college p res id en ts  w ith c o lle c tiv e  bargaining experience were more
favorably  in c lin ed  to  unionization  in  higher education than college
p resid en ts  w ithout such experience ( 6 ^  versus fa v o ra b il i ty ) ,
These re s u l ts  can be p red ic ted  by th e  p resen t theory  i f  th ree
p lau sib le  assumptions a re  made? (a) a  negative a tt i tu d e  r e s u l ts
from the  asso c ia tio n  of "unionization" w ith unpleasant consequences
( th is  assumption has been supported by evidence previously c ite d ) ;
(b) th e  conditioned negative a t t i tu d e  g enera lizes to  other ex is tin g
unions and proposed unions; (c) in  the  above example (Odewahn &
S p ritz e r , I 976) , th e  college p res id en ts  favorably  inc lined  to
unionization  su ffe red  no s t r ik e  a c t iv i ty  a t  th e i r  in s t i tu t io n .
I f  th e  above th re e  conditions hold, then the  p resen t theory would
p red ic t th a t  those u n iv e rs ity  p resid en ts  w ith c o lle c tiv e  bargaining
experience were capable of making a  u se fu l d iscrim ination . While
i n i t i a l l y  gen era liza tio n  would occur to  th e  fa c u lty  union, thus
e l ic i t in g  a  negative a t t i tu d e ,  ex tin c tio n  v ia  non-reinforcement
(lack  of s tr ik e s )  i s  p red ic ted  to  even tually  r e s u l t .  In  the
Odewahn and S p ritz e r  i l lu s t r a t io n ,  i t  would be p red ic ted  th a t  the
p resid en ts  w ithout c o lle c tiv e  bargaining experience were unfavorably
disposed to  c o lle c tiv e  bargaining in  higher education because th e i r
negative a t t i tu d e s  caused by s tr ik in g  unions were not extinguished,
2but ra th e r  generalized  to  fa c u lty  unions.
I f  in  th e  above i l lu s t r a t io n  (Odewahn & S p ritz e r , I 976)
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p leasan t even ts, ra th e r  than simply a  lack  of unpleasant events, 
were a sso c ia ted  w ith th e  fa c u lty  union, then  counterconditioning 
of the  generalized  negative a t t i tu d e  would he p red ic ted  to  occur.
This might he a  more e ffic ac io u s  technique fo r  f a c i l i t a t in g  a  
d iscrim ina tion , p a r t ic u la r ly  i f  th e  response i s  h igh ly  re s is ta n t  
to  ex tin c tio n ,
UGS In te n s i ty , A conditioned stim ulus asso c ia ted  w ith a  very 
in tense  unconditioned stim ulus produces s tro n g er o r more measurable 
conditioned responding in  c la s s ic a l  conditioning than one assoc ia ted  
w ith a  weak unconditioned stim ulus ( e ,g , ,  Lomhardo, Weiss, & S tich , 
I 97I ;  E escorla  & Wagner, 1972; Spence & Spence, I 966; Weiss, I 968 ; 
Weiss, Weiss, & Chalupa, I 967) , Comhination o f ru le s  o f correspondence 
8 and 18 r e s u l ts  in  the  p red ic tio n  th a t  unions assoc iated  w ith 
long s tr ik e s  w il l  even tually  he faced w ith s tro n g er negative 
a t t i tu d e s  than unions a sso c ia ted  w ith sh o rt s t r ik e s .
Support f o r  the  preceding p red ic tio n  i s  provided hy Immerman 
(1973) • A dm inistrators o f a  governmental department which had 
re c en tly  experienced "a  c rip p lin g  s t i ik e  of long duration" (p . 104) 
showed th e  le a s t  favorab le  a t t i tu d e s  toward la b o r unions in  
comparison to  o th e r departments w ithout such aversive  a sso c ia tio n s .
The d e sc rip tio n  o f the  s t r ik e  as "cripp ling" and "long" could 
in g ly  no t only a  dura tion  fa c to r  hut a lso  a  s t r ik e  th a t  was widely 
supported. Rules o f corre^ondence 9 and 18 can he combined to  
derive  th e  p red ic tio n  th a t  s t r ik e s  vriiich are  widely supported hy 
union members w il l  re s u l t  in  more negative a t t i tu d e s  than those
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s tr ik e s  in  which fewer members a re  engaged.
S trik es  in  an e sse n tia l serv ice  ( e .g . ,  f i r e  o r po lice  serv ices) 
should be more negatively  responded to  than a  s tr ik e  in  a  non- 
e sse n tia l service (pred icted  v ia  ru le s  of corresponse 10 and 18),
This p red ic ted  i s  supported by McClain’s (1973) survey of freshmen 
a t  Texas Tech U niversity , He found th a t  students were le s s  
favorable to  unionization of po lice  and firemen (52. ^ )  tlian 
teachers (71. 1^) and even le s s  supportive of unionization of 
government o ffice  and p o s ta l workers {k^a '5 % )»  In  ad d itio n , a 
public  sec to r/p r iv a te  sec to r d is tin c tio n  i s  av a ilab le  in  McClain's 
d a ta . Much g rea te r support fo r  unionization of general laborers 
and construction workers (90, 3̂ )  than fo r  the  pub lic  sec to r 
occupations c ite d  above was found by McClain, Support was a lso  
more favorable fo r  auto workers, team sters, and dock workers (85 . 9^) 
than fo r  the public  sec to r.
The reduced aversive nature o f the  unconditioned stim ulus analog 
fo r  non-essen tia l serv ice  s tr ik e s  a s  compared to  e sse n tia l serv ice  
s tr ik e s  was examined by Burton and K rider ( I970) v ia  th e  variab les 
leng th  o f s tr ik e  and p a r t ia l  operations. They found th a t  s tr ik e s  
in  non-essen tia l serv ices were longer (10,6  days) and le s s  l ik e ly  
to  undergo some form of p a r t ia l  operations ( 77% o f the time) than 
s tr ik e s  in  an e sse n tia l serv ice  (duration was 4 .7  days and p a r t ia l  
operations occurred 92%  o f th e  tim e).
More r e s t r ic t iv e  le g is la tio n  dealing with co lle c tiv e  bargaining, 
r ig h t  to  s t r ik e ,  and agency shops would a lso  be p red ic ted  when a
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union i s  associated  with a long s tr ik e , a  widely supported s tr ik e ,  
o r a  s tr ik e  o f  e s s e n tia l  workers. This i s  p red icted  by combining 
ru le s  o f correspondence 8, 9, and lO, re sp ec tiv e ly , w ith ru le  of 
correspondence I 9 . For example, a  na tio n a l survey found a  general 
d isfavor fo r  th e  pub lic  employee's r ig h t  to  s tr ik e ;  however, 
a tt i tu d e s  varied  and were contingent on the  re fe re n t group ("Survey 
F inds," 1978) .  The public most vehemently opposed po lice  and 
firem en 's s tr ik e  r ig h ts  ( 6 ^  and 6 6 ^  opposed, re sp ec tiv e ly ), 
followed by p o s ta l workers (58^  opposition ), san ita tio n  employees 
( 5 ^  opposition), and teachers (5 1 %  opposition). In  add ition , an 
o v e ra ll increase was reported  in  the  opposition fo r  the  r ig h t to  
s t r ik e  fo r  these employees from 1975 to  1978. (Opinions regarding 
p o s ta l workers' r ig h t to  s tr ik e  were not surveyed during 1975.)
Burton and K rider (l9?0) found th a t  in junctions were sought 
and granted most frequently  in  s tr ik e s  o f e s se n tia l serv ices 
(35^ granted) in  comparison to  work stoppages involving interm ediate- 
serv ice  employees ( 2 ^  granted) or non -essen tia l se rv ices  (1$^ 
g ran ted ). In  add ition , e sse n tia l-se rv ic e  personnel were f ir e d  le s s  
frequen tly  than le s s -e s se n tia l  employees as a  r e s u l t  o f the  s t r ik e . 
Burton and K rider a ttr ib u te d  th is  l a t t e r  finding  to  the  "short-run  
ind ispensab ility "  of employees providing e sse n tia l serv ices .
.Within le g a l s tr ik e  model s ta te s ,  as previously noted, the  
employees providing e sse n tia l serv ices a re  generally  not given the 
freedom to  withhold th e i r  se rv ices . An extended version of a  model 
fo r  s tr ik e s  dealing with e s s e n tia l i ty  o f serv ices allows non-
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e sse n tia l serv ice  employees to  s tr ik e  fo r  an unlim ited length  of 
tim e, in term ediate-serv ice  employees to  s tr ik e  fo r a  lim ited  
dura tion , and e sse n tia l-se rv ic e  providers are  given no r ig h t to  
s tr ik e  (Brookshire & Holly, 1973)•
I f  the  public  sec to r i s  conceptualized as being more e sse n tia l 
than th e  p riv a te  sec to r (due to  g re a te r  in e la s t ic i ty  o f demand and 
n o n -su b s titu ta b ility  o f s e rv ic e s ) , then a  s tr ik e  in  the  public 
sec to r should re s u l t  in  more r e s t r ic t iv e  le g is la tio n  and harsher 
a tt i tu d e s  than a  p riv a te  sec to r s t r ik e .  Zack ( I968) supported th is  
p red ic tio n  by noting a  d if fe re n tia tio n  based on public  sec to r 
s tr ik e s  being "more immediate and more d isru p tiv e  to  our d a ily  
a c t iv i t ie s "  (p . 70) , Anecdotal accounts o f events which emphasize 
th e  d ire c t  and d isru p tiv e  e ffe c ts  o f public  sec to r s tr ik e s  are 
av a ilab le  in  the  l i te r a tu r e  ( e .g . ,  Foegen, 1972; Zack, I 968) .
These e ffe c ts  are  con trasted  w ith the  e ffe c ts  o f s tr ik e s  in  
industry  which a re  " su f f ic ie n tly  remote from our immediate needs 
th a t we have come to  accept them" (Zack, I 968, p. 69) .
Hallem e t  a l .  (1972) summarized the  d is tin c tio n  between the 
aversiveness o f the  s tr ik e  in  industry  and government and the 
re su ltin g  outcome fo r  the  pub lic  sec to r; "Because of th e  v i ta l  
functions th a t public  employees serve in  th e i r  communities, the 
public  reac tio n  to  th e i r  job actions have been sw ift, strong and 
overwhelmingly negative" (p . 888). Such reac tio n s  are  predicted 
l?y the  present theory.
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es Saliency. G enerally, a  s a lie n t conditioned stim ulus w ill 
more re a d ily  become associated  with the  unconditioned stim ulus than 
an obscure stim ulus ( e .g . ,  Greer, H itz ing , & Schaeffer, I 966; 
Gormezano, 1972; G rice, 1972, 1977; Kamin, I 965; Logan, 195^» 1977; 
Rescorla & Wagner, 1972). I t  would thus be p red ic ted  th a t  s tr ik in g  
unions receiv ing  su b s ta n tia l p ress coverage would expierience 
re s is ta n t  pub lic  a tt i tu d e s  as w ell as more circum scribed le g is la tio n  
re la t iv e  to  s tr ik in g  unions th a t  receive l i t t l e  o r no p ress coverage. 
These p red ic tions are  derived from the combination o f ru le s  of 
correspondence 11 and 18, and 11 and I 9 , re sp ec tiv e ly .
For example, education and hea lth  serv ice  work stoppages 
have been noted to  receive  an abundance o f  public  a tte n tio n  (White,
I 969) . Robins ( I 969) noted th a t  work stoppages, themselves, have 
"claimed a  d isp roportionate  share of public  in te re s t"  (p . 316). 
However, th is  e f fe c t  has been c ite d  as being more pronounced in  
th e  public  sec to r based on i t s  enhanced aversiveness r e la t iv e  to  
th e  p riv a te  sec to r. Since th e  public  sec to r s t r ik e  receives 
"thorough and c r i t i c a l  p ress coverage" unlike a  s t r ik e  in  th e  p riv a te  
sec to r (Zack, I 968 , p. 7 0 ) ,  pub lic  a t t i tu d e s  and le g is la t io n  are 
p red ic ted  to  r e f le c t  th is  d is t in c tio n . Evidence c ite d  e a r l ie r  
supports th is  ( e .g . ,  McClain, 1973)» Weitzman (1976) noted th a t 
"pub lic  a tt i tu d e s  toward unions have undoubtedly been a ffec ted  by 
highly  public ized  s tr ik e s  o f po lice  in  San Francisco, firemen in  
Kansas City, doctors in  Chicago and Los Angeles, and teachers in  
P ittsburgh" (p . 244). Such responses are  p red ic ted  to  occur by the
14?
present theory.
In te rac tio n  o f UCS In te n s ity  and T r ia ls . In  c la s s ic a l 
conditioning, an in te ra c tio n  between unconditioned stim ulus in te n s ity  
and the number o f conditioning t r i a l s  e x is ts  in  the  form of a 
m u ltip lica tiv e  re la tio n sh ip  (diverging curves, e .g . ,  Spence, 1956; 
Weiss, 1968; Weiss, Chalupa, Gorman, & Goodman, I 968) .  A strong, 
in tense unconditioned stim ulus re s u lts  in  g rea ter increments in  
conditioning over t r i a l s  than does a weak unconditioned stim ulus.
In  labor re la tio n s , i t  would be p redicted  th a t a  g rea te r d isp a rity  
in  a tt i tu d e s  would re s u l t  in  an increase in the number of long 
s tr ik e s  than an increase in  the number of short s tr ik e s .  This 
p rediction  i s  derived by combining ru le s  of correspondence 8 and 18. 
S im ilarly , le g is la tio n  should be more re s t r ic t iv e  when an increase 
occurs in  long ra th e r  than short s tr ik e s  (based on ru le s  of 
correspondence 8 and I 9) .  S im ilar predictions can be derived from 
the combination of ru le s  o f correspondence 9 and lO with ru le s  of 
correspondence 18 and I 9 ; i l lu s t r a t iv e ly ,  the  divergence in  a tti tu d e s  
re su ltin g  from th ree  po lice  s tr ik e s  as compared to  one police  
s tr ik e  i s  expected to  be g rea te r than the  divergence in  a ttitu d e s  
fo r  th ree  versus one teacher s t r ik e .
CS-UCS Arrangements. The v a rie ty  of temporal re la tio n sh ip s  
employed in  c la s s ic a l conditioning can a ffe c t the conditioned 
response observed. Simultaneous conditioning generally  e l i c i t s  
a  weaker conditioned response than th a t generated by the use of 
delay or tra ce  conditioning procedures ( e .g . ,  Bitterman, 1964;
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Creer, H itzing, & Schaefer, I 966; F itzw ater & Reisman, 1952;
Smith, Coleman, & Gormezano, I 969) . S im ilarly , iDackward 
conditioning is  genereilly considered to  be a  f a i r ly  unre liab le  
method o f conditioning ( e .g . ,  Fitzw ater & Reisman, 1952; Kimble, I 96I ;  
Mackintosh, 197^; Smith, Coleman, & Gormezano, I 969; Trapold,
Homzie, & Rutledge, 196^ ) . However, conditioning has developed 
with both simultaneous and bacb-rard conditioning procedures when a 
r e la t iv e ly  long duration unconditioned stim ulus i s  employed (Heth 
& Rescorla, 1973; c f. Heth, I 976; Holmes & Davis, 1979)• In  addition, 
conditioning in  which verbal mediations and s im ila r cognitive 
processes have been documented to  occur in  humans has evidenced 
re l ia b le  backward conditioning (Zeiner & Grings, I 968) . Delay 
conditioning generally produces a superior conditioned response to  
tra ce  conditioning ( e .g .,  Kamin, I 965) .
Based on the  above re la tio n sh ip s , i t  would be predicted  th a t 
the  procedure which would be expected to  re s u lt  in  the  most severe 
negative a tt i tu d e s  and re s t r ic t iv e  le g is la tio n  would be the 
following; When a union i s  reported  as being in  negotia tions fo r 
an in te rv a l p r io r  to  and during a s tr ik e  (predicted  by combining 
ru le s  o f correspondence 12 and 18, and 12 and I 9) .  The simultaneous 
presen ta tion  of the union engaging in  s tr ik e  a c tiv ity  should be 
a r e la t iv e ly  in e ff ic ie n t method of producing negative responses 
(based on ru le s  of correspondence 14 and 18, and 14 and I 9) .
However, when the union engages in  a  lengthy s t r ik e , th is  type of 
p resen ta tion  can be e ffec tiv e  in  developing s ig n ific a n t negative
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a ttitu d e s  and re s tr ic t iv e  le g is la tio n  (based on a combination of
ru le s  o f correspondence 8, 14, and 18 and 8, 14, and I 9) .  The
reporting  of a s tr ik e  p rio r  to  d isclosure  of the union involved
could produce negative a ttitu d e s  toward the union or r e s t r ic t iv e
le g is la tio n  relevan t to  the union i f  the indiv idual making the
response employs verbal responses so th a t the s tr ik e  i s  an tic ipated
3
when the union occurs. This p red iction  i s  derived from ru le s  of 
correspondence I5 and 18, and I 5 and I 9 . But i f  the 
s tr ik e  was re la tiv e ly  lengthy, then, in  sp ite  of the fa c t th a t the 
s tr ik e  was reported p rio r  to  d isclosure  o f the  union, negative 
a tti tu d e s  and re s t r ic t iv e  le g is la tio n  may indeed develop. This 
pred iction  i s  based on a combination of ru le s  of correspondence 
8, 15» and 18 and 8, 15» and I 9 . Another e ffec tiv e  method of 
conditioning the negative a tti tu d e  toward the union and producing 
re s t r ic t iv e  le g is la tio n  would be when the union i s  reported  as 
s tr ik in g  subsequent to  negotiations with a  time period intervening 
between the negotiations and the  s tr ik e  (v ia  ru le s  o f correspondence 
13 and 18, and I 3 and I 9) ,
Since press coverage i s  involved in  each of the  s itu a tio n s  
described above, conditioned stim ulus saliency e ffe c ts  are a lso  
involved. Thus unions which receive su b stan tia l press coverage 
when they are in  negotiations which precede and overlap a  reported 
s tr ik e  th re a t should incur harsher a ttitu d e s  and le g is la tio n  
than unions without extensive media coverage (v ia  ru le s  of 
correspondence 11, 12, and 18; 11, 12, and I 9) . The effectiveness
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of tra c e  conditioning in  producing re l ia b le  conditioned responses 
has been shown to  be a  function o f conditioned stim ulus saliency  
in  c la s s ic a l  conditioning, with g re a te r  conditioning w ith strong 
conditioned stim u li and l i t t l e ,  i f  any, conditioning with weak 
conditioned s tim u li (Kamin, 1965)» Thus the  e f fe c t  o f media 
coverage should be q u ite  s ig n if ic a n t when an in te rv a l separates 
nego tia tions and a  s t r ik e .  I t  would be p red ic ted  th a t when the 
union receives extensive coverage during nego tia tions and a  s tr ik e  
ensues a t  some la te r  d a te , negative a tt i tu d e s  and r e s t r ic t iv e  
le g is la tio n  w ill be more l ik e ly  to  r e s u l t  than when the  union 
n ego tia tions are  not covered with such in te n s ity  (baaed on the  
combination o f ru le s  o f correspondence 11, 13» and. 18; 11, I 3 » and
19) .
Constant and In te rm itten t OS's. In  c la s s ic a l  conditioning, 
an in te rm itte n tly  presented conditioned stim ulus w ill  r e s u l t  in  
more e ffe c tiv e  conditioning th a t a  constant conditioned stim ulus 
(Gormezano, 1972; Papsdorf, F ishbein , & Gormezano, 1964-). By 
combining ru le s  o f correspondence 16, I 7 , and 18, i t  can be 
p red icted  th a t a  union represented to  th e  pub lic  in te rm itten tly  
in  nego tia tions p r io r  to  s tr ik e  a c t iv i ty  would receive  harsher 
a tt i tu d e s  d irec ted  a t  them than one whose nego tia tions a re  reported  
re la t iv e ly  continuously. S im ilarly , a  union receiv ing  in te rm itten t 
p ress coverage p rio r  to  a  s tr ik e  should be faced with more r e s t r ic t iv e  
le g is la tio n  than one receiv ing  continuous coverage (v ia  ru le s  of 
correspondence 16, I 7 » and I9) .  To con tro l fo r  the  e ffe c ts  of
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the  conditioned stim ulus saliency  analog, however, the  to t a l  
amount of rep o rtin g  should be the  same in  the  in te rm itte n t and 
constant conditions described above.
Discussion •
Compound Conditioning
Some recen t developments in  c la s s ic a l  conditioning have 
im plications fo r  the e f fe c ts  of more than one conditioned stim ulus 
in  th e  conditioning paradigm. This l i te r a tu r e  i s  denoted as 
"compound conditioning" ( e ,g , , Kamin, I 968, I 969; Rescorla &
Wagner, 1972; Wagner, I 969) ,  These developments would appear 
to  be of p a r t ic u la r  relevance to  so c ia l behavior since  so c ia l cues 
a re  o ften  p resen t in  in t r ic a te  compounds in  th e  so c ia l  environment. 
Some o f the  unique re la tio n sh ip s  av a ilab le  through examining 
s itu a tio n s  involving more than one conditioned stim ulus w ill  be 
b r ie f ly  p resented  and extended to  labor r e la t io n s . As before, 
th ese  extensions w ill  be i l lu s t r a t iv e  ra th e r  than exhaustive. 
T yp ically , i t  has been assumed th a t  reinforcem ent r e s u l ts  
in  increases in  conditioned responding and non-reinforcement re s u l ts  
in  decreases in  conditioned responding. However, experim entation 
in  learn ing  has shown t h i s  to  not be the  e s tab lish ed  fa c t  i t  was 
once believed to  be. R ather, in v estig a to rs  have shown th a t i f  a 
conditioned stim ulus (X) i s  re in fo rced  in  the  presence of another 
conditioned stim ulus (A), then the  p r io r  h is to ry  and p ro p e rtie s  of 
stim ulus A a re  re lev an t and can have an impact on the  conditioning
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accruing to  stim ulus X (e ,g ,s  K^-in, I 968; I96Q; Rescorla & Wagner, 
I 972) • For example, i f  stim ulus A i s  an exceptionally  v ivid stim ulus, 
i t  can "overshadow" stim ulus X, a  le s s -s a l ie n t  stim ulus, the re su lt  
being th a t even though both s tim u li are present and re in forced  by 
the  unconditioned stim ulus, stimulus A acquires more conditioned 
response s treng th  than stim ulus X, S im ilarly , i f  stim ulus A had 
p rio r  associations with the  unconditioned stim ulus so th a t in  
essence i t  has become a  "signal" (Wagner, I 969) fo r  reinforcem ent, 
then stimulus A can "block" any conditioning to  stim ulus X even 
i f  stim ulus X i s  re in fo rced  (together, in  compound, with stim ulus A).
These two phenomena, overshadowing and blocking, could be 
important to  an analysis  o f the conditioning of h o s t i l i ty  to  
labor unions. Often d iffe re n t labo r unions are  associated  with 
each o ther, e ith e r  through a  formal a f f i l i a t io n  or so le ly  through 
the  p u b lic 's  perception of them, A labor union th a t  has received 
su b stan tia l press coverage (conditioned stim ulus salience  analog, 
re fe r  to  ru le  of correspondence #11) might preclude the development 
of h o s t i l i ty  toward i t s  a f f i l i a t e  even though both are  on s tr ik e .
However, th i s  seems to  be opposed to  a  concept of "g u ilt  by 
association", Learning researchers have investiga ted  such a 
phenomenon termed "sensory preconditioning" (Brogden, 1939)•
Sensory preconditioning re s u lts  when two s tim u li (A and X) are 
paired p rio r  to  the reinforcem ent of one, stim ulus A, Subsequent 
to  reinforcement of stim ulus A, te s t in g  shows th a t conditioned 
responses are a lso  e l ic i te d  by stim ulus X even though i t  has never
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■been re in fo rced . For labor unions, sensory preconditioning might 
develop i f  two unions (union A and union X) are a f f i l i a te d  p rio r 
to  s t r ik e  a c tiv ity  by one, union A, The s tr ik e  a c tiv ity  of union A 
re s u lts  in  negative a tt i tu d e s  to  not only i t s e l f  but a lso  to  the 
"innocent" union X. Here, however, the press coverage to  both 
unions should be roughly equivalent so th a t one union i s  not more 
sa lie n t than the o ther.
Another s itu a tio n  could be conceived in  the area of labor 
re la tio n s  ; One union, union A, has a long h isto ry  of s tr ik e  
a c t iv i ty . Subsequently, union A becomes a f f i l ia te d  with union X 
and both go on s t r ik e .  In  th is  case we would p red ict th a t 
h o s t i l i t i e s  to  union X would not develop but would ra th e r be 
blocked by union X 's association  with union A (which already 
e l i c i t s  su b s tan tia l h o s t i l i ty ) .
In  learn ing , i t  has been discovered th a t a stimulus w ill 
not be blocked when i t  i s  presented in compound with a  previously 
re inforced  stimulus i f  the  in te n s ity  of the unconditioned stimulus 
i s  increased during compound conditioning ("unblocking", Kamin,
1968) .  Thus, i f  the  s tr ik e  by unions A and X was longer in  duration 
(ru le  of correspondence #8 ), more widely supported (ru le  of 
correspondence # 9) 1 or involved more e ssen tia l services (ru le  of 
correspondence #10) than the previous s tr ik e  a c t iv i t ie s  of union 
A, i t  i s  predicted th a t h o s t i l i ty  toward union X would develop.
Other in te re s tin g  s itu a tio n s  involving analogs of overshadowing, 
sensory preconditioning, blocking, and unblocking are availab le  by
examining different types of conditioned stimulus analogs. For 
example, we might compare the hostility developed to a union leader 
and the union members that could result from excessive media coverage 
of the leader's activities, predicting the overshadowing of.the 
striking members by their leader. Another variant might focus 
on the effect of union endorsement of a political candidate. If 
the endorsement occurred prior to strike activity, a situation 
resembling sensory preconditioning could occur. Therefore it would 
be predicted that animosity would be conditioned to the political 
candidate. Alternatively, if a political candidate were to ally 
him/herself with a union with a prior strike history, subsequent 
strikes should block antagonism directed at the political candidate 
(unless the strikes became longer, more widely supported, or involved 
a more essential service than prior strikes the union).
In learning research, it has also been discovered that an 
aversive excitor (a conditioned stimulus which has been consistently 
paired with an aversive unconditioned stimulus) will block the 
conditioning of stimuli subsequently associated with the absence 
of an attractive stimulus (e.g., Dickinson & Bearing, 1979» Fowler,
I978; Fowler, Goodman, & DeVito, 1977; Fowler, Goodman, & Zanich, 1977). 
This finding could also be applied to labor relations : A political 
candidate endorsed by a union with a militant history ("aversive 
excitor") should not suffer dissaffection when the candidate and 
the union are subsequently associated with an absence of agreements 
or information supporting a voter's opinions on certain issues
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(a ttra c tiv e  s tim u li, see, e .g . ,  Byrne, I 97I ;  Lamberth, Gouaux,
& Davis, I 97I ;  Weiss, M iller, S te ig leder, & Denton, 1977)t In 
o ther words, the m ilitan t union which has come to  s ig n a l negative 
hedonic outcomes (s tr ik e s )  fo r  the  voter w ill block the conditioning 
of d is lik e  to  the p o l i t ic a l  candidate even though the candidate 
(together with the union) no longer agrees with or supports the 
vo ter on certa in  issu es . I f  the union and the candidate go a 
s tep  fu rth e r and disagree with the  voter (ra th e r than being n e u tra l) , 
blocking would s t i l l  be p red ic ted  i l  the disagreements were not 
more aversive than were the p r io r  s tr ik e s . An increase in  aversive­
ness, fo r example, disagreements on extremely important issues 
(see, e .g . .  Clore & Baldridge, I 968; Lombardo, Libkuman, & Weiss,
1972) ,  would y ie ld  unblocking, re su ltin g  in  a  d is lik e  fo r  the 
union-endorsed candidate.
Escape and Avoidance Conditioning
Other paradigms of p o te n tia l application  fo r  labo r re la tio n s  
scholars would be escape conditioning and avoidance conditioning.
In these  learning paradigms, the behavior allowing an individual 
to  escape or avoid the noxious stimulus might be so c ia lly  in te re s tin g . 
For example, Peterson and Tracy (1977) found th a t when the costs of a 
s tr ik e  were expected to  be high, the  constituen ts of both union and 
management negotiators were more lik e ly  to  support the  negotiated 
settlem ent than when s tr ik e  costs were not ejqpected to  be so extensive. 
Extensive costs of a s tr ik e  might be considered a highly aversive 
stim ulus. For management, some of these potenticil costs have been
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delineated  under the  ru b r ic  of unconditioned stim ulus in te n s ity  
analogs. When a response can be made which w ill escape or avoid 
the  extensive costs  o f a  s t r ik e ,  i t  w il l  be re in fo rced . One 
i l lu s t r a t iv e  response would be supporting a negotia ted  se ttlem en t.
Although r e s t r ic t iv e  le g is la tio n  has been examined in  the 
p resen t an a ly sis  as a  conditioned response in  a  c la s s ic a l  defense 
conditioning paradigm, i t  could a lso  be p o te n tia lly  conceptualized 
as an avoidance or escape response analog. For example, i f  
le g is la tio n  disallow ed c o lle c tiv e  bargaining, the  pub lic  would be 
able to  avoid the  union which has acquired aversive c h a ra c te r is tic s  
based on i t s  a ssoc ia tion  with the  s t r ik e .  S im ilarly , i f  le g is la t io n  
disallow ed the  s t r ik e ,  presumably the s tr ik e  would be avoided. I t  
i s  in te re s t in g  to  note th a t labor re la t io n s  scholars have in c reasin g ly  
observed th a t le g is la tio n  banning s t r ik e  a c t iv i ty  i s  in e ffec tiv e  
( e .g . ,  W ellington & W inter, I 97I ) . Another way to  view the 
in e ffic acy  of s tr ik e  bans i s  th a t  they do not allow the public  to  
avoid the  s t r ik e .  As a  r e s u l t ,  a l te rn a te  responses are  made to  
attem pt the  escape from or avoidance of the  aversive s tr ik e  ( e .g . , 
a rb i tra t io n , th e  non-stoppage s t r ik e —Kassem & M utterer, I 97I)  u n t i l  
one response i s  successfu l in  e lim inating  the  aversive analog.
This type of t r ia l- a n d -e r ro r  behavior has been demonstrated in  
avoidance learn ing  experiments (M ille r, I 95I) when the  contingencies 
o f reinforcem ent are modified so th a t the  response (banning th e  s tr ik e  
or banning the  union) no longer avoids or term inates the  aversive 
stim ulus (the s tr ik e  or the  union which has acquired aversive
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properties  through i t s  association  with s t r ik e s ) .
The sp ec ifica tio n  of variab les  a ffec tin g  these and other 
imaginable responses which allow the ind iv idual to  escape from 
or avoid the noxious s tr ik e  or even th e  union which has acquired 
aversive c h a rac te ris tic s  are numerous (see, e .g . ,  Weiss, I 980) .
The examination of analogous variab les  and re la tio n sh ip s  might 
prove to  be a  f r u i t f u l  l in e  of inquiry  in  labor re la tio n s .
For the union members who are on the receiv ing  end of the  
harsh a tt i tu d e s , i t  can be predicted  th a t certa in  responses w ill be 
em itted which enable them to  escape or avoid these negative sentim ents, 
A steady increase in  the  r a te  of union d e c e rtif ic a tio n  has been 
reported ; and fu tu re  researchers and th e o r is ts  have been en treated  
to  proceed in  developing th eo rie s  and analyses which "w ill enable 
us to  b e tte r  understand the  m otivations underlying the  union 
d e c e rtif ic a tio n  process" (Dworkin & E x te jt , 1979, p , 24j ) ,
Learning theory can be of tremendous assis tance  in  such a development. 
I t  allows the p red ic tion  not only of the  m otivation behind the 
d e c e rtif ic a tio n  process ( e ,g , , escape from or avoidance of harsh 
a tt i tu d e s  or aversive s tim u li) and the  variab les influencing th is  
process, but i t  a lso  perm its the  p red ic tion  and explanation of 
the  process underlying the formation of the harsh a tt i tu d e s .
Conclusions
Support fo r  the  c la s s ic a l defense conditioning theory proposed 
in  th is  paper i s  su b s ta n tia l. The theory developed in  th is  paper
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which draws analogies between c la s s ic a l  defense conditioning and 
labor re la tio n s  in teg ra te s  a  su b s ta n tia l, d iverse body of l i te r a tu r e .  
In  add ition , a  myriad o f p red ic tions have been derived which are 
capable of leading fu tu re  in v estig a tio n s  in  the f ie ld  of labor 
re la tio n s  in  severa l o rig in a l d ire c tio n s .
Many ind iv iduals have discussed the  re la tio n sh ip  between 
s t r ik s s  and a t t i tu d e s , Eruger and Rodgers ( 1 9 7 8 ) fo r  example, 
noted an " in te re s tin g  im plication" of th is  re la tio n sh ip : "That
public  employees themselves help to  form public  opinion toward 
th e i r  own s tr ik e  behavior" (p . 275)• S im ilarly , according to  
R o tigel (1967) ,  John Dewey noted th e  capacity  of teachers to  "shape 
public  opinion through th e i r  lab o r a f f i l ia t io n "  (p . 21). Learning 
theory  brings out the  in te re s tin g  aspects o f th is  process and expands 
on i t  in  several unique and in tr ig u in g  paths.
Immerman (1973) s ta te d  th a t " the  question of employee m ilitancy 
in  government i s  of increasing  concern" (p. 98) .  Immerman fu r th e r 
observed a lack  of system atic in v estig a tio n s  concerning the 
a t t i tu d e s  toward pub lic  unions. As in  o ther f ie ld s ,  fo r  system atic 
in v estig a tio n s  to  proceed, th eo rie s  must be av ailab le  to  guide 
research  and in teg ra te  the  estab lished  re la tio n sh ip s  with o ther 
information in  the  f ie ld .  This paper has shown th a t  learn ing  
theory can f u l f i l l  these  functions. Learning theory can explain 
many ex istin g  fa c ts  and i t  can guide fu tu re  research  in  numerous, 
cap tivating  d ire c tio n s . The "question" o f employee m ilitancy , when 
investigated  with the guidance of a  theory and incorporated w ithin
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an elegant th e o re tic a l network, should become more p red ic tab le  and 
eQ )lainable and, in  tim e, more thoroughly understood.
16 0
Footnotes
1. Weiss (1963) has e laborated  on the  problem o f measurement 
o f non-physical stim ulus s im ila r i ty ,  recommending the  technique of 
m ulti-dim ensional sca lin g .
2. I t  should be noted th a t  public  opinion p o lls  o ften  survey 
respondents concerning a t t i tu d e s  about " labor unions" without 
requ iring  any d iscrim ination  between sp e c if ic  unions. Even in  
those cases in  which occupational categories are id e n tif ie d , th e re  
may be a  lack  of s p e c if ic i ty  necessary to  determine whether a  
d iscrim ination  has developed.
3 . For those in v e s tig a to rs  in te re s ted  in  labo ra to ry  sim ulation 
techniques, Spence ( I966) and Ross and Ross (l9?2) have emphasized . 
the  use o f masking ta sk s  to  con tro l the  p o te n tia l confounding of 
cognitive fa c to rs . These fa c to rs  could a f fe c t  the backward 
conditioning technique in  some, but not a l l ,  sub jec ts  (see Zeiner & 
G rings, I 968) , making th e  r e s u l ts  prone to  a  high degree of e rro r 
variance. Zeiner and Grings ( I 968) have used an a lte rn a te  technique 
th a t  might a lso  be employed fo r  con tro l purposes. This procedure 
involves separa ting  a  backward conditioning group in to  sub jec ts 
employing cognitive mediations and sub jec ts w ithout these  cognitions 
regarding the conditioned stim ulus (based on i n t e r - t r i a l  in te rv a l 
rep o rts  and post-experim ental in te rv iew s).
4 . I f  agreements a re  considered as negative ra th e r  than 
p o s itiv e  re in fo rce rs  ( e .g . ,  Byrne, I 969; Byrne & Clore, I 967; 
Lombardo, Libkuman, & Weiss, 19?2; Lombardo, T ator, & Weiss, I 972) ,
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then blocking should s t i l l  ensue as long as there  i s  no increase in  




The general approach denoted by Neal M ille r (1959) "extension 
of l ib e ra liz e d  S-R theory" was employed in  th is  paper fo r th ree  
d is t in c t  a reas o f management: (a) job redesign , (b) the  Hawthorne
s tu d ie s , and (c) a t t i tu d e  formation and change toward labor unions.
In the first application in this endeavor, job redesign was system­
atically examined from a learning theoretical perspective. Sources 
of drive that can be potentially introduced with a job redesign 
program were described and their effects on the behavior of employees 
were elaborately specified. The advantages of extending a wide 
variety of learning theoretical principles and paradigms was 
demonstrated; many specific predictions were generated and several 
existing facts in the literature were shown to be explainable by 
this elegant theory.
Next, several studies undertaken at the Hawthorne plant of 
the Western Electric Company were analyzed and shown also to be 
capable of being integrated by learning theory. Evidence taken 
from the reports of these classic studies was used to substantiate 
certain assumptions which were made regarding appropriate analogs
1 6 3
of learning theoretical variables. As with job redesign, evidence 
for several sources of drive in these studies was reported and the 
effects on the behavior of those involved in these respective 
studies were specified. Again, learning theory was shown to be 
capable of integrating many of the reported results of these studies. 
In addition, learning theory is capable of analyzing other "Hawthorne 
effect" types of situations. The specification of the critical 
variables involved in such a situation is important for field 
studies undertaken in several areas (e.g., educational psychology, 
organizational behavior, organizational development); learning 
theory permits this specification. Thus, Somner's ( I 968) plea 
for an understanding of the Hawthorne effect itself is assisted 
tiy the present learning theoretical analysis. Rubeck's (1975) 
conclusions regarding the absence of any involvement of the 
Hawthorne effect in research concerned with "higher levels of 
thinking involved in the process of reading" (p. 379) is also 
subsumable by this analysis. Such a conclusion can be justified 
by learning theory. In addition, the specification of appropriate 
techniques involved in the design of educational and other types 
of field research involving complex tasks could also be undertaken. 
For example, researchers would want to eliminate any evaluational 
cues and they should attempt to make the observation and measurement 
of crucial dependent variables as unobtrusive or neutral as possible. 
If evaluational cues were present, rather than a "Hawthorne effect" 
(e.g., increased productivity) one might observe, instead, a
debilitation of performance, a high error rate, etc.
In the third application of learning theory, attitudes 
toward labor unions were analyzed. Classical defense conditioning 
was used as a model to predict and e%p)lain the effects that a 
strike (as an unconditioned stimulus analog) can have on both 
attitudes and legislation. A large body of literature was 
explained by this theory; in addition, several heretofore unexamined 
predictions were derived. These predictions were rigorous and 
precise, allowing future research in this area to be guided in a 
unique and systematic direction.
There is no reason to believe that the three research areas 
examined in this paper are unique in their ability to be integrated 
by learning theory. Learning theory can potentially be a fruitful, 
heuristic device for other areas of management as well. There are 
no guarantees that such a strategy will always be successful.
There is no reductionist philosophy inherent in this strategy that 
implies that it must. However, the successes of extending 
learning theory to management demonstrated in the present paper 
are encouraging for future endeavors.
Berger and Lambert ( I 968) noted learn ing  th e o ry 's  a e s th e tic  
power based on the  "su rp ris in g  're d isc o v e rie s ' of i t s  lo re  in  
strange em pirical places" (p. 161). Some o f these  "rediscoveries" 
have been previously noted fo r  a  wide range o f so c ia lly  r ic h  to p ic s . 
Although Berger and Lambert were re fe rr in g  to  learn ing  th e o re tic a l  
app lications to  so c ia l psychology, i t  i s  the  te n e t o f th i s  paper
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th a t  many research  areas o f management could be s im ila rly  benefited  
by the  ap p lica tio n  of learn ing  theory . The extension o f  learn ing  
th e o re tic a l  p r in c ip le s , when appropria te , could permit p rec ise  
t^ o th e s e s  to  be p red ic ted  and known re la tio n sh ip s  to  be e:q>lained. 
As a  r e s u l t ,  a  guidance to  research  would be made p o ssib le , and 
organized, in teg ra ted  knowledge would become fe a s ib le . These 
p o te n tia l outcomes o f such an endeavor are  worthy indeed!
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